PLURALISM AND PARTY TRANSFORMATION IN LEBANON

AL-KATA'IB, 1936-1970

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

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JOHN P. ENTELIS

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LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1974

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With II Tables and 3 Charts



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To my Parents
and
à Françoise

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PREFACE

Purpose

This study is a micropolitical analysis of the Lebanese *Kata'ib* Party (LKP)—the largest, best organized, and most effective political organization in contemporary Lebanon. Its primary purpose is to describe and analyze the party's transformation from an elitist, all-Christian, para-military youth movement into a modern and relatively interconfessionally and interregionally represented political party. This will lead to an investigation of internal structural, ideological, and human characteristics as well as electoral and governmental performances within the Lebanese system. The nature of systemic change and the Kata'ib's response to that change as reflected in its system challenging and system maintenance functions will be explored in detail.

The emphasis here will be on internal developmental processes and external responses to systemic change. This study is not intended as a definitive history of the LKP nor a chronologically detailed account of all its political activities. Nevertheless, as the first major study of the Kata'ib there is the unavoidable need to concentrate upon describing very particular details. This of course does not permit the testing of generalizations by reference to several political parties either within a single country or across national boundaries. It is the belief of this author, however, that before meaningful systematic theory building can occur we must begin to fill the informational gap currently characterizing the study of comparative politics. Filling the existing gap requires attention to segments of political systems usually in the form of microanalytical case studies. By presenting greater quantitative and qualitative data about a significant segment of a developing polity this study hopes to contribute to the kind of empirical foundation necessary if intelligent theorizing about political systems, modernization, and social change is to take place.

Note on Transliteration

With the exception of commonly accepted Anglicized names such as Lebanon, Beirut, Tripoli, Nasser, etc., all Arabic names have

been transliterated according to the system adopted by the Library of Congress ("Arabic Transliteration," Bulletin No. 49, November, 1958) excluding the use of diacritical marks which have been omitted except for *hamzah* (ʼ) and *ʻayn* (ʻ). Varient forms of Arabic transliteration as they appear in direct quotation have been left in their original. Also left untouched are source citations which use a French system of tranliteration. Thus, a reference such as Pierre Gemayel, "Mouvement et école", would remain as is although throughout the text and in transliterated Arabic materials by the same author the name would appear as Pierre Jumayyil. All translations of French and Arabic materials are those of the author.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study would not have been possible without the encouragement, assistance, and support of two of my intellectual mentors, Professors I. William Zartman and R. Bayly Winder, both of New York University. By their constructive criticisms and constant search for intellectual rigor they have shown the way and I thank them.

A large number of people provided generous assistance in facilitating my field work in Lebanon. In particular I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the late Maurice Jumayyil, Pierre Jumayyil, Joseph Saʻadah, Elias Rababi, Elham Rizq, Samir Ishaq, Karim Pakradouni, Antoine Najm, Joseph Abu Khalil, Joseph Hashim, ʻAdil Yaqub, and Professors Ralph Crow and K. S. Salibi. The two anonymous readers of the manuscript made invaluable suggestions for its improvement much of which I wisely heeded. Phyllis Goldberg typed the manuscript with typical excellence, efficiency, and punctuality. No author could have asked for more.

Permission to reprint a number of previously published although slightly revised articles was graciously granted by the Middle East Institute, publisher of the *Middle East Journal*, Cambridge University Press (*International Journal of Middle East Studies*), Hartford Seminary Foundation (*The Muslim World*), and *Middle Eastern Studies* under the editorship of Elie Kedourie of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Financial support for this study, from its initial research stage through its writing and final revision phases, was made possible through grants from the Fulbright-Hays Graduate Fellowship

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To my parents, Stanley and Charlotte Entelis, and my wife, Françoise, I dedicate this book. They all have been, each in their own way, an indispensable part of my personal, emotional, and intellectual growth and for that, and much more, I am deeply appreciative.

INTRODUCTION

Lebanon is a pluralistic confessional society; a society characterized by sharp cleavages between different sectarian groups. It is not a pluralistic society on the "democratic" model, however, where pluralism is conceived as a "dispersion of power between groups which are bound together by crosscutting loyalties, and by common values..."[1] This "equilibrium" model of democratic pluralism presupposes cultural homogeneity and an integration resting on "common values and common motivation at the individual level, and on the functional relations of common institutions at the social level,"[2] of which only the latter is present in Lebanon.

Nor, on the other hand, does Lebanese pluralism resemble the "conflict" model of plural society where "internally autonomous and inclusive political units [are] ruled by institutionally distinct numerical minorities."[3] According to leading proponents of the conflict theory, especially J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith,[4] "plural" societies—as opposed to "pluralistic-democratic" societies—are characterized by dissensus and conflict between sub-national groups. Such a system can only be maintained, it is argued, by domination, regulation, and force; that is, society is integrated by force, by the monopoly of power in the hands of one section of society.[5]

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[1] Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.), *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 3.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 14; for an elaboration of this approach see, for example, William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960) and Edward A. Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (London: Heinemann, 1956).

[3] J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 304. Furnivall defines plural society as "...a medley [of people]... [who] mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit." (p. 304).

[4] See, for example, M. G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965) for the best exposition of this approach.

[5] For details see Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration," in Kuper and Smith (eds.), *Pluralism in Africa*, pp. 67-81.

While recognizing the diversity of religious, socioeconomic, and political affiliations, confessional pluralism organizes political parties, educational systems, and voluntary associations along the lines of sectarian or confessional cleavages. Thus, although cultural homogeneity is lacking and sub-national groups coexist in an almost constant state of tension if not open conflict, Lebanese society has managed to produce satisfactory institutional mechanisms through which sectarian and ethnic interests find legitimate expression thereby minimizing the potential for broad-scale systematic conflict.

Existing representative institutions like the Chamber of Deputies, the cabinet, and political parties are less the outcome of a genuine democratic "spirit" than the adoption of a pragmatic attitude to an otherwise inevitable conflict situation. Confessional pluralism would probably resemble the conflict model if in fact a single ethno-confessional group predominated. Instead the society is made up of numerous minorities none of which can by itself integrate the society by force or monopolize power at the expense of other sub-national groups.

In many ways confessional pluralism resembles Lijphart's model of consociational democracy which he defines as a democratic system "with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism and instability which [is] deliberately turned into [a] more stable [system] by the leaders of the major subcultures."[1] For consociationalism to work a high degree of inter-elite cooperation has to exist based on an ability to (1) reconcile competing interests and demands of the subcultures, (2) transcend cleavages and cooperate with elites of rival subcultures, (3) accept and work towards the maintenance of the system, and (4) recognize the dangers inherent in a fragmented system.[2]

Concomitantly at the mass level Lijphart recommends the existence of distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures. This, he asserts, has the advantage "of limiting mutual contacts and,

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[1] Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies*, 1 (April, 1968), p. 20.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 22 and Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, XXI (January, 1969), p. 216. Cf. Timothy M. Hennessey, Edward E. Azar, and James McCormick, "Lebanese Consociational Democracy: Sources of Transformation" (paper presented at the fourth meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Columbus, Ohio, November 5, 1970).

consequently, of limiting the changes of everpresent potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility."[1]

Over the years Lebanese elites have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for minimizing inter-sectarian conflict although they have been less successful at sustaining, both formally and informally, inter-elite cooperation. At the mass level Lebanese society exhibits clear subcultural cleavages which, while helping to limit short-term contacts and antagonisms, actually works to perpetuate, over the long-run, interconfessional divisions thereby making difficult the establishment of a future national consensus.

While confessional pluralism satisfies the almost unique conditions of Lebanese society it does not necessarily make for an enduring stability. In fact Lebanese stability is precarious and ever threatened by sharp cleavages between the different plural sections whose relations to each other are generally characterized by inequality. Its confessionally heterogeneous population, while sharing a significant historical, linguistic, and cultural heritage, lacks a sense of corporate consciousness. The absence of a national consensus is compounded by a disequilibrated system which in recent years has undergone rapid although uneven socio-economic change. Regionally Lebanon has been the envy of its Arab neighbors who have sought, at various intervals in its post-independence history, to alter its essential character through subversive if not violent means. Thus the pressures of rapid social mobilization and the threats of regional coercion have added another dysfunctional element to an already fragmented political culture.

The most remarkable aspect of the Lebanese system, given the nature of these internal cleavages and external strains, has been its capacity to survive within a relatively stable framework, guarantee basic democratic freedoms for all sub-national groups, and modernize (socially and economically more than politically) without radically disrupting the essentially traditional structure of society.

Survival and Stability

The system's capacity to survive within a relatively stable framework has been attributed to a "complex balance of power among the several traditional groups."[2] According to this approach the system

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[1] Lijphart, "Typologies," p. 25.

[2] Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (January, 1969), p. 247.

contains various "autonomous power centers" bound together in relatively interdependent relationships making possible a "balance-of-power politics." This power balance is analogized to the classic international balance-of-power system: "in each case the possibility of any of the actors being eliminated is remote; in each case this fact is perceived by the actors." From this Michael Hudson concludes, correctly I believe, that "intergroup strife on a large scale is the most likely alternative to cooperation. Lebanese politicians therefore have exhibited an unusually high degree of responsibility in the absence of a controlling authority."[1] A multiple balance of power among the subcultures rather than a dual balance of power or a clear hegemony of one group is thus viewed as enhancing the chances for stability in a fragmented system.

This balance of power does not imply a collective acceptance of common values and beliefs but only a basic willingness to adhere to the system's few primitive rules of the game, the essential one being: Lebanon should be neither fully Arab-Islamic nor fully Western-Christian. Any actor within the system seeking to achieve either extreme threatens the overall stability of the state. Thus, while major instances of systemic violence have been avoided, a pattern of regularized sub-systemic instability and chronic minor crises has developed, usually more as the outcome of perceived rather than real attempts at system transformation.

For the most part the system has prevailed because its major actors have found it in their common interest to support a partially satisfactory system rather than one totally unsatisfactory or totally transformed. Hence the existence of a "negative consensus;" a minimal interconfessional and intercommunal concurrence on what the state should not be or do.

Aside from the system's basic rule a wide variety of conflicting ideologies, belief-systems, cultural orientations, and political preferences are permitted to coexist and compete within the system. Thus while almost everyone plays the "survival" game and adheres more or less consistently to its rules, few play the "democracy" and "modernization" games according to common sets of regulations or norms. In such an inherently conflict situation it is not unusual for actors to assert the primacy of their ideological orientations without necessarily transgressing the system's basic rule. However, when

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

that fundamental rule appears on the verge of being abrogated, as it has so often seemed in the post-1967 period, the system's "balancers"—the military, the more efficacious political parties in the establishment, and relevant political elites—manage to restore, if only temporarily, the system's fragile balance.

Democracy in a Plural Society

In a plural society like Lebanon it might be expected that the dominant elites or best organized and efficient groups would seek to impose, by force if necessary, a general acquiescence of the existing system. This has not occurred for two reasons: a traditional acceptance of communal autonomy involving a "recognition of communal differences and an understanding of the norms of intercommunal relations"[1] by the majority of the population, and the failure of assimilationists to organize and mobilize the masses in effective opposition to the pluralists' conception of national integration.

This dichotomy is reflected in the ideological division of the state. On the one hand there exists a wide variety of modernistic, pan-Arab, socialist, and revolutionary forces who seek the elimination of all communal differences on the basis of a common acceptance of a rational, secular, socialist, Arab state. Assimilationists seek the abolition of the tradition of confessional and ethnic autonomy and seek instead a system of horizontal integration which reduces the "distinctive characteristics of ethnic [and confessional] groups by obliterating the particular, and superimposing characteristics which mostly stand for the dominant group."[2]

Pluralists, on the other hand, have emphasized the need for some form of vertical integration whereby each community conscious of its ethno-sectarian[3] distinctness is permitted a place in the national government, a "recognition of its political and other rights, and

[1] Iliya F. Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3 (July, 1972), p. 315.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

[3] A. Hourani defines ethnic groups as "...communities of which the members have shared a historical experience long and profound enough to give them a significant degree of identity: in language, and all that is bound up with it, in modes of thought and feeling..." Albert Hourani, *A Vision of History: Near Eastern and Other Essays* (Beirut: Khayats, 1961), pp. 72-73.

responsiveness on the part of the government to the community's needs."[1] This mode of integration emphasizes adjustment of community life to the central government. Where horizontal integration "seeks to apply pressure on the community for social adjustment, vertical integration tolerates social distinctiveness with political adjustment in the system as the primary task, allowing social integration to take its natural and slow course."[2]

In order to preserve the cultural heterogeneity of Lebanese society pluralists have obtained recognition of the legitimacy of communal identification and organization within the broader confines of the state. That is, if a plural society is to remain viable it must seek to safeguard the legitimate needs and interests of each group and to promote the harmony that is necessary in relations between the groups and in community life. This, in fact, is the democratic problem in a plural society: "to create political institutions which give all the various groups the opportunity to participate in decision-making..."[3]

Confessionalism is the Lebanese response to this democratic problem in a plural society; it is the institutional means by which the system's sub-national groups are permitted legitimate representation in the state's political, governmental, and administrative structures in relative proportion to their numbers based on the sectarian breakdown as revealed in the last "official" census of 1932.

For nearly three decades confessionalism has guaranteed the democratic rights of communal and ethnic groups. As such it has been functional to the maintenance of the system. Not all, however, have shared this belief in the functionality of confessionalism. Many organized, semi-organized, and independent elements of essentially leftist coloration and pan-Arab sentiment have denounced the parochial and traditional implications of confessionalism. Nevertheless, no viable alternative has been presented which can guarantee the democratic rights of the communities and yet enable an effective nation-state to develop.

Confessionalism's durability can in part be attributed to the paradoxical but nonetheless explainable condition which finds two essentially opposing political elements supporting a mutual prin-

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[1] Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution," p. 304.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 66-67.

ciple: traditional elites of all confessions whose power base depends upon the allegiance of sectarian client groups, and genuinely democratically-inspired and modern political organizations who seek an evolutionary form of social integration based upon the legitimate recognition of confessional interests.

Modernization in a Plural Society

Developmental theorists have often argued that modernization is difficult where predominantly ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse social patterns prevail. A modern society, it is argued, must possess most if not all of the following characteristics:

> (1) Predominance of universalistic, specific, and achievement norms; (2) High degree of social mobility (in a general—not necessarily "vertical"—sense); (3) Well-developed occupational system, insulated from other social structures; (4) "Egalitarian" class system based on generalized patterns of occupational achievement; (5) Prevalence of "associations," i.e., functionally specific, non-ascriptive structures.[1]

This generally accepted sociological model of modern society implies that political change must involve a "transfer of loyalties from primordial allegiances to secular and ideological commitments."[2] The process of transformation from "traditional" to "modern," from "primordial" to "civil," however, is not so clear cut, since two motivating forces animate the peoples of the new states.[3] The first is a search for identity, "a demand that that identity be publicly acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of the self...;" the second is practical: "it is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice..."[4]

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[1] F. X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 71.

[2] Samir Khalaf, "Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 4 (April, 1968), p. 263; for a criticism of the unilinear and pro-Western bias of recent studies on political development see I. William Zartman, "Morocco," in *Political Modernization in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Conference, 1966), pp. 25-26.

[3] Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 108.

[4] *Ibid.*

Although interrelated both motives are basically different, stemming from different sources and responding to different pressures. The resulting tension is one of the major factors obstructing national evolution in the new states.

In Lebanon traditional attachments remain deeply rooted in the society. Nonetheless it has managed to develop effective social and economic institutions and today is one of the most socially and economically advanced countries in the Arab world. Not unlike other transitional societies modernization in Lebanon "does not mean destroying the old but simply adding the new."[1] Thus the Lebanese preference for adaptive change which finds primordial loyalties competing equally with secular attachments without necessarily inhibiting modernization.

Given Lebanon's historical record of synthesizing varied and often contradictory socio-cultural patterns, it is not surprising to find political modernization and the persistence of primordial ties existing in symbiotic relationship. Given its pattern of development it is extremely doubtful that Lebanon will ever be a duplicate of a "rational, secular and egalitarian society based exclusively on achievement-oriented and universalistic criteria."[2]

If anything, the Lebanese experience has demonstrated that an accommodative attitude toward parochial interests can actually accelerate national integration, enhance the legitimacy of the political system, and maximize the possibility of peaceful adjustment of social conflicts. Moreover, the adaptive elements of Lebanon's modernization process have helped to cope with internal tensions and discontinuities resulting from rapid social change. Sometimes enhancing the system's tension-reducing capacities may be as important for future modernization as is its ability to absorb and generate change.

The Role of the Lebanese Kata'ib Party

The system's capacity to sustain political stability, guarantee democratic freedoms, and encourage a significant level of develop-

[1] Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization," p. 255; see also Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[2] Khalaf, "Primordial Ties," p. 244; see also Samir Khalaf, "Adaptive Modernization: The Case for Lebanon," American University of Beirut, December, 1968. (Mimeographed.)

ment will depend on the efficacity of organized political groups in promoting and legitimizing those beliefs, programs, and policies dedicated to maintaining the system—system maintenance process—while urging political and social change—system challenging process.

Given the primacy of the ethno-confessional principle and the legitimacy of its operation in the Lebanese pluralist society, legal and responsible political parties perform the important tasks of expressing and protecting communal interests while acting as institutional means through which interconfessional and interethnic conflict can be resolved. Moreover, with the gradual demise of the *za'im* (notable) as the traditional intermediary between citizen and government, parties have assumed the crucial political role of articulating and aggregating sectarian interests while making increasing use of the state's representative institutions to influence and determine public policy.

While parties remain as yet ineffective agents for a broadly-based consensual form of national integration their system maintenance and system challenging roles are slowly being recognized. The question then becomes which parties, groups, or political organizations are ready, willing, and able to assume the dual task of defense (system maintenance) and development (system challenging)?

It is the contention of this study that the Lebanese Kata'ib Party (LKP), by far the largest political party in contemporary Lebanon, is the most important and influential political organization in the country dedicated to preserving the system's essential physiognomy while concurrently encouraging meaningful forms of evolutionary or adaptive social change. There are many essentially Christian-populated political and para-political elements dedicated to a static form of political equilibrium whose support of the status quo is directed at maintaining existing structures and practices and thereby insuring stability at the expense of social change. The Maronite clergy, certain elements of the military establishment, entrepreneurial elites, Camille Sham'un's Liberal Nationalists Party (*al-Hizb al-Wataniyun al-Ahrar*), Raymond Eddé's (Iddah) National Bloc (*al-Kutlah al-Wataniyah*), and the Constitutional Bloc (*al-Kutlah al-Dusturiyah*) are prime examples of groups seeking to preserve their elite statuses in the face of pressing demands for visible forms of social and political change.

There are others, mostly Muslim and mostly of pan-Arab per-

suasion, who seek to modernize the state through radical action irrespective of the consequences to the system's stability and, by implication, to its democratic institutions. Many legal, semi-legal, and illegal political elements within contemporary Lebanon advocate a revolutionary form of social levelling in order to eliminate the socio-economic and political disparities existing in society. These range from the relatively innocuous *al-Najjadah* through the more dynamic Kamal Junbalat and his Progressive Socialist Party to the truly revolutionary political groups of both the right and left like the Syrian Social Nationalist Party or PPS (*Parti Populaire Syrien*), the Arab *Ba'th* Party, and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP).

This study suggests that the Kata'ib, more than any other single organization, has committed itself to the distinctly positive tasks of construction, change, and cooperation. No other legal political party has the same structural stability, ideological commitment, membership support, and coercive powers to influence government policy as the LKP. Even such technically illegal parties as the LCP, PPS, and Ba'th, all well-disciplined, hierarchically organized, ideological, and highly enthusiastic, lack grass-roots support among communal groups, are beset by chronic leadership problems, and are unable to compromise their dogmatic vision of political life with the particularistic configurations of local and national interests.

In many ways the Kata'ib is reflective of the society at large representing as it does both specific sectarian and multi-confessional interests. Specifically, the party serves several important functions: as the oldest and most effective Christian-dominated political organization in the country it is the major instrument for guaranteeing Lebanese-Christian interests in the state. Moreover, in times of political crisis the LKP becomes the focal point to which the normally fragmented Christian and minority communities coalesce for guidance, leadership, and protection. Likewise, the party seeks to challenge the system positively by various institutional and behavioral means although it is not beyond para-military action when it feels the state's interests directly threatened. More important, in spite of the predominance of a single ethnoconfessional membership, the Kata'ib is seeking to create a Lebanese nationalist image wherein the various sectarian groups would be permitted legitimate individual expression while giving political

allegiance to a strictly Lebanese as opposed to an Arab nationalist or pan-Syrian nation.

Finally, in Lebanon today the Kata'ib is virtually unique in adopting an instrumental approach to the problems of development and social change. It has not tried to destroy or control parochial loyalties and structures in the name of abstract socialist or trans-nationalist ideologies; instead, it has attempted to generate spontaneous popular support by adopting pragmatic policies that appeal to traditional sentiments and interests. The result is an adaptive interaction between modernity and tradition that fuses parochial and universal elements.

It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that one of the primary reasons why Lebanon has been able to endure the various internal and external strains imposed upon it, especially since 1958, has been the LKP's efficacy in combating Arab nationalist designs in Lebanon, propagating a common ideological identity, serving as a rudimentary but nevertheless real organization for political representation, and working to achieve social and political change through evolutionary means and within the general framework of Lebanon's socio-cultural heritage.

Part one ("Aspects of Lebanese Society: The Confessional and Identity Dimensions") will include a discussion of confessionalism and the problem of national identity in Lebanon. Chapter I ("Confessionalism: Its Genesis and Institutionalization") traces the historical genesis of the confessional principle and its eventual institutionalization as a political form in contemporary Lebanon. The attempt here is to present the already commonly accepted thesis that the history of ethno-confessional independence is not the exclusive product of the French colonial policy of divide-and-rule or of the self-interest policies of sectarian elites determined to maintain the confessional appearance of Lebanon and thereby deny its class consciousness,[1] but rather the result of long-developed historical processes which have been effective in regulating inter-communal relations and serving as the social basis for the operation of a viable political democracy. Chapter II ("The Problem of National Identity") investigates the major ideological orientations towards

[1] For a rather innovative but unconvincing argument of Lebanon's confessional pluralism as a "guise for class interests" see Suad Joseph, "Pluralism as a Guise for Class Interests: The Lebanese Case" (paper presented at the third meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, November 14-15, 1969).

Lebanon's national identity presently competing for public recognition and acceptance. The problems of stability, democracy, and development very much revolve around the conflicting interpretations of Lebanese nationhood. Until there is at least a viably minimal consensus on what the Lebanese state represents and stands for the prospect of future viability will always remain precarious.

Part two ("Party Transformation in Lebanon: The Lebanese *Kata'ib* Party") concentrates on the Kata'ib's internal development. Chapter III ("Al-Kata'ib Transformed: Some Historical Perspectives") describes specific historical themes concerning the party's growth: its transformation from a militant "boy-scout" movement to a full-fledged nationalist political party and its legitimization among the Lebanese masses. Chapter IV ("Belief-System and Ideology Formation in the Lebanese Kata'ib Party") analyzes the party's attempt to create a viable nationalist ideology as one partial means of resolving the identity dilemma. Its own internal belief-system will also be identified in order to better understand the nature of its ideological response and the full meaning of its social and political actions. Chapters V and VI ("Party Structure and Organizational Development" and "Membership Pattern and Party Leadership") are in-depth studies of the party's organizational structures, command channels, party membership, and leadership groups at the local, regional, and national levels. As the first study of its kind such an analysis is necessary for a fuller understanding of the party's evolutionary growth and potential as a mass-based inter-confessional represented nationalist party. Chapter VII ("Electoral Participation and Political Performance") presents a detailed analysis of one important institutional dimension of party transformation: the LKP's attitude towards and participation in Lebanon's principal representative structures—the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet.

Part three ("System Challenge and System Maintenance") begins with a brief introduction of the analytical and theoretical components of the system challenging and system maintenance processes. Chapter VIII ("Positive System Challenger") identifies the system challenging process and the conditions under which the LKP feels the need for effective response to unbearable strains originating either from domestic sources, external sources, or a combination of both. Examples of coercive, non-violent techniques of system challenge as well as instances where the use of force is

deemed necessary will be presented. Chapter IX ("System Maintenance: Dynamic") dichotomizes between intra- and extra-systemic efforts at dynamic system maintenance. Selected party programs and policies will be used to illustrate internal attempts at system maintenance while party policies towards Lebanese emigrants will be used to demonstrate extra-systemic efforts at dynamic system maintenance. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of system change and the LKP's inability to adapt fully to new circumstances precipitating the rather easy slippage from dynamic system maintenance to static system maintenance. The case study of the 1969 *fidayin* crisis and the Kata'ib's response to it makes up the concluding chapter (X: "System Maintenance: Static"). The study closes with a discussion of the kinds of options available to the LKP in its attempt to protect and promote the Lebanese political system.

PART ONE

ASPECTS OF LEBANESE SOCIETY: THE CONFESSIONAL AND IDENTITY DIMENSIONS

CHAPTER ONE

CONFESSIONALISM: ITS GENESIS AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The roots of confessionalism may be found in mid-nineteenth century feudal Lebanon and, more generally, in the whole pattern of Middle Eastern social organization as it has developed over the centuries. To get a better understanding of its development let us briefly review the genesis of confessionalism in its historical context.

The peoples of the Middle East are primarily divided acccording to religion. As Hourani observes, "[t]he primary divisions inside the Near East are, as they have been for over a thousand years, religious: whether a man is Moslem, Christian, or Jew, and which branch of the Moslem Christian, or Jewish community he belongs to."[1] Ethnic groups—"communities of which the members have shared a historical experience long and profound enough to give them a significant degree of identity"[2]—form the secondary division.

That sectarian and ethnic identities prevailed within an essentially Arab-Islamic state is attributed to the nature of the Islamic political community. Because they were recognized as "people of the book" (*ahl al-kitab*) Christians and Jews were allowed a certain degree of communal autonomy. Their status was that of *dhimmis*, free non-Muslim subjects living in the Islamic State who, in return for paying the capital tax, enjoyed protection and safety.

This practice was extended during the period of Ottoman rule when the non-Muslim peoples were recognized as separate religious communities of *millets* (Arabic: *millah*).[3] Each millet was in charge of regulating its communal life in accordance with its own religious law. It had authority to administer the property and institutions of its community and to decide on matters of personal status. By agreement with the dominant Islamic community each millet, represented by its ecclesiastical head, was accorded specific legal

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[1] Albert Hourani, *A Vision of History: Near Eastern and Other Essays* (Beirut: Khayats, 1961), p. 72.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

[3] See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 317-55.

recognition. The millet system was based on religious rather than ethnic, linguistic, or geographic identification. Thus, for example, all Jews in the Empire regardless of their province, origin, or linguistic group formed one millet.

As this system was gradually formalized it enabled the different religious communities to develop unhampered by threats of persecution or expulsion. At the same time, however, it created among the different sects exclusivist tendencies often leading to bitterness and suspicion between them.

For the religious sects or confessions consciousness of belonging to a religious community "was the basis of political and social obligation."[1] Each confession was well aware of not belonging to other communities. Inevitably this sense of communal distinctiveness fostered distrust not only between religious communities but also between sects of the same religion.

Because of its geographical make-up, with its two mountain ranges, Mount Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, Lebanon has traditionally served as a refuge for minority groups fleeing religious or ethnic persecution from neighboring lands. Throughout various Byzantine, Arab, Mamluk, and Ottoman conquests Lebanon's religious minorities,[2] organized into semi-autonomous communities, remained effectively independent of direct foreign rule.[3] Each community was established around its own lordly families with a *de facto* recognition of geographical areas where each sect predominated. So long as feudal chieftains managed to pay the necessary tribute to the Sublime Porte, which they did with the help of their *muqati'jis* whose functions included the collection of taxes,[4] there was little reason for direct Ottoman intervention into the political life of the mountain.[5]

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[1] A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 64.

[2] See Albert H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947) and Yusuf Ibish, "The Problem of Minorities in Syria" (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1951).

[3] Leila M. T. Meo, *Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 10-13. For a review of Meo see Stuart E. Colie, "Confessional Politics," *The Muslim World*, LVI (April, 1966), pp. 96-103.

[4] For details on the functions of the *muqati'jis* see Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 61-64.

[5] Meo, *Lebanon*, pp. 11-13.

By the early Ottoman period three elements in the structure of Lebanese society already existed: "the population, the system of lordship, the autonomy of the local rulers."[1] These elements, however, did not form an organic whole until the emergence of the *imarah* or princedom as the ruling institution in the early seventeenth century. The development of the imarah of Mount Lebanon was the result of a process of internal change wherein one of the lordly families—the Ma'nis—rose to supremacy over all other and was succeeded by its kinsmen, the Shihabis, after it became extinct in 1697.[2]

The imarah was the result of an alliance between the two major communities of the mountain: the Maronites, predominating in the north, and the Druzes, predominating in the south.[3] Although each community remained distinctly independent of the other in terms of its own social, religious, personal, and cultural affairs there was an accepted subordination to a single political authority. Significantly the first Ma'ni ruler, Fakhr al-Din II (1590–1635), had no recognizable religious identification—Sunnites, Druzes, and Maronites all claimed him for their own—and therefore his "claim to authority had no religious sanction."[4] In fact, the idea of the letitimacy of a confessional pluralism operating within a recognizable "national" framework can be traced to Fakhr al-Din "who first created a close and permanent union of a number of hitherto separate lordships, and gave them a leadership that most of them recognized and which had at its disposal a standing army and some kind of regular administration."[5]

When Shihabi rule began in 1711 the institution of the imarah remained unchallenged as the source of legitimate authority. The amir's authority was based on the joint support of other communal lords: Junbalat in the Shuf, Abi al-Lama'a in the Matn, Talhuq in the Gharb, and Khazin in Kisrawan.[6]

During the middle and late eighteenth century, however, this *iqta'* or feudal system of rule, defined as a "political system in

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[1] Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," in Leonard Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 15.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 16; see also Harik, *Politics and Change*, p. 30ff.

[3] Meo, *Lebanon*, p. 13.

[4] Hourani, "Lebanon," p. 16.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

which authority is distributed among a number of autonomous hereditary autocratic chiefs subordinate in certain political respects to a common overlord,"[1] was gradually being undermined. The seeds of dissension that were later to manifest themselves in bloody sectarian wars were sown throughout the eigthteenth century. In the empire itself the central government was progressively losing its control over the provinces. Administration, once known for its reliability, became corrupt and inefficient; the Janissaries, once the proud slave army of the sultan, loyal, disciplined, and impartial, lost these characteristics becoming "more dangerous to the Sultan than to his enemies, and more a threat to public order than the force which maintained it;"[2] and the provincial tax-collectors, previously serving as the network through which the central government controlled the countryside, became increasingly unreliable as they sought to establish an independent base of power in their own districts. Thus the eighteenth century witnessed the strengthening of communal loyalties as a consequence of this process of disintegration.

In the imarah itself the surface appearance of unity and freedom between Christians and Druzes belied an underlying conflict situation. Specifically, four tendencies were manifesting themselves in the latter half of the eighteenth century which were later to disrupt the unity of the mountain:

> (1) the spread of the Maronite peasantry southwards; (2) the increase in the power of their hierarchy; (3) the gradual transfer of Shihabi favor from Druzes to Maronites; and (4) ...the growth in influence of the great Druze families, Jumblatt and Bellama, through the extension of their control over the fertile lands of the Biqaʿ.[3]

In the last decade of Amir Bashir II's rule (1789-1840) the rift between Druze and Maronite communities expanded. Bashir's deliberate policy of favoring the Christian majority over the Druze minotiry, sometimes at the expense of impinging upon the heredi-

[1] Iliya F. Harik, "The *Iqtaʿ* System in Lebanon: A Comparative Political View," *Middle East Journal*, 19 (Autumn, 1965), p. 405; see also Harik, *Politics and Change*; cf. Antun Dahir al-ʿAqiqi, *Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1959) and I.Y. Ashour, "The Remnants of the Feudal System in Palestine, Syria, and the Lebanon" (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1946).

[2] Hourani, *Vision*, p. 40.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

tary privileges of Druze feudal families, gradually destroyed the precarious entente between the two communities. When the Junbalat wing of the Druze community began to challenge Bashir's authority the Amir turned to Muhammad 'Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, who, in 1831-32 had successfully conquered Syria and Lebanon, for political support and military protection.

Although Ibrahim's victory managed to strengthen Bashir and reimpose his authority it brought into question the whole legitimacy of the iqta' system. When Egyptian rule became oppressive, Maronites joined with Druzes in the revolt of 1840 against Shihabi rule. That uprising saw Anglo-Turkish forces intervene against the Egyptians and resulted in the subsequent banishment of Bashir.[1] The feudal system, which had served well Lebanon's multiconfessional society by subordinating sectarian distinctions to feudal interests and legitimizing political authority in the amir, was now virtually destroyed. Confessionalism was soon to take its place.

Social Disequilibrium and European Intervention

The immediate effect of the imarah's downfall was the increased sectarian division between Druzes and Maronites. Resentful of Maronite ascendancy and angered by Christian intrusion into the south the Druzes revolted in the mixed districts of the mountain in 1841. This led the major European powers to pressure the Ottomans into effecting a major realignment in the system of rule in the mountain.

In the first attempt to regularize directly the internal affairs of Lebanon the Ottoman authorities divided the country into two districts or *qa'im-maqamiyah*, one Druze and the other Maronite, governed by a district ruler (*qa'im-maqam*) who was appointed and could be removed by the pasha of Sidon, the Sultan's direct Ottoman representative in the coastal Levant.[2]

The institution of the double *qa'im-maqamiyah* was thus the first

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[1] William R. Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 140ff.

[2] Clyde G. Hess and Herbert L. Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," *Middle East Journal*, 8 (Winter, 1954), p. 12; K. S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 71; for a review of Salibi see A. Hourani, "Lebanon from Feudalism to the Modern State," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2 (April, 1966), pp. 256-263.

consecration of the confessional principle which was now legalized as the basis of the political structure of Lebanon. Each district governor was assisted by a *majlis* (council) "composed of a deputy kaymakam, a judge and an adviser for each of the Sunnite, Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic sects, and an adviser for the Shi'ites.'[1]

This system was only partially successful. Since neither district was completely homogeneous and most of the mixed areas remained unregulated, sectarian rivalries increased further aggravating political tensions. Between 1842 and 1845 the European Powers and Ottoman authorities sought to give legitimate expression to communal demands by establishing the office of *wakil* (authorized representative) in each of the mixed districts. These "sectarian agents" had jurisdiction over the interests of their coreligionists in the mixed districts.[2]

Because this new system of rule was based on religious equality and, in fact, required that political allegiances be given to the religious communities rather than the imarah or the Porte it was the first embodiment of the confessional principle in Lebanon. However, because it had no real institutional links, it was unable to stabilize sectarian differences. The imarah had no concrete replacement. Therefore, from 1840 to 1860, no legitimate authority regulated the political life of the mountain and, inevitably, no internal power could control the peasant revolts and religious massacres which erupted during the 1858-1860 period.

What had initially originated as a class struggle between an oppressed Christian peasantry and an uncomprising feudal elite eventually degenerated into a sectarian war. Thus, when the Maronite peasantry in the southern district of the Shuf rose against their Druze masters in 1860 they were viciously suppressed and many of them were massacred. This three-month long religious war resulted in the direct intervention of European and Ottoman powers and contributed to the further institutionalization of confessionalism.[3]

[1] Salibi, *Modern History*, p. 71.

[2] See *ibid.* and Hess, "Confessionalism."

[3] See Michel al-Ghurayyib, *al-Ta'ifiyyah wa al-Iqta'iyyah fi Lubnan* (sectarianism and feudalism in Lebanon) (Beirut: Matba'at Faris Sumayya, 1962); Edward Hunayn, "al-Ta'ifiyya fi Lubnan: Nash'aha wa Haqiqaha" (Confessionalism in Lebanon: Its origin and real meaning), *Muhadarat al-Nadwa* ("Les Conférences du Cénacle"), IV (May, 1950), pp. 101-124; and Edmond Rabbath, "L'Evolution du Confessionnalisme en Orient," *Al-Jaridah* (Beirut), February 5 and 6, 1953.

Effective and legitimate rule could no longer be restored from within once the double qa'im-maqamiyah had been discredited. Authority could now only be guaranteed by foreign presence. A new system of rule was introduced in 1861 when the *Règlement Organique* made Lebanon into an autonomous *sanjaq* (administrative district and subdivision of a *vilayet*). The June 9, 1861, protocol signed by the five major European powers—Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary—and the Sublime Porte created a district physically smaller than the Shihabi imarah and essentially equivalent in extent to the present-day district of Mount Lebanon, excluding the predominantly Muslim city-areas of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon as well as the Biqa'. A non-Lebanese, non-Maronite Christian *mutasarrif* or governor,[1] appointed by the Porte with the approval of the European powers, was authorized to administer the *mutasarrifiyah*. The organic statute also stipulated the establishment of a local administrative council (*majlis*) to assist the governor in performing his duties. The twelve members constituting this majlis were to be chosen from Mount Lebanon by the heads of each religious community.[2] Originally each community had two representatives to the majlis but an 1864 amending statute distributed council seats on the basis of confessional size roughly determined. Thus, four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunnite, and one Shi'ite made up the mutasarrif's advisory council.[3] Throughout the rest of the sanjaq's governmental structure communal representation permeated at all levels. Hence, "the principle of confessional allotment of seats within a given administrative or electoral district was founded."[4]

The basic assumption of this new system of government was that while all the confessions coexisted the Maronites were dominant. Most importantly, however, was the system's guarantee of separate confessional identities in the local administrative and representative councils of the state. Since no larger national or extra-national loyalties competed with parochial attachments, confessional re-

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[1] For a brief but competent description of the role and functions of the first *mutasarrif* see John P. Spagnolo, "Mount Lebanon, France and Daud Pasha: A Study of Some Aspects of Political Habituation," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2 (April, 1971), pp. 148-167.

[2] Hess, "Confessionalism," p. 14.

[3] Salibi, *Modern History*, p. 110.

[4] Hess, "Confessionalism," p. 14.

presentation ensured the integrity of Lebanon's pluralist system.[1]

The sanjaq's autonomy was abolished in October 1915 when the mutasarrifiyah was replaced by direct Ottoman rule. Following the Allied victory in World War One Lebanon came under French control. In 1922, through the League of Nations, France was awarded the mandate over Lebanon.[2] It was during over twenty years of French suzerainty that confessionalism assumed its elaborate and permeating hold over Lebanese government and administration. Whatever specific long-term objectives France might have had in encouraging a deliberate policy of divide-and-rule it almost became obligatory that confessionalism be further institutionalized once Greater Lebanon was formed on September 1, 1920. The incorporation of Sidon, Tripoli, the Biqa', and Beirut with their overwhelming Muslim populations into the state of Lebanon weakened what in the preceding fifty years had developed into a cohesive "national" unit in the Mountain under the recognized leadership of the Maronite Patriarch.[3]

The sanjaq's political, confessional, and social cohesion was now destroyed. While the new state became economically more viable it lost its social homogeneity. The creation of Greater Lebanon, by extending society's pluralism, necessitated the institutionalization

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[1] For critical interpretations of the confessional principle see Anis Sayigh, *Lubnan al-Ta'ifi* (Sectarian Lebanon) (Beirut: Dar al-Sira' al-Fikri, 1955) and Fayiz Sayigh, *al-Ta'ifiyya* (Confessionalism) (Beirut: Matba'at al-Thabat, 1947); for a descriptive analysis see P. Corval, "Raison et Fragilité de l'Equilibre Libanais," *Etudes Mediterranéennes*, 7 (Spring, 1960), pp. 97-105; for a highly critical interpretation of the concept of pluralism in Lebanon see Suad Joseph, "Pluralism as a Guise for Class Interests: The Lebanese Case" (paper presented at the third annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, November 14-15, 1969).

[2] The best study in English on the Mandate period is Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); also competent are Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, *Lubnan bayna Mushriq wa Mugharib, 1920-1969* (Lebanon between East and West) (Beirut, 1969), Nagib Dahdah, *Evolution Historique du Liban* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, third edition, 1968), Ahmad Mustafa Haydar, *al-Dawlah al-Lubnaniyyah, 1920-1953* (The Lebanese State) (Beirut: Matba'at al-Najma, 1954), George M. Haddad, *Fifty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950), René Ristelhueber, *Les Traditions Françaises au Liban* (Paris: Alcan, 1925), Raymond O'Zoux, *Les Etats du Levant sous Mandat Français* (Paris: Larose, 1931), and Abdallah Sfer, *Le Mandat Français et les Traditions Françaises en Syrie et au Liban* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1922).

[3] See Noel W. Spencer, Jr., "The Role of the Maronite Patriarchate in Lebanese Politics from 1840 to the Present" (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1963).

of confessionalism if political stability was to be guaranteed. With Maronite authority now diluted it was imperative that all confessions be granted legitimate political expression so that the new republic could remain viable.[1] Towards this end French authorities revived the former majlis and reestablished the entire governmental and administrative structure on a confessional basis.[2]

The May 24, 1926, French-inspired constitution, for example, specifically included an article insuring confessional equilibrium in government. Article 95, still in force today, reads: "As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministry, provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state."[3] Originally intended as a self-interest measure on the part of the French who claimed special status with Lebanese Christians, article 95 has come to be recognized as the legitimate expression of sectarian representation as historically developed.

Throughout the 1930's the implications of article 95 were worked out. In 1934, for example, the first Maronite president was elected (Habib Sa'd). Three years later the virtually unbroken line of Sunnite prime ministers was initiated. Later the Shi'ites established a claim to the speakership of the Chamber of Deputies.

Although never constitutionally explicated the practice of electing a Maronite president, Sunnite premier, and Shi'ite speaker has virtually achieved the status of law. It was reaffirmed in the *Mithaq al-Watani* (National Pact) of 1943. The Mithaq was "an unwritten agreement between some Christian and some Muslim leaders to accept the independence of Lebanon and preserve the communal system on condition that Lebanon follow a foreign policy truly independent of France and aligned to that of other Arab states."[4]

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[1] See, for example, Etienne de Vaumas, "La Répartition confessionnelle au Liban et l'équilibre de l'état libanais," *Revue de Géographie Alpine*, XLIII (1955), p. 597.

[2] See Halim Faris Fayyad, "The Effects of Sectarianism on the Lebanese Administration" (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1956) and Ralph E. Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (August, 1962), pp. 489-520.

[3] *The Lebanese Constitution: A Reference Edition in English Translation* (Beirut: Khayats, 1960), p. 33. For the Kata'ib attitude towards article 95 see Antoine Messarra, "La Repartition confessionnelle: permanente ou provisoire?" *Action*, XXII (December, 1964), pp. 35-40.

[4] Hourani, "Lebanon," pp. 27-28.

While the Mithaq's substance has never been publicly recorded the speech of prime minister Riyad Al-Sulh to the Chamber of Deputies on October 7, 1943 gives us the clearest indication of the Pact's objectives.[1] The principles he then elaborated included the following: "the number of seats in Parliament was to be distributed in such a way as to ensure a majority to the Christians. Also, the President of the Republic was always to be a Christian, while the Premier in the government was always a Muslim."[2]

Table 1
Population by Sects

Sects	*1932**	*1956+*
Maronites	227,800	423,708
Sunnites	178,130	285,698
Shi'ites	155,035	250,605
Greek Orthodox	77,312	148,927
Druzes	53,334	88,131
Greek Catholics	46,709	87,788
Armenian Orthodox	25,462!	63,679
Armenian Catholics	5,694!	14,622
Protestants	6,712!	14,365
Jews	9,981!	6,692
Syrian Catholics	2,675!	5,699
Syrian Orthodox	2,574!	4,798
Roman Catholics	———	4,506
Chaldean Catholics	528!	1,466
Others	6,301!	7,184
Totals	798,247	1,407,858

Sources: * = Etienne de Vaumas, "La répartition confessionnelle au Liban et l'équilibre de l'état libanais," *Revue de Géographie Alpine*, XLIII (1955), p. 582;
+ = *al-Nahar* (Beirut), April 26, 1956, based on figures from the Bureau of Vital Statistics;
! = A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 121.

[1] For the interpretation of the *Mithaq* by the Maronite president, Bishara al-Khuri, see *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyyat* (Lebanese Truths) (Harisa: Marba'at Basil Ikhwan, 1960-61).

[2] George Dib, "Selections from Riadh Solh's Speech in the Lebanese Assembly (October 7, 1943) Embodying the Main Principles of the Lebanese 'National Pact,'" *Middle East Forum*, 34 (January, 1959), pp. 6-7; also reproduced in Muhammad Khalil (ed.), *The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record.* Volume I: Constitutional Developments (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), pp. 105-109; see also Kamal Yusuf al-Hajj, *al-Ta'ifiyyah al-Banna'at aw Falsafat al-Mithaq al-Watani* (The builders of confessionalism or, the philosophy of the national pact) (Beirut: Matba'at al-Rahbaniyyah al-Lubnaniyyah, 1961).

It was thus during the period of the French Mandate (1920-1943) that the principle of communal representation was firmly institutionalized. The constitution, judicial laws, administrative statutes, the composition of the chamber, the presidency, electoral laws, and the cabinet were designed to maintain a confessional equilibrium.[1] According to the French-sponsored census of 1932 by which the confessional distribution of governmental and administrative positions are allocated, the Maronites constitute the largest sect (30%) followed by Sunnites (22%), Shi'ites (18%), Greek Orthodox (10%), Druzes (6%), and Greek Catholics (6%). (see Table 1)

Conclusion

These groups constitute the leading religious communities among Lebanon's seventeen "ethno-sects." Since no real sense of corporate consciousness or feeling of national solidarity exists on a cross-confessional basis the guarantee of democratic institutions and procedures in a pluralist society demands some form of political expression based on a relatively equal system of sectarian representation in government and administration. Such has been the role of confessionalism in contemporary Lebanon. Its long-term effectiveness, however, depends on the eventual creation of a viable Lebanese political community which can transcend but not necessarily destroy sectarian loyalties. The problem of what constitutes Lebanese nationhood and the various sectarian images of national identity have made the creation of a commonly-accepted Lebanese political community extremely difficult to achieve. Let us now turn to the different and competing images of Lebanese national identity.

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[1] For the Christian attitude towards confessionalism see Joseph Chader, "Confessionalisme libanais," *Action*, XIII (December, 1955), pp. 533-35 and Antoine Mouarbes, "L'Exploitation politique du sentiment confessionnel," *Action*, XVII (June, 1959), pp. 594-6; for an attack on this principle see Wafiq al-Qassar, "al-Ta'ifiyya wa Atharuha fi al-Wad' al-Lubnani" (confessionalism and its effect on the Lebanese situation), *al-Jaridah*, February 25, 1964 and Joseph Mughayzil, *Didda al-Ta'ifiyyah* (against confessionalism) (Beirut: Al-Nadi al-Thaqafi al-'Arabi, 1960).

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

During the mutasarrifiyah period confessionalism was successful in stabilizing political life in the Mountain. Characterized by a relatively high degree of social cohesion and an accepted predominance of Maronite rule, Lebanon was able to enjoy an extended era of systemic harmony. The creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and the rise of Arab nationalist consciousness in the post-Ottoman period, however, seriously disrupted the system's internal stability.

Confessionalism was an appropriate governing instrument so long as no broader or extra-territorial nationalist ideology competed for the loyalties of the Mountain's subjects. Now, with a large Muslim population incorporated against their will into a predominantly Maronite state, at a time when the concept of pan-Arab unity was beginning to emerge, existing communal cleavages were exacerbated while new levels of para-nationalist conflicts developed. Inevitably, opposing ideological orientations on the nature of Lebanese nationhood soon developed with their consequent strain on the system's stability. As Zuwiyya Yamak correctly observes: "The most immediate and urgent problem that faced the nascent state of Greater Lebanon in the 1920's was that of fusing its mosaic population into a politically viable and socially cohesive entity..."[1]

Several ideological perspectives concerning Lebanon's national identity have developed since the state's formal creation. Arab nationalists view Lebanon as an integral part of the Arab world ethnically, culturally, historically, and geographically. For the more extremist among them Lebanon can have no separate political identity except within a well-defined Arab framework.[2] Moderate pan-Arabists concede to Lebanon a certain ethnic and communal distinctiveness without, however, denying its essential Arab character.

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[1] Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 36.

[2] See Clovis Maksoud, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism," in Leonard Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 239-254.

Syrian nationalists also deny Lebanon's separate political existence, regarding it as a geographical and political anomaly. Only within its "proper" environmental context as historically developed can Lebanon have any viable meaning. Thus, pan-Syrians, especially the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, seek Lebanon's reintegration as a subordinate unit into the Syrian "nation."

Lebanese nationalists, on the other hand, regard Lebanon as possessing certain fundamental attributes which differentiate it from the rest of the Arab world and justify its independent status. Citing the Mountains's historical development, the unique mosaic pattern of its population, and its traditional role as a bridgehead between east and west Lebanese nationalists defend the state's separate existence. Some of the more zealous elements among them deny *any* Arab character to Lebanon preferring to associate its historical development to Phoenician or other Mediterranean-inspired ancestral roots. More moderate groups, however, are willing to accept a Muslim-Christian symbiosis so long as it does not imply a renunciation of Lebanese sovereignty.

Finally, there are those among both Christians and Muslims who seek to transform Lebanon either into a national homeland for Levantine Christians or have it included into a larger pan-Islamic federation. Neither "pure" Christian nationalism not Islamic fundamentalism, however, find much support in contemporary Lebanon.[1]

While these various nationalist orientations find mixed sectarian support, it may generally be said that most Sunni Muslims champion the cause of Arab nationalism while most Maronites adhere to one form or another of Lebanese nationalism.

Sunnite Perspectives on Lebanese Nationhood

Two important factors have determined Sunnite attitudes towards Lebanese nationhood: first has been the psychological frustration arising from loss of prestige and recognition. Having once held a privileged position under the Ottoman Empire, Sunnites resented

[1] For variations on these approaches see Zuwiyya Yamak, *SSNP*, p. 36; Leila M. T. Meo, *Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 64; and A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 133-134.

their minority status in Greater Lebanon. Their historically-dominant place in the Islamic world was abruptly altered in 1920 when the Sunnites "suddenly found themselves in an inferior position, treated almost as second class citizens."[1] Even after fifty years of incorporation within the Lebanese state this psychological crisis continues to determine the attitudinal response of Sunnites to their social and political environment.

The second determining factor influencing Sunnite attitudes is the concept of *'urubah* or Arabism.[2] 'Urubah is a semi-mystical term denoting the essence of being an Arab—"the sense of belonging to the Arab nation, the possession of Arabic as mother tongue, the fact of having been born an Arab in an Arab land, being a Muslim."[3] Implicit in the feeling and awareness of Arabism is unity or *wihdah.* Wihdah "involves political unity, but also the aspiration for a more profound unity transcending the merely political or economic." Moreover, Arabism "posits the indivisibility of the Arab nation; the longing for wihdah reflects the will to restore to wholeness what has been violated by history, adversity, and accident."[4]

Both 'urubah and wihdah constitute the fundamental components of Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyyah al-'arabiyyah*). This "nationalist" feeling has a profound psycho-ideological meaning to all Arabs and especially Sunni Muslims, while identification with Lebanese nationhood implies, in great part, a denunciation of 'urubah thereby severing the Muslim from the Arab *ummah* or Nation.

The practical implications of these two psychological conditions was best reflected in the strongly anti-Maronite, anti-Kata'ib manifesto published by the "Provisional Committee for the Permanent Conference of Moslem Organizations of Lebanon" on March 13, 1953. Entitled *Moslem Lebanon Today*, this pamphlet is an extreme example of radical Muslim thought but nevertheless represents certain dominant attitudes commonly shared by Lebanese Muslims.

The document purports to be a

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[1] Zuwiyya Yamak, *SSNP*, p. 40.

[2] See 'Abd al-Karim Dandashi, *Al-'Urubah fi Lubnan* (Arabism in Lebanon) (Damascus: Matba'at al-Jumhuriyyah 1957).

[3] Hisham B. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 96.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

> frank discussion of the struggle on the part of Lebanon's non-Christian majority to secure a proportionate voice in the government in order to work effectively for the abolition of state sectarianism in the interests of national unity and equality for all citizens.[1]

It begins by describing Lebanon as "an Arab republic carved from the coastal areas of Syria by the Allied powers of World War One in defiance of the expressed wishes of the vast majority of the inhabitants of this part of the Arab world who desired a united Arab nation."[2] The remaining section on Lebanon's "historical background" outlines French intervention on behalf of the Maronites and the subsequent division of Lebanon into an "artificial state composed of various religious communities."[3]

Part history, part fiction, and mostly propaganda this interpretation of Christian supremacy achieved through direct European intervention identifies the essential component of psychological discomfort characterizing the contemporary Sunnite community. That Lebanese Muslims consider themselves and are considered by others as socially backward, economically deprived vis-à-vis Christians, and are underrepresented in government are the result of a deliberate conspiratorial policy initiated by the French and later sustained by the Maronite Christians.[4] However distorted from reality this image may be it gives Muslims an explanation for their subordinate status and further justifies their withholding ultimate loyalty to what is conceived as an essentially Christian-dominated state.

The report concludes by accusing the Maronites of purposely seeking to destroy the Arab nationalist spirit among Lebanese Muslims in order to propagate the myth that Lebanon is a "Christian country."[5]

Besides ideological and psychological dissatisfactions there exist concrete socio-economic and political grievances further alienating an already disaffected community. Compared to Maronites and Christians in general the Sunnites are an economically less-advanced sub-national group who, rightly or wrongly, blame their

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[1] *Moslem Lebanon Today* (Beirut: n.p., 1953), p. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] For a more reasoned argument see H. al-Daftardar Madani and Muhammad 'Ali al-Zu'bi, *Al-Islam wa al-Masihiyya fi Lubnan* (Islam and Christianity in Lebanon) (Beirut: Matba'at al-Insaf, 1960).

[5] *Moslem Lebanon Today*, p. 15.

current status on the policies of Lebanon's Western-oriented, predominantly Christian ruling elite. It is thus not surprising that to this day the Sunnite masses display only a tenuous loyalty to Lebanon, its institutions, and national symbols.

Christian Perspectives on Lebanon's National Identity

The major determining factor conditioning the Christian's image of Lebanese nationhood has been the constant identification of Lebanon as a place of refuge, a territorial enclave serving to protect oriental Christians from Muslim attempts to subjugate and disperse them. According to the Christian frame of reference only in Lebanon can minority religious sects of the Middle East find protection, free of intimidation and persecution; this is the role Lebanon has traditionally played and one it should continue playing in the future.

As a minority people living in an Islamic state, usually on the fringes of its social life, sharing neither its responsibilities nor its rights, it is understandable that a "persecutionist" mentality would eventually develop among them. This, in essence, was the major unifying link among Lebanon's numerous Christian sects. And, although no homogenous nationalist attitude predominated among all of them, the Maronite community, as the largest and most powerful confessional group manifesting certain clearly identifiable patterns of community consciousness, initiated and inspired a generally acceptable nationalist ideology among the Christians and, to a much lesser extent of course, the Druze peoples of the Mountain.

The Maronite community has a historical self-consciousness and a keen sense of a common destiny. Unlike other confessional groups it views Lebanon as its one and only homeland. As Harik informs us the Maronite people are a national group reflecting "distinctive ethnic characteristics, a single religion, and a long history; for centuries they lived in one compact area and once had a distinct language (of which they kept some vestiges in their religious books) and memories up to the recent past."[1] They are also unique among the Christians of the Arabic-speaking world in that they are the only one of the many sects who can be considered a compact

[1] Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 128.

minority. Other Christian sects are spread out over larger areas and nowhere do they form groups more compact than a few villages. This difference is what makes the Maronites so self-conscious of their identity as a separate people.[1]

The roots of Maronite nationalism may be found in the sixteenth century although its essence emerged in the early and mid-seventeenth century under the intellectual stimulus of the Maronite hierarchy. According to one scholar who has studied their history closely the first coherent view of the values of the Maronite community was put forth by the Maronite bishop of Cyprus Jibra'il Ibn al-Qila'i (d. 1516).[2] According to Ibn al-Qila'i the Bsharri region of northern Mount Lebanon constituted the national home of the Maronites. Most of his writings and poetry, however, focused on the community, its traditions and history, and not on the nation or land of Lebanon. Moreover, what he and later Maronite chroniclers elaborated was not objective history but, rather, an exposition of the Maronite self-image.

Another Maronite clergyman, Istfan al-Duwayhi (1629-1704), emphasized in his historical writings the common Maronite theme "that the community's history is a continuous struggle to maintain national and religious identity in a dominant Muslim environment...,"[3] by which interpretation he sought to exploit the psychological impact of discrimination that the Maronite dhimmis were experiencing in the Ottoman Empire.

Up to the middle of the eighteenth century what most of these clergymen-qua-historians did was to identify and thereby distinguish the Maronite community and its relevant components from all other religious or ethnic communities. Thus, the Maronite worldview emphasized the community's "strong sense of ethnic unity" and took pride in its history and political integrity.[4] Throughout the literature the Maronite community is viewed by its intellectual elites as something separate and distinct from the imarah system.

It is only in the writings of the lay Maronite, Antonious Abi Khattar (1750-1820?), that the idea of linking the imarah's

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[1] See Noel W. Spencer, Jr., "The Role of the Maronite Patriarchate in Lebanese Politics from 1840 to the Present," (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1963), p. 104.

[2] Harik, *Politics and Change*, p. 128.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

importance to the Maronite community is introduced. He thus breaks with the ideological tradition of his clerical predecessors when he begins to describe Maronite history as coterminous with the imarah's history.[1] By making this linkage, Khattar was broadening the Maronite view of political community which, by including non-Maronite peoples, deemphasized the strictly ethno-religious character of Maronite-Lebanese nationalism.

This concept was refined by Bishop Niqula Murad (d. 1862) who was the first Maronite to stress the need for a unified political system in the Mountain and, thereby, the first Maronite to lay down the following modern Lebanese nationalist thesis: "the political unity of the whole of Mount Lebanon under the Imarah."[2] Unlike his predecessors Murad included large non-Maronite areas of the imarah as legitimate parts of the Maronite "nation." According to Murad this was justified inasmuch as the Druzes were "inferior" to the Maronites and thereby less qualified to govern and lead the state.

A secular Maronite writer, Tannus al-Shidyaq (1794-1861), introduced an altered interpretation shifting his emphasis from a strictly Maronite community to a Lebanese one. This pluralist approach sought the creation of a society geographically and politically united. Thus, Shidyaq viewed geographic Lebanon in two ways: "one as a national homeland, the other as the geographic limits of the Imarah."[3] As an essentially secular political outlook Shidyaq's synthesis found limited appeal among Maronite nationalists of the period. Probably the writings of Yusuf Karam (1823-1889), who stressed the independence of Lebanon and the supremacy of the Maronites, reflected more accurately the political temper of the Maronite community. In any case, Maronite nationalism, in its later developed form, equated political Lebanon with the Maronite community; one was inseparable from the other.[4]

Throughout its development Maronite nationalism was closely related to the idea of Western especially French protection and association. Trained abroad in Catholic schools, clerical and lay Maronite elites transported Western ideas and influences back to

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-137.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 145.
[4] See Iliya Harik, "The Maronite Church and Political Change in Lebanon," in Leonard Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 38-39.

Lebanon which, for better or worse, determined the community's nationalist orientation as it related to non-Maronite Christians and Muslims. It was thus not surprising to have Maronites view Lebanon "not so much as the western frontier of the Arab East but as the eastern frontier of the Christian West..."[1]

This Maronite nationalism, apart from the psychological satisfaction it might have given the Maronite community, may have had a political rationale so long as Lebanon remained a relatively homogeneous social entity. But once this homogeneity was fractured, as it was in 1920, Maronite nationalism had little *raison d'être*. Moreover, after independence had been achieved and Western hegemony over the Arab world destroyed, the concept of promoting Lebanon as a national home for Levantine Christians became an untenable formulation. Thus the 1945 publication of *S.O.S.: The Lebanon, the "Christian National Home" of the Near East*[2] was the last open attempt to assert the supremacy of the Maronite nationalist ideology.

The birth of the League of Arab States with its implications of Arab unity and the withdrawal of French military presence from Lebanon and Syria in 1946 aroused fear and anxiety among Maronites and other pro-French Christians. *S.O.S.* was an attempt to involve the major world powers in the creation of a national home in Lebanon for all Christians in the Near East. This anonymous pamphlet warned of the dangers that would befall Lebanon if it were to become integrated into a larger Arab state wherein the Christian population would become a minority without significance or power. The brochure claimed for Middle Eastern Christians the right of having a home, as the Jews claimed for themselves, wherein they would have the right to live a free and independent life without feeling inferior.[3]

Although today the idea of creating a Christian homeland finds little expression among organized groups, attachment to Mount Lebanon and anxiety for maintaining its individuality have prompted some Maronite circles to demand a narrowing of the country's frontiers in order to better preserve it.[4]

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[1] Zuwiyya Yamak, *SSNP*, p. 36.

[2] *S.O.S.: The Lebanon, the "Christian National Home" of the Near East* (n.p., n. pub.: 1945?).

[3] See *ibid.*, passim; see also Francis Nour, "Particularisme libanais et nationalisme arabe," *Orient*, II (1958), p. 34.

[4] Raymond Eddé, for example, has traditionally represented this attitude. See

Two ideological offshoots of Maronite nationalism are the concepts of Phoenicianism and Mediterraneanism. The notion of tracing Lebanon's origin to ancient Phoenicia was first introduced in the writings of Shidyaq. Later it was used by Christian writers to emphasize the non-Arab character of Lebanon.[1] Mediterraneanism was similar in its intent since it sought to link Lebanon's physical and cultural origins to the Mediterranean basin, again as a means of distinguishing Lebanon from its Arab milieu. Both concepts found limited support among organized groups although much of their implications have been accepted by more militant Lebanese Maronites. These two intellectual movements, which found their greatest strength in the 1930's and 1940's, were directed at countering the Arab nationalist idea and Syrian nationalism and had few positive attributes with which to create a viable Lebanese nationalist ideology which could give Lebanese a coherent world view of themselves and their society.

Lebanonism or Lebanese nationalism,[2] especially as propounded by the Kata'ib, has attempted to fill this ideological void by presenting an essentially secular interconfessional (although with unmistakably strong Maronite roots) interpretation of Lebanese nationhood. It is not that the Kata'ib was the progenitor of the Lebanese nationalist concept in its modern form—Michel Chiha was probably the most original thinker on the subject[3]—but, rather, that it was the Kata'ib, as the largest and best organized political

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the 1947 pamphlet distributed by Eddé's National Bloc which states, among other things: "...Lebanon, the only Christian country in Asia, has for centuries been the home of a unique cultural and spiritual tradition, a land of genuine tolerance and freedom. Shielded by its mountain terrain, it has withstood the pressures of the outside world, preserved Christianity against the Moslem invasion of the seventh century and the all-encompassing Moslem world around it." George Akl, Abdo Ouadat, and Edouard Hunein (eds.), *The Black Book of the Lebanese Elections of May 25, 1947* (New York: Phoenicia Press, 1947), p. 3.

[1] Charles Corm was probably the leading contemporary exponent of this doctrine. See Charles Corm, *La Montagne Inspirée* (Beirut: n.p., 1964 [reprint of a 1934 publication]).

[2] See Maurice Harari, "The Dynamics of Lebanese Nationalism," *Current History*, 36 (February, 1959), pp. 97-101 and Pierre Rondot, "Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 3 (July, 1968), pp. 37-51.

[3] See, for example, Michel Chiha, *Liban D'Aujourd'hui* (Beirut: Editions du Trident, 1949); "Lebanon at Home and Abroad," *Les Conférences du Cénacle*, XX (1966), pp. 15-170; and "Le Liban dans le monde: perspectives d'avenir," *Les Conférences du Cénacle*, V (December, 1951), pp. 256-282.

group in Lebanon, which adopted, refined, and then propagated Lebanonism as its primary ideological doctrine.[1]

The Identity Dilemma Defined

How can these competing ideological orientations concerning the nature of Lebanese nationhood be reconciled so as to enable a communally segmented society to develop socially, economically, and politically within an essentially democratic framework?

The mithaq al-watani managed to resolve only part of this identity dilemma. It was, in fact, a pragmatic arrangement which, by establishing coexistence rather than conflict as the basis of relations between the religious communities, discouraged the rise of irrational confessionalism and, consequently, prevented the possible dissolution of the state. Nevertheless, the mithaq was not meant as a long-term formula for national unity; rather, it was a temporary accommodative measure by which conflict could be minimized.

By identifying what Lebanon was not—neither fully part of the Western world nor fully part of the Arab world—it consecrated the notion of a negative consensus; that is, national concurrence on what the state should not be.

While the mithaq was an effective political measure it was manifestly unable to resolve the more serious national and communal cleavages which arose in the decades following independence. If Lebanon was not to be dissolved some form of national identity had to be created which could bring together culturally and socially discrete groups.

In Search of Political Community

Since basic loyalty to the national community is far weaker than the traditional set of loyalties, the problem then becomes whether, and how, a sense of joint citizenship and of Lebanese nationhood, based on common values, can be created, strong enough to counterbalance the centrifugal forces in the communities. This problem, of course, is not unique to Lebanon. Throughout most of the

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[1] See "Le Libanisme, une doctrine," *Action* (December, 1956), pp. 1134-1139 and Jacques Nantet, "Le Patrimoine libanais: aspect historique," *Action*, XXVI (January, 1967), pp. 60-65. The meaning of Lebanese nationalism as interpreted by the Kata'ib will be discussed in detail in chapter four.

developing world the basic problem facing the young nation-states involves

> the need to induce loyalty to the nation and to ensure that loyalties to subnational groups do not lead to distintegration of the state. The political actors must share a consensus on the "rules of the game," a consensus that will mitigate intense group conflict and encourage citizens to support the national regime.[1]

In Lebanon, however, the dichotomy between the need for unity and the fissiparous impact of communal and ethnic consciousness is compounded by a further problem: the strong psychological attachment of a significant number of Lebanese Muslims to a pan-Arab nationalist identity. Thus, among the Muslim masses essentially two sets of loyalties prevail: primordial loyalties which find practical expression in the sectarian community, and trans-national loyalties which find expression in the concepts of ummah, ʿurubah, and wihdah. Communal attachments serve not only parochial needs but may also serve the daily demands of support, stability, and services which communal chieftains can provide. By so doing the dependence upon the central authorities is minimized, further weakening the link between individual and state, and lessening the chances of creating a unified national state. Trans-national attachments satisfy psychological needs since they stress the Arab and Islamic components of the Muslim's identity. For most Maronite Christians, however, Lebanon remains the superordinate political symbol to which they identify. Chart 1 illustrates the competing patterns of socio-political loyalties.[2]

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[1] Charles F. Andrain, "Democracy and Socialism: Ideologies of African Leaders," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 166.

[2] Cf. John Gulick's 1955 study of the Greek Orthodox village of al-Munsif. He suggests there that the individual is involved in six concentric spheres of association: the family, the lineage, the village, the nation, the sect, and the linguistic group. See John Gulick, *Social Structure and Culture Change in a Lebanese Village* (New York: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc., 1955), p. 163. A similar ranking was found among students of the American University of Beirut who ranked the family first, followed by the ethnic group, the religion, citizenship, and the political party. See Levon Melikian and Lutfy N. Diab, "Group Affiliations of University Students in the Arab Middle East," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 49 (1959), pp. 145-159.

Chart 1
Hierarchy of Sectarian Loyalties

Christians				Muslims
E&M	----→	Ummah	←——	E&M
E&M	——→	Lebanon	←oooo ←----	E M
E M	oooo→ ----→	Secular Organizations*	←oooo ←----	E M
M&E	——→	Sectarian Community	←——	M&E
M&E	——→	Family	←——	M&E

Key: E = elites; M = masses; ----- = weak attachments; xxxxx = moderate attachments; ——— = strong attachments; this paradigm does not distinguish between symbolic and substantive attachments.
* = includes political parties, labor unions, voluntary associations, etc.

There are four possible ways this dilemma may be resolved: (1) the assimilationist pattern of revolutionary-socialist Arab states which entails the elimination of the distinctive cultural traits of minority communities and the substitution of some kind of overarching Arab nationalist culture. (2) Separatism as advocated by an increasing number of dissatisfied Christian elements, especially Maronite. Disillusioned and disgusted with Lebanon's current political direction these groups have privately called for the separation of predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon from the remaining parts of Lebanon and the subsequent creation of an autonomous, Western-inspired, Western-supported, and Christian-dominated state. Towards this end the Maronite patriarch and his close supporters, both lay and clerical, have threatened to revive the independence of the former sanjaq of Mount Lebanon. (3) A third alternative is a policy of segregation. Among many of Lebanon's traditional zu'ama' remains a strong desire to avoid any form of meaningful integration or, on the other hand, the dismemberment of the state, both of which would eliminate their political dominance over a traditional clientele group. (4) A final alternative is a plura-

list pattern of vertical integration wherein national rather than trans-national loyalties would be established without eliminating sub-national cultures. In the latter, the primary effort would thus be directed at creating a sense of territorial nationality overshadowing but not necessarily destroying subordinate parochial loyalties, and a definition of national community which will not only identify the Lebanese to himself but also provide canons of behavior for responding to his environment. The task thus becomes to accommodate the particularism of sect with a definition of community that is compatible with the dictates of the modern world. This implies that political unity and cultural diversity can simultaneously be established as the foundation for a modern state. This is possible in a society where no single sectarian or ethnic group dominates. The first alternative is advocated by Arab nationalists, the second and third by neo-feudal elements, and the last by the Kata'ib.

The problem of creating a viable political community is essentially a problem of consensus. Consensus is viewed in a pragmatic way by the LKP; that is, a basic consensus can only be established by maximizing integrative values through the interplay of individual and group interests rather than by avoiding conflict and competition either through coercion or exhortation. Thus, the establishment of a viable national identity must fuse together culturally disparate groups into a single territorial unit while concurrently preserving a plural society in which each group's self-conscious cultural qualities are allowed free expression.

Until such an identity is achieved, however, confessionalism seems destined to continue operating. As Zeltzer correctly points out, "formal abolition of [confessionalism], without supplanting it by a higher social order, would lay the state open to abuses by communities bound to be strengthened from outside in undermining the foundations of the state."[1]

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[1] Moshe Zeltzer, *Aspects of Near East Society* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), p. 82.

PART TWO

PARTY TRANSFORMATION IN LEBANON: THE LEBANESE KATA'IB PARTY

CHAPTER THREE

AL-KATA'IB TRANSFORMED: SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

It is now time to turn to the Kata'ib. This part of our study will essentially concentrate on a single political process: the transformation of the Lebanese Kata'ib Party (LKP) from a militant youth movement to a modern, nationalist political party and its subsequent legitimization within the Lebanese political system.

Among the crucial components to be identified and analyzed will be the party's internal transformation especially its ideological, structural, and human development and the pattern of interaction within the larger system in which it operates. We will be particularly concerned with the LKP's gradually increased power position in the state and its assumption of political responsibility as reflected in its electoral and governmental participation and performance over the last twenty-five years.

This chapter will direct itself to the historical component of the transformation process and will be concerned less with describing the already fully documented history of modern Lebanon,[1] which the Kata'ib's own history obviously closely parallels, than with identifying some of the critical elements in the transformational process which saw an essentially all Maronite "boy scout" movement gradually develop into an effective and modern political organization.

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[1] See, for example, K. S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954); Leonard Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966); Leila M. T. Meo, *Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965); Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968); Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968); Michael W. Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967); William R. Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); N. A. Ziadeh, *Syria and Lebanon* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968); and Philip K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1957).

In this metamorphosis the LKP moved gradually along a legal-illegal continuum. First an organization proscribed both by law and in fact, later becoming a formally illegal one permitted in practice to enjoy a quasi-legal existence, then going through a formally legal stage although subject to various degrees of political persecution, after which it enjoyed precarious legality, under which its status could not be taken for granted, to finally reach the position of being not only legal but becoming an integral part of the institution of government, part of the establishment, part of the established order of things to the degree that, if made illegal, some form of revolutionary upheaval changing the basis of legitimate authority would occur.[1]

The Founding of the Party

The 1930's can be described as the era of "shirts" in the Arab world:[2] blue and green shirts in Egypt, gray and white shirts in Syria, khaki shirts in Iraq, and tan shirts in Lebanon. In most cases these para-military youth organizations used Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and phalangist Spain as their models and, inevitably, became associated with those variants of European fascism which predominated in the 1930's.

Although many superficial similarities existed—uniforms, salutes, parades, physical fitness, discipline—the authoritarian groupings of the Arab east bore little resemblance to the fascist parties of Europe. They were, in fact, a response to local conditions and particularistic needs: dissatisfaction with existing hierarchies of political and economic power; a reaction against the "cynicism, egoism and businessman's mentality of the professional 'politicians';"[3] the beginning of social awareness and a resentment of traditional elites who were dedicated to preserving their favored positions usually achieved through open collaboration with the imperialist powers; and, most important, the rise of Arab nationa-

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[1] Adapted from Thomas L. Hodgkin, *African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 75-76.

[2] The following discussion on the "shirts" and their fascist characteristics borrows from a brief but excellent article by Elsa Marston, "Fascist Tendencies in Pre-War Arab Politics: A Study of Three Arab Political Movements [PPS, *Misr al-Fatat*, and *Futuwa*]," *Middle East Forum*, 35 (May, 1959), pp. 19-22.

[3] Arnold Hottinger, *The Arabs: Their History, Culture and Place in the World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 228-229.

list consciousness which sought to give meaningful identity to the Arab and his situation. This attempt was best reflected in the organization of indigenous elites dedicated to countering the rule of the colonial and mandatory powers.

In both instances, whether originating from local needs and conditions or developing as responses to colonial rule, the patriotic, semi-military, uniformed and centrally directed youth movements of the Arab world looked to fascism as their model. They were particularly impressed with its efficiency, strength, and self-confidence. In addition, they were attracted to the German and Italian examples first, because of their remarkable national recoveries following the first World War and, second, because these states effectively challenged Western hegemony in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In essence, it was the operation of the long-accepted Arab principle: "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

In most instances these Arab parties and proto-parties had only fascist forms. They lacked a clear understanding of Nazi or fascist ideologies and, in fact, made little effort to study them carefully. Once formed, their primary efforts either as autonomous units or as para-military adjuncts to already existing political organizations[1] were aimed at mobilizing for large-scale demonstrations and strikes against the mandatory or colonial powers. Once these short-run objectives were achieved more often than not these groups voluntarily disbanded, were forced to dissolve, or were eventually amalgamated into larger, more broadly nationalistic political parties.

In many ways the birth of the Kata'ib[2] resembles that of other militant youth groups but it also differs significantly in terms of ideological orientation, belief system, and nationalistic aspirations.

Amongst the para-military youth organizations of Europe and the Middle East in the interwar period, the Kata'ib was one of the last to emerge. The idea of creating a nationalist youth movement in Lebanon was conceived in Europe when a young Maronite

[1] The Blue Shirts of the Egyptian Wafd were good examples of the latter type. See James P. Jankowski, "The Egyptian Blue Shirts and the Egyptian Wafd, 1935-1938," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 6 (January, 1970), pp. 77-95.

[2] Arabic plural of *katibah*, meaning "squadron," "regiment," "battalion," or "phalanx." According to LKP leaders the movement "was called Kata'ib, the plural of Katibah, which means a military division, for the founders wanted it to be a semi-military organization, in order to instill discipline and organization into Lebanese youths." *al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah: Political Democratic Party* (party mimeograph in English, 1958), p. 1. For the sake of uniformity and consistency Kata'ib will be used throughout as a collective and therefore in the singular.

athlete and his Muslim colleague, representing their country's soccer federation, attended the 1936 Berlin olympic games. Both Pierre Jumayyil and Husayn Sij'an[1] were inspired by the discipline and organizational efficiency characterizing Nazi society. As Jumayyil was to indicate many years later, "there [in Germany] I was struck with admiration. We orientals are, by nature, an unruly and individualistic people. In Germany I witnessed the perfect conduct of a whole, unified nation."[2] He was particularly impressed with Germany's sense of discipline, order, purpose, and nationalist zeal that were manifestly absent in his native Lebanon. Also absent was a fundamental comprehension of the underlying philosophical assumptions and predilections of Nazi ideology. What struck Jumayyil and others like him was the external form rather than the inner substance.

Before returning to Lebanon Jumayyil visited several Central European states including Czechoslovakia.[3] There he was impressed with that country's Sokol movement[4] which, founded in 1862 and dedicated to the athletic and educational development of the country's youth, scorned any political and military indoctrination as part of its nationalist teaching.[5] His initial reaction to the Sokol was in the form of a question: "why not the same thing in Lebanon?"[6] If Europe had the wherewithal to create well-disciplined and patriotic youth movements dedicated to nationalistic objectives why was Lebanon not capable of the same?[7]

While these experiences inspired some ideas as to what structural

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[1] In 1939 Sij'an directed the Muslim counterpart of the Kata'ib, al-Najjadah. See *La Revue du Liban* (Beirut), November 23, 1968, pp. 13ff.

[2] *Magazine* (Beirut), February 1, 1968, p. 36.

[3] In each of them he "had observed and made contacts with their youth movements, studied their structures and organizations, and attempted to evaluate their impact upon the nationalist spirit. He found their influence wide-spread, their activities energetic, and their morale high." Jamil Jabr al-Ashqar, *al-Harakah al-Kata'ibiyah: mafhum 'aqidatiha, tarikhaha, ahdafiha* (the Kata'ib movement: its doctrine, history and objectives understood) (Beirut: Matba'at al-'Amal, 1949), p. 16.

[4] Czech word meaning "falcon" and, by extension, "hero," "brave." Founded by Miroslav Tyrs and Jindrich Fügner in 1862 as a youth movement dedicated to sports and education in order to arouse a sense of nationalist consciousness. *Larousse Universel*, Vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1949), p. 805.

[5] Interview with Elias Rababi, former editor-in-chief of al-Kata'ib's daily Arabic newspaper, *al-'Amal*, and currently a leading member of the party's Political Bureau, Beirut, March 13, 1969.

[6] *Magazine*, February 1, 1968, p. 36.

[7] Interview with Pierre Jumayyil, February 25, 1969. He often asked himself:

form a future nationalist organization would take, the actual formation was precipitated by the local conditions of Lebanese society. The Kata'ib was in fact a response to the social decay and political turmoil resulting from internal dislocations of traditional authority patterns, social disequilibrium, and the rise of transnationalist ideologies which sought the overthrow of the imperialist system, the destruction of the traditional order of things, and the establishment of a unified pan-Arab or pan-Syrian nation.

For many years, prior to 1936, prominent Lebanese Christians, ever conscious of the rise and appeal of Arab nationalist and pan-Syrian aspirations within Lebanon, had sought to create a "Lebanese nationalist party which would stand for the complete separateness and integrity of Lebanon."[1] At that time, however, neither the Arab nationalist nor pan-Syrian movements were so developed as to directly threaten the national integrity of Lebanon, nor were the Christians so organized as to be able to agree on a unified course of action. By 1936, however, these nationalist trends had assumed specific form.

Especially consequential to the birth and rise of the Kata'ib was the creation of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party or *Parti Populaire Syrien* (PPS) by Antun Sa'adah on November 16, 1932. This highly organized and disciplined political party with a "definite national doctrine and a well structured ideology"[2] attracted widespread support. The charismatic appeal of its leader and the persuasiveness of its pan-Syrian ideology posed a direct challenge to Lebanese nationalists and their concept of an independent Lebanon. Operating as a secret political organization, it was only discovered by the French authorities in November 1935. Its discovery and alleged popularity aroused great anxiety among those Lebanese Christians who had hitherto felt confident that the French mandatory would act as the permanent guardian of strictly Lebanese interests.

Four months after its discovery, on March 10, 1936, a "Conference of the Coast" was convened in Beirut which gathered leading Muslim notables from Syria and Lebanon including members of the PPS. The group unanimously agreed that all former Muslim areas

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"youth, zeal, strength...why were these qualities so effectively mobilized in the West and not so in Lebanon?" Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 17.

[1] Salibi, *History of Lebanon*, pp. 80-81.

[2] Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. III.

which had been appended to Greater Lebanon in September 1920 should now be reintegrated into the Syrian state. The Conference was a relatively accurate reflection of Muslim sentiment in Lebanon and was followed by widespread Muslim agitation in support of Syrian unity. Immediate Christian reaction came in the form of a hastily created Party of Lebanese Unity which sought to insure the political and territorial status quo of Lebanon. It gained political inspiration from the often uncompromising and strongly political Maronite Patriarch Monsignor 'Aridah. Consistent with the Lebanese pattern of "countervalency,"[1] some Muslim notables (under Sunnite religious auspices) replied with the creation of a "Muslim Consultative Council," whose primary aim was to "coordinate the demands of all Moslem sects in the country."[2] Neither of these two avowedly sectarian groupings ever assumed much political import. If anything, they further aroused and exacerbated existing confessional tensions, heightened political anxiety in both religious communities, and, inevitably, weakened the legitimacy of constitutional authority in Lebanese political life.

The ideological conflicts taking place in the political sphere were being duplicated in society at large. Throughout the month of October, 1936, for example, strikes and demonstrations by urban laborers in Beirut and Tripoli paralyzed the commercial and economic life of the country.[3] Part of the civil unrest was a result of the general economic depression and dislocation caused by the 1929 crisis but also reflected Muslim discontent with French attempts to finalize the political legitimacy of Lebanon. The passage by the Lebanese Assembly of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty on November 13 1936, aroused anger among the Muslims who saw the Treaty as a final confirmation of Lebanon's independence and territorial composition. In the days that followed serious and often bloody clashes between Christians and Muslims took place in Beirut.

It was in this highly charged atmosphere that, on November 21, 1936, five Lebanese Christians, four of them Maronites—Pierre

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[1] See Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 283-327.

[2] Salibi, *History of Lebanon*, p. 181; Longrigg, *Mandate*, p. 219.

[3] For example, on October 12, typographers went on strike in Beirut following the devaluation of the Franc and all newspapers were suspended for thirty days. On October 17, 12,500 workers went out on strike and three days later 800 business employees struck to protest sharp price increases on oil, bread, and gas. See *L'Orient* (Beirut), November 17, 1936.

Jumayyil, Shafiq Nasif, Charles Hilu, George Naqash, and Emile Yarid—, created *al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah*,[1] initially popularized under the name of *Phalanges Libanaises*. The founders were relatively young (they averaged slightly under thirty), French-educated, middle class professionals (a pharmacist, a lawyer, two journalists, and an engineer) with a strong commitment to an independent and Western-oriented Lebanon.[2] A circular announcing the creation of a "Lebanese nationalist movement"[3] was subsequently distributed throughout Beirut and Mount Lebanon asking for the signature of all those who wished to join.[4]

Although directed by a five-man executive council it was generally acknowledged that Jumayyil would assume the role of *chef supérieur* or *ra'is* (president) of the movement.[5] Several factors were involved: firstly, in the traditional rivalry between the country's two leading Maronite politicians, Bisharah al-Khuri and Emile Eddé, the movement's founders assumed partisan positions: Hilu and Yarid supported Khuri, Naqash and Nasif favored Eddé. As a neutralist with no manifest political preferences, Jumayyil was regarded as the natural choice. Secondly, it was initially assumed

[1] The initial use of the French designation, *Phalanges Libanaises*, rather than its Arabic counterpart, *al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah*, was later regretted. Besides associating it with fascist currents abroad it identified it as an externally created movement with distinct foreign connections. Interview with Maurice Jumayyil, February 19, 1969.

According to Salibi the Muslim-Christian clashes of November 15, 1936, "immediately led to the formation of the Kata'ib organization as a counter poise to the Moslem street force in the capital." Salibi, *History of Lebanon*, p. 182; see also Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 17 and *Nash'a Hizb al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah* (origins of the Lebanese Kata'ib Party) (Beirut: n.p., n.d.), p. 1.

[2] Everyone except Jumayyil withdrew from the movement within three years after its formal establishment. Nasif, a Beirut Lawyer, was later instrumental in the creation of the Liberal National Party; Hilu, former journalist and editor of *Le Jour* (Beirut), was elected president of the Republic in 1964; Naqash, co-founder, and former chief editorialist of the prestigious French daily, *L'Orient* (Beirut), remained a very close supporter of the LKP until his death in 1972; and Yarid, the only non-Maronite of the group, heads a large engineering firm in Beirut and remains politically inactive.

[3] According to Nasif "a request for French military instructors to aid in the training and recruiting of prospective members was flatly rejected." Interview with Shafiq Nasif, November 4, 1968.

[4] Three months after its founding it was reported to have had over 300 members. See Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 31.

[5] He was officially designated *chef supérieur* on April 29, 1937, by the movement's executive committee, composed of the original founders as well as Joseph Shadir, Joseph Sa'adah, Elias Rababi, and Maurice Jumayyil. See Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 32.

that this new movement would espouse nonpolitical goals and all except Jumayyil harbored future political ambitions.[1] Thirdly, Jumayyil, more than the others, had both the "time and inclination to assume actual power of the movement."[2] Finally, it was agreed that the young pharmacist and football enthusiast possessed the necessary charismatic qualities of leadership.

The movement's early objectives were rather ill defined although formally there was an emphasis on nationalistic awareness, civil responsibility, self-discipline, and high moral training, all of which were to be regarded as the necessary ingredients for a unified and progressive Lebanon. According to Antoine Mu'arbas, a leading member of the party's political bureau, the Kata'ib was founded "...with the sole aim of inculcating into the Lebanese youth principles of honesty, civic and national consciousness, professional responsibility, and a sense of duty and honor."[3] More specifically "the Lebanese youth needed to be brought together and organized," Nehmé informs us,

> [in order] to fight the confusion of classes, parties, and communities; the defeatism of official representatives; the corruption of the older generation and the ruling classes; [and] the pan-Arab and pan-Syrian tendencies which were gaining strength in Lebanon. This youth was in search of law, discipline, and a common mode of life. It aspired to a *redressement national*.[4]

Although not explicitly stated at the time of its founding the LKP's primary preoccupation was to preserve the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of an independent Lebanon.[5]

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[1] One party mimeograph states that "those who authored the party's first statement in 1936 calling for the youth of Lebanon to enlist in the Kataeb ranks were not candidates for parliamentary seats and harbored no political aims." *al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah* (1958), p. 1. Within three years, however, all except Jumayyil had withdrawn on the pretext that identification with the Kata'ib severely limited their scope of political action.

[2] Interview with Shafiq Nasif, Beirut, November 4, 1968. According to Pierre Jumayyil, the others "lacked a hero-image and were unwilling to fight, sacrifice, and assume the selfdiscipline necessary to lead the movement." Interview with Pierre Jumayyil, February 25, 1969.

[3] Antoine Mouarbes, "Le Parti et le Pouvoir," *Action* (November, 1956), p. 509.

[4] Katia Nehmé, "Les quatre premières années de l'existence phalangiste," *Action*, XXV (December, 1966), pp. 10-11.

[5] Elias Rababi, close friend of Pierre Jumayyil and long-time party member, explained that "while Muslims and Arabs had a plethora of formal and informal organizations, in and out of Lebanon, to represent and protect their interests,

There was no concern with structural change, social rectification, or political development; rather, the emphasis was on stabilizing political life in the country and protecting Christian interests. These principles and objectives espoused by the LKP found support among schoolboys, university and college students, young men of the lower middle classes, apprentices, young employees, and minor officials who eventually came to constitute the majority of the movement's early membership.

Unlike its counterparts in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq the Kata'ib lacked the obsessive and irrational qualities that tended to characterize these neo-fascist movements. There was no assertion of racial supremacy as implied in A. Sa'adah's doctrine of Syrian nationalism, nor was there a demand for power or totalitarian rule. Similarly, the Kata'ib rejected the emotionalism, irrationalism, anti-intellectualism, and the constant tension produced by propaganda which became the hallmarks of the PPS and other authoritarian parties of the period.

As opposed to the PPS which had elaborate and explicit regional ambitions, the Kata'ib limited itself to raising the spirit and substance of Lebanese society, unifying and strengthening the people, and, later, eliminating foreign rule. It was more concerned with glorifying the nation than elaborating a political ideology or program of action. Even its para-military structure reflected a search for discipline rather than power.

PRE-INDEPENDENCE NATIONALIST STRUGGLE: 1937-1943

Throughout the country's brief pre-independence struggle—a half decade marked by increased social agitation and political turmoil—the Kata'ib became directly involved as a nationalist force of some consequence. In fact, it was this nationalist mystique identified with the birth of the nation-state which gave the LKP an advantage denied other contending parties and political movements.

After its creation the Kata'ib sought to develop a coherent

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there was a noticeable void among the Christians; the Kata'ib was created to fill that void." Interview with Elias Rababi, March 13, 1969. Less sympathetic interpretations may be found in A. Qubrisi, *Nahna wa Lubnan* (we and Lebanon) (Beirut: Mataba'at Lubnan, 1954); Bashir A. Aridi, "Parties and Politics in the Lebanese Society" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1955), pp. 93-94; and Joseph Eed, *al-'Arab* (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1951), p. 153.

nationalist doctrine, one capable of crossing confessional lines without necessarily offending political sensibilities. Thus, during its formative years, the movement was preoccupied with essentially non-political and nationalistic considerations. Its main ideas were formalized in the movement's first of several general statutes. Article one of the 1936 Kata'ib statute, for example, defined the movement's goals: "to recruit, educate, and organize the Lebanese youth in order to maintain and develop in them a national awareness and prepare them to fulfill all the civic obligations which have been generated by our independence."[1]

Most of the Kata'ib leaders eschewed any form of direct political involvement in the affairs of the state since association with specific political tendencies would tend to dilute the movement's nationalist objectives. The Kata'ib president was unequivocal on this point. "The Phalanges Libanaises," Jumayyil stated on January 12, 1937, "does not constitute a political party. It is neither for nor against anyone; it is for Lebanon."[2]

These pronouncements did not arouse much consternation among the mandatory authorities nor find wide appeal among the Lebanese masses. In fact, it is uncertain in which direction the Kata'ib might have developed if French policies, marked as they were by extreme political and diplomatic ineptness, had not helped to legitimize the Kata'ib in the eyes of the public as a genuine expression of Lebanese nationalist sentiment.

Throughout the whole of the mandatory period, and much before, Lebanese Christians and Maronites in particular had established and sustained close cultural, social, educational, and religious ties with France. In the middle and late 1930's however, as local and regional nationalist aspirations rose to the surface, points of conflict between the imperialist power and local elites came out into the open. Even the cordial although informal contacts between the French and Kata'ib leaders began to deteriorate visibly once the movement assumed a specifically nationalist posture;

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[1] *L'Orient*, December 16, 1936. "Independence" in terms of having been guaranteed separate political identity from Syria rather than the possession of formal political sovereignty.

[2] *Connaissance des Kataeb: Leur doctrine et leur politique nationales. Dans les déclarations, messages, articles et lettres officielles, depuis 1936 de Pierre Gemayel, chef supérieur des Kataeb* (Beirut: Imprimerie Jeanne d'Arc, 1948), p. 79; *Action* (November, 1958), p. 4.

a posture which inevitably came into direct conflict with French colonial interests.

In June 1937, for example, amidst reports (later proven to be false) that the Tripoli area might be annexed to Syria, Jumayyil and his supporters threatened to call a nationwide strike and public demonstrations for June 13. The French authorities, anxious to avoid civil disorders, summoned Jumayyil and Tawfiq 'Awad, leader of the *hizb al-wahdah al-lubnaniyah* (party of Lebanese unity), in an attempt to dissuade them from carrying out their plan. After the failure of this attempt they issued, rather reluctantly, a formal communique reaffirming France's support of the territorial integrity of Lebanon.[1]

Six months later, however, on November 18, 1937, a government decree was issued[2] dissolving all para-military organizations in the country.[3] Citing violations of a little known Ottoman statute and a 1934 mandatory decree[4] the minister of interior, Habib Abu Shahlah, accused these movements of being "incompatible with the public interest."

Whatever its ultimate intentions might have been, the dissolution decree[5] and subsequent seizure of the Kata'ib headquarters actually worked to strengthen what had hitherto been regarded as a Maronite "boy scout" movement. The Kata'ib leader was not exaggerating when, in response to the first of three dissolutions which the movement was to face during the 1937-43 period, he declared that the Kata'ib was the only independent national or-

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[1] Issued on June 12, 1937, in Beirut. *Connaissance des Kataeb*, pp. 80-81; Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 33.

[2] Dissolution decree number 1474/EC. See *L'Orient*, November 19, 1937.

[3] According to Longrigg, "the dissolution of the paramilitary associations, however unpopular, was greatly in the public interest." Longrigg, *Mandate*, p. 253.

[4] According to these texts "in order to be legally constituted these associations have to satisfy two conditions: (1) they must have sports as their exclusive and only objective and (2) they must not have a political character or objective nor participate in any political gathering or demonstration." *L'Orient*, November 19, 1937.

[5] In support of his French-Kata'ib collaborationist thesis Richard Laursen states: "why the authorities closed an organization that they were supporting is not clear. [Perhaps] they did not feel strong enough to disband some groups and not others. [Or] [p]erhaps the French felt that such action would actually strengthen the Kata'ib and increase its appeal to the Lebanese youth." Richard Hans Laursen, "The Kata'ib: A Comprehensive Study of a Lebanese Political Party" (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1951), p. 45.

ganization in the country dedicated to preserving Lebanon's integrity and that in order to dissolve the movement one would have to suppress all of its 8,000 members.[1]

The dissolution decree preceded by three days the Kata'ib's planned first anniversary celebrations. Ignoring the government's ban, early on Sunday morning of November 21, 1937, several hundred Kata'ib members and supporters gathered at the Place des Canons in central Beirut to participate in an expected mass rally and demonstration. To meet them were several hundred well-armed Senegalese troops of the *force publique*, who, in their attempt to disperse the boisterous but nonviolent demonstrators,[2] killed two Phalangists and wounded seventy including Jumayyil. The president, along with eighty of his colleagues, was immediately incarcerated in the Raml prison on the outskirts of Beirut.[3]

Popular reaction was swift. And when widespread demonstrations and strikes erupted throughout Mount Lebanon, the French military authorities released the prisoners.[4] The movement's *baptême du sang* marked its official entry into the independence struggle, created a kind of "mystique" around Pierre Jumayyil,[5] and immeasurably strengthened the popularity and appeal of the Kata'ib movement.

Although under official ban from 1937 until November 27, 1943, the movement functioned unhampered. The period from 1938

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[1] *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 83; Ashqar, *Harakah*, pp. 33-34; *Action*, November, 1958 and December, 1960.

[2] On the basis of four pictures taken by an amateur photographer directly on the scene and subsequently published in *L'Orient*, the following four conclusions could be reached: (1) the demonstrators did not exceed 100; (2) the demonstrators were calm and orderly; (3) the police initiated the attack; and, (4) "beyond all doubt, the disturbances were not planned by the demonstrators but were a spontaneous upheaval of the Beirutis themselves." *L'Orient*, November 29, 1937.

[3] See Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 34; *Action* (June, 1960), p. 978; *Action* (December, 1960), pp. 1141-1143; *Magazine*, February 1, 1968, pp. 40-42; *Les Phalanges Libanaises: 25 ans au service du Liban* (party publication, 1961 [?]), p. 6.

[4] Although a French soldier was killed during the disturbances, the LKP was absolved of any responsiblity. In fact, a special representative of the military authorities, Captain Darcix, presented Maurice Jumayyil with documentary proof of the Kata'ib's innocence. That such effort was made by the French army reflected the conflict then existing between the French civilian leadership which opposed all para-military grouping including the Kata'ib, and the French military authorities who looked upon the movement with favor. Interview with Maurice Jumayyil, February 19, 1969.

[5] Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, p. 143. See also *Lisan al-Hal* (Beirut), November 25. 1937, *al-Bayraq*, December 16, 1937, and *al-Ahwal*, December 7, 1937.

until the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, was one of organizational and statutory readjustment, coupled with an increased effort to situate the Kata'ib's nationalist philosophy within the Lebanese framework.[1] On July 1, 1938, for example, the movement's revised basic statute defined the Kata'ib as a "purely Lebanese national institution" free of any "confessional or racial characteristics, fighting against all anti-nationalist doctrines which seek to destroy or diminish present day Lebanon." The Kata'ib is for an "ordered and disciplined democracy. Its motto is: God, Fatherland, Family."[2]

On the political front the Kata'ib's ambivalent attitude towards France made it difficult to pursue a consistently active nationalist position. On the one hand it praised Franco-Lebanese collaboration as a "fundamental condition for Lebanon's social and economic reorganization, moral and political progress..." and, on the other, it affirmed that "the nation's contemporary situation highlights the need for a radical reform of our institutions and a complete change of the political personnel in charge."[3] Pierre Jumayyil made the latter point explicit to the newly-installed French High Commissioner, Gabriel Puaux, when he demanded

> the revision and readaptation of the constitution so as to conform with the aspirations of the people and satisfy their needs and financial possibilities; and the institution of a policy of national collaboration that would exclude clan politicians and the so-called political parties.[4]

Less than three months later war broke out in Europe and although the period from September 3, 1939, until after the Franco-German Armistice on June 22, 1940, was a relatively tranquil one, it marked the temporary suspension of active political life in the country.

Not surprisingly France's swift and humiliating defeat embarrassed and disappointed many Francophile Maronites. In turn, the period following the armistice

> witnessed a persistent malaise within the French community [in Lebanon]..., a deterioration of...Lebanese feeling towards France,

[1] See Nehmé, *Action*, XXII (December, 1964), pp. 8-9; *Action*, XV (December, 1966), pp. 16-17; Ashqar, *Harakah*, pp. 36-37.

[2] *Al-Qanun al-Asasi* (the basic laws) (Beirut: Matba'at 'Azar, July 1, 1938), articles 1, 4, and 5.

[3] *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 89.

[4] *Connaissance des Kataeb*, pp. 90-91.

> an economic crisis easily used for political (that is, for Nationalist) purposes, public disorders reminiscent of the early weeks of 1936, and a dangerous and humiliating infiltration of German and Italian agents.[1]

The economic misery created among the poor by soaring prices, acute shortages, and widespread unemployment came out into the open by January 1941. Collaborating with the Najjadah in the first of several pre-independence coalitions, the Kata'ib made repeated demands for improved economic conditions.[2] When these demands[3] were ignored the two movements organized a bread strike against the government of General Dentz and President Emile Eddé.[4] The major issue was the manner in which food supplies were being provided. Because of general dissatisfaction, the Kata'ib was able to play an important part in forcing the resignation of the president and his government. In retaliation, on April 3, 1941, the French authorities once again dissolved the movement and closed down its headquarters.[5]

The following month the High Commissioner banned all Kata'ib gatherings and threatened to exile Jumayyil and thirty-five other members to Palmyra unless they desisted from their periodic attacks on the government. The following year the Kata'ib added its voice to the demands for the resignation of the prime minister, Ahmad Da'uq, and his minister of supply, Wa'il 'Izz al-Din, again over the issue of food supplies.

Although Lebanon's independence was proclaimed by the Free French and guaranteed by the British on June 8, 1941, and its territorial integrity officially recognized five months later, it was

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[1] Longrigg, *Mandate*, p. 298.

[2] This was not the Kata'ib's first effort in the economic and social fields. In late 1938 its bureau of social affairs organized a "day for the poor" wherein free medical and legal aid was offered to the needy of Beirut, Tripoli, Zahlah, and Juniya. Likewise, recalling the famine of 1917-18, it began to store foodstuffs and rationing wheat. See Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 37; *Action*, December, 1960, p. 1142; and *Action*, XXV (December, 1966), pp. 17-21.

[3] For details see *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 95 and Ashqar, *Harakah*, pp. 41-42.

[4] See, *Action*, XXII (December, 1964), p. 10; Laursen, "The Kata'ib," pp. 47-48; *25 ans*, pp. 8-10; Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 42; Longrigg, *Mandate*, p. 303; and *Action* (December, 1960), p. 1142.

[5] A year later, on March 27, 1942, the authorities issued a communique confirming the former dissolution decree. For Jumayyil's reply to this decree see *Action*, XXII (December, 1964), p. 11. See also Alfred Naccache, *Levant 1941-1943, entre le faucon et l'épervier* (Beirut: n.p., 1969); cf. Mary Azoury, "Les révélations du President Naccache," *La Revue du Liban*, October 15, 1968, pp. 15-18.

not until March 25, 1943, that General Georges Catroux, under pressure from Major General Sir Edward Spears, Britain's minister to Syria and Lebanon, restored Lebanon's constitution and prepared the country for general elections.[1] Despite blatant French interference, the supporters of Bisharah al-Khuri won major control of the Chamber of Deputies. When the new parliament met on September 21, 1943, it elected al-Khuri as president of the Republic.[2] He subsequently selected the popular Muslim politician Riyad al-Sulh as his prime minister.

Once installed, the new government entered into consultations with the newly-arrived French Délégué-Général, Jean Helleu, for the immediate termination of the mandate. Among its demands was the amendment of the constitution so as to eliminate mandatory restrictions, the transfer of full legislative and administrative power to itself, and the early conversion of the office of Délégué-Général into a normal embassy.[3] When Helleu openly rejected the government's demands, the Lebanese legislature, on November 8, 1943, unilaterally passed a special bill (by a vote of 48-0) removing the mandatory restrictions[4] through constitutional amendments. President al-Khuri immediately countersigned the bill and on November 9, it was published in the official gazette, all before Helleu, then in Algiers consulting with the French National Committee, had time to object. Helleu's subsequent actions not only marked the effective end of the mandate but "unified the entire Lebanese nation against France in a single night."[5]

In the process, the Kata'ib played a significant if not decisive role in the final phase of Lebanon's independence struggle, and thereby established itself as a consequential political force in the country. Under Helleu's directive, between four and five o'clock on the morning of November 11, 1943, French marines and colonial

[1] Salibi, *History of Lebanon*, p. 187.

[2] This extinguished forever the hopes and political aspirations of his Francophile Maronite opponent Emile Eddé. For a personal account of his father's political history, see "Raymond Eddé explicite le rôle et l'attitude de son père," *La Revue du Liban*, November 16, 1968, pp. 15-18.

[3] See Salibi, *History of Lebanon*, pp. 188-189 and Longrigg, *Mandate*, pp. 330-331.

[4] These included "the removal of all references to the Mandate, emphasis on Lebanon's sovereign status, omission of all functions, obligations or rights of the ex-Mandatory, and the discontinuance of French as an official language." Longrigg, *Mandate*, p. 331.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

troops arrested the Lebanese president, his prime minister, and two other members of the cabinet, Camille Sham'un and Salim Taqla, all of whom were immediately sent to the fortress at Rashayya, in the Wadi al-Taym region of eastern Lebanon, where they were joined shortly thereafter by another minister, 'Adil 'Usayran, and the prominent Sunnite deputy from Tripoli, 'Abd al-Hamid Karami.[1] Meanwhile Helleu issued simultaneous decrees announcing the nullification of the constitutional amendments, the suspension of the constitution itself, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, and the appointment of Emile Eddé as president of the Republic.[2]

Lebanese public reaction was immediate and powerful. When informed of the arrests[3] Pierre Jumayyil along with Husayn Sij'an gathered their supporters and demonstrated throughout Beirut. The following day (November 12) Anis Saghir and Jamil Makkawi, representing the Najjadah, joined with the Kata'ib to establish a unified command and organize a nation-wide strike. Other Christian and Muslim organizations immediately followed suit. Angry demonstrations and riots ensued, countered by heavy French military presence and the imposition of a rigid twenty-four hour curfew on Beirut.

Although it was to be the last of its kind and was more of a necessary expedient than an ideological accommodation, the Najjadah-Kata'ib coalition became an effective instrument for nationalist action.[4] Besides organizing and leading strikes and demonstrations, inspiring the people towards unified action, and using its highly disciplined para-military cadres to combat French troops,[5] the coalition became the recognized intermediary between the people and the government-in-exile at Bchamun.[6]

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[1] For details see Camille Chamoun, *Crise au Moyen Orient* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), pp. 110-116.

[2] See Salibi, *History of Lebanon*, p. 189; Longrigg, *Mandate*, p. 331; Elie Eugenie Abouchdid, *Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria (1917-1947)* (Beirut: Sader-Rihani Printing Co., 1948), p. 133; and Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 53.

[3] See *Action*, XXII (December, 1964), p. 12.

[4] See Georges Vigny, "La lutte commune pour l'indépendance, racontée par Pierre Gemayel et Jamil Mikkaoui," *La Revue du Liban*, November 23, 1968, p. 13.

[5] See *Magazine*, February 1, 1968, p. 43.

[6] Two members of Sulh's cabinet, Habib Abu Shahla and Majid Arslan, had avoided arrest and escaped on November 12 to the mountain village of Bchamun, "which, amidst the forests and steep cliffs which surround it, takes on the aspect of an impregnable citadel," from which they directed a government claiming sole legitimacy. See Chamoun, *Crise*, p. 115. According to Khalil Taqi al-Din it was

On the second day of the Kata'ib-organized strike, Jumayyil and Elias Rababi were arrested, placed in solitary confinement, and threatened with exile to Brazzaville if they continued their activities.[1] Twenty-three other Kata'ib members were arrested and thirty wounded, while Joseph Shadir, vice-president of the movement, was left to run the organization and lead demonstrations.

Finally, under heavy British pressure and faced with an impossible situation, the French were forced to reverse their policy. On November 22, 1943, president al-Khuri and his cabinet along with all the arrested Kata'ib members were released. In recognition of the Kata'ib's role in the independence struggle,[2] a presidential decree annulled the former dissolution decree and the movement was officially recognized on November 27, 1943,[3] five days after Lebanon had achieved its independence.

CRISIS OF IDENTITY: 1944-1951

The Kata'ib was faced with an identity dilemma in the immediate post-independence period. Because it had been closely identified with the nationalist phase of the independence struggle many of its members felt its existence no longer justified now that independence had been achieved. Others sought the perpetuation of a patriotic youth movement as a means of preserving the nationalist integrity of Lebanon. In any case the movement lacked future direction and awaited some satisfactory resolution.

Three alternatives faced the Kata'ib: (1) dissolution, (2) placing the "nationalist movement" into temporary hibernation, to be aroused only "when the integrity and independence of the country were threatened,"[4] or (3) transforming the Kata'ib into an effective instrument for political action, that is, into a political party.[5]

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at Bchamun that the "decisive step in the battle for independence was taken." Mary Azoury, "Novembre 1943: L'indépendance libanaise racontée par Khalil Takieddine," *La Revue du Liban*, November 9, 1968, p. 16.

[1] Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 55.

[2] According to P. Jumayyil Lebanese independence could not have been achieved without the Kata'ib's participation. Interview with Pierre Jumayyil, February 25, 1969.

[3] See *Le Jour* (Beirut), November 27, 1943.

[4] *Taqrir al-Amin al-'Amm* (Report of the Secretary-General) (Shaturah: First General Party Congress, September 28-30, 1956), p. 9. (party mimeograph)

[5] According to Karim Pakradouni, who has studied the party closely, once legal independence had been achieved the movement "could dissolve...for lack

Between late 1943 and early 1945 extended and often acrimonious debates among the various proponents of each alternative took place within the party. Although there were few who called for immediate dissolution, the argument for direct or indirect involvement in the Lebanese political system was not resolved until 1945 and then only partially.

While the debate continued it was decided that a "transitional" stage be inaugurated and the movement maintained until some final decision could be reached. Moreover, there was apprehension that too sudden a transformation might dislocate the organization's tenuous structure and disperse its members. Consequently, the "vigilante" character of the movement was retained and even perpetuated. Towards this end it advocated an isolationist policy for Lebanon. In 1944, for example, it vigorously opposed the Alexandia Protocol and brought pressure to bear on president al-Khuri for the recognition of Lebanon's "special" position in the Arab world.[1] It also initiated an intensive press campaign against the regime when al-Khuri adopted a mildly pro-Arab nationalist regional policy and made significant concessions to Lebanese Muslims in government and administration.[2]

In essence the movement's early objectives could be characterized as essentially protectionist attempts to preserve Lebanese independence against the forces of disintegration. As yet the movement lacked a structured ideology and programmatic base; there was little discussion of development, social change, modernization, and the effective use of political institutions to gain power and influence public policy. Rather, according to its own spokesmen, "during every event, in every crisis, the Kataeb was there...; against unionist projects, against our neighbors' schemes and intrigues; against the "Fertile Crescent" and "Greater Syria" projects, and against all projects of union or federation."[3] Es-

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of a new *raison d'être*" or be "converted from one of protest to one of active rebuilding of the nation." Karim Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb" (unpublished Mémoire de Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures de Sciences Politiques, Université de St. Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon, September 27, 1967), p. 44. *Nash'a*, p. 6, also identifies two options: "keeping the Kata'ib as a nationalist movement to educate the nation's youth or transform it into a political party."

[1] See *al-'Amal* (Beirut), August 10, October 4 and 12, 1944; March 31, 1946; cf. *L'Orient*, October 12, 1944.

[2] For details see *Action*, May 27, 1944.

[3] *Action*, XXII (December, 1964), p. 14.

pecially prevalent was the insistence on being "outside and above all parties"[1] while remaining "averse to partisan and confessional quarrels, and a refusal to take part in communal dissensions."[2]

The movement's identity crisis was partially resolved when it decided to involve itself in a distinctly political act—running a candidate in the by-election of March 4, 1945. The Kata'ib's official entrance into the political arena has been described as a turning point in the party's development.[3]

In practical terms the party wanted to be represented in the Chamber for two principal reasons: (1) to have an official voice in the discussions concerning the Arab League, and (2) because it feared that the present government was planning to work for closer union with Syria.[4]

Undoubtedly the decision to participate in electoral politics marked a new stage in the Kata'ib's growth. However, it did not represent a "transformational watershed" as some of its chroniclers would have us believe.[5] Joseph Shadir, for example, did not hesitate to say that "the Kata'ib still is and intends to remain a youth organization in order to continue teaching the new generation what is required of good citizens and men."[6] Moreover, none of its ideological, organizational, or programmatic qualities, where they existed at all, had so altered by March 1945 as to justify its new appellation—political party.[7] Nevertheless, as perceived by the leadership, the process of transformation had begun. Even in official documents and publications the French designation "les

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[1] *Al-'Amal*, November 20, 1941.

[2] *Action* (December, 1960), pp. 1145-1146.

[3] See, for example, Bahige B. Tabbarah, "Les forces politiques actuelles au Liban" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Grenoble, 1954), p. 238; Laursen, "The Kata'ib," p. 49; Pakradouni, "Structure," pp. 44-45; *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 14; *Nash'a*, p. 1; Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 81; and Antoine Mouarbes, "Parti et Pouvoir," *Action* (November, 1956), p. 509. Maurice Jumayyil presents a contradictory point of view. According to him "it was in 1945 that the Kata'ib made its second biggest mistake [the first was using the name of 'Phalanges']: it decided, against its nature, to imitate political parties and assume a party label. This imitation, however, was artificial and did not deeply penetrate the Kata'ib." Interview with Maurice Jumayyil, February 19, 1969.

[4] *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 15.

[5] See, for example, Tabbarah, "Les forces politiques," pp. 240ff.; Pakradouni, "Structure," pp. 50ff.

[6] *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 14.

[7] According to Pakradouni, "the 1945 elections constitute a turning point in the movement's life. From then on it will tend to become a party." Pakradouni, "Structure," p. 45.

Phalanges Libanaises" prevalent until then was gradually being replaced by the corresponding Arabic, *Hizb al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah.*[1]

This process was extended in 1947 when the Kata'ib, as part of its preparation for the general elections that year, collaborated with the Najjadah to protest the growing corruption in administration and government. Towards this end the party's daily newspaper, *al-'Amal*, launched a vigorous editorial campaign against the al-Khuri regime.[2] Although its four candidates[3] lost by wide margins in elections universally condemned as corrupt and fraudulent, the party gained a new sense of purpose and determination. "Since those elections,"[4] Ashqar writes, "a new stage has begun for the Kata'ib—a stage of relentless opposition and intellectual revolt."[5]

As with any process of change the transition from movement to party inevitably led to certain internal strains. Tensions between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conscious or ultimate ends were also evident. Similarly the conflicting demands of the movement and the party were manifested in the struggle between those who saw power as necessary and desirable and those who saw it as corrupting. No immediate effort was made to fully reconcile these conflicting demands and the party pursued a variety of political, para-political, and para-military ends simultaneously. The attempt here was to sustain its defensive or protectionist posture[6] as well as involve itself in the political processes of the state in the hope of increasing its power position, expanding its base of legitimacy, and popularizing the movement among the masses.

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[1] See Tabbarah, "Les forces politiques," p. 239.

[2] See *al-'Amal*, March 14 and 23, 1946.

[3] The candidates were: Joseph Shadir from Beirut, Elias Rababi and Joseph Sa'adah from Mount Lebanon, and Jacques Shadid from North Lebanon. See chapter seven for details.

[4] A week before the elections *al-'Amal* was to write: "[the Kata'ib] forcefully denounces the flagrant interference of the Seraglio, and the Government's maneuvers to influence the electors and 'fix' the elections." *Al-'Amal*, May 16, 1947.

[5] Ashqar, *Harakah*, pp. 93-94.

[6] In June 1949, for example, the Kata'ib and PPS became involved in a bloody riot forcing government intervention and eventual dissolution of both parties on July 20. The outlawing of the Kata'ib was only perfunctory, however, and within two weeks (August 3, 1949) the party was officially recognized under the name of *Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani* (party of Lebanese unity). For details of the "Jumayzah incident" see *Le Jour*, June 10, 1949. For statutory details of the "new" party's objectives see *al-Nizam al-Asasi li-Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani* (the basic statute of the party of Lebanese unity) (Beirut, 1949), pp. 1-2.

In 1951 the party once again presented a slate of candidates[1] for the general elections and in spite of his own promise to remain outside of the political battle P. Jumayyil, for the first time, represented the party in an election. Although he was to lose in a hotly contested run-off election, Jumayyil's participation in electoral politics marked another turning point in the party's development. Its politicization through elections, the elaboration of new regulations, and the presentation of a program were concrete manifestations of this new stage.

Political Transformation: 1952-1957

The Kata'ib's internal identity crisis was formally resolved in the 1952-57 period when the movement was deliberately subordinated to the larger political party organization.[2] While its role as a "nationalist training camp" was retained the primary emphasis was now placed on achieving political power through electoral and institutional means. Similarly, its para-military character remained intact both to supplement the party's "educational" functions as well as to train members for combat situations in "defense of the homeland." According to A. Mu'arbas,

> it was a normal evolution of a movement which, year after year, had viewed its collaboration as indispensable to the edification of the young state; it had to expand its cadres and horizons in order to undertake a totally different path. Parallel to this new party there always remained the youth movement which prepared the young militants to integrate into the cadres of the political party.[3]

The party leadership had gradually come to realize that defending Lebanon's national integrity in an increasingly hostile environment required broadened popular acceptance as well as political legitimization.[4] It hoped to reinforce its defensive posture both by retaining and expanding its para-military apparatus[5] while simul-

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[1] The candidates included Pierre Jumayyil from Matn, Dahir Mattar from Kisrawan, Joseph Shadir from Beirut, Jean Skaff from Biqa', and Albert Hajj from 'Akkar. See *L'Orient*, April 15, 1951.

[2] See Joseph Sa'adah, "Présence des Kataeb," p. 15.

[3] Mouarbes, "Le parti et le pouvoir," p. 510.

[4] For a rejection of the Kata'ib's new role as a political party see the editorial by Georges Naccache, "Pour les 17 ans des Phalanges," *L'Orient*, November 29, 1953.

[5] As early as 1949 P. Jumayyil saw the need to create a "political party" and discard the "youth" movement appellation if he was to retain the original

taneously gaining access to the system's political core through electoral participation, programmatic appeal, and organizational expansion.[1] Thus, in May 1952, the party's most comprehensive general statute was elaborated redesignating the Kata'ib as a *hizb dimuqrati ijtima'i lubnani* (Lebanese social democratic party).[2] It was a highly detailed organizational code defining membership, national and local structures, patterns of authority, disciplinary procedures, and administrative jurisdiction over the various party organs. Two of its more noteworthy provisions were the transfer of executive power from the president to a multi-member political bureau, "the decision-making organ of the party," and the creation of an annual party congress.[3]

Two years later the party's first comprehensive program, aiming "at reforming Lebanese society, promoting discipline, justice, and welfare,"[4] was set forth. Although a brief section was devoted to foreign policy,[5] the greater part of the program dealt with internal political and administrative reforms. It was, in fact, less a positive program for action than a listing of various grievances extant in government and society. Nevertheless, it represented the first major effort to dissect the political system and imprint a strictly Kata'ib solution.

Within the political system itself the Kata'ib actively participated in both the 1953 and 1957 general parliamentary elections. Although most of its candidates were easily defeated[6] the party continued to support the principles of influencing or achieving political power through the system's representative institutions. This did not preclude, however, the use of coercion and, when necessary, force in order to oppose political tendencies threatening

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membership and leadership who "were no longer young enough to belong to a 'youth' organization and submit to its rigorous discipline." *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 17, 1949.

[1] Cf. Tabbarah, "Les forces politiques," p. 239; see also *al-'Amal*, November 4, 1952.

[2] *Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah* (the basic statute of the Lebanese Kata'ib) (party mimeograph, 1952 including the amendments of 1956 and 1957), article 1.

[3] *Ibid.*, articles 13 and 50.

[4] *Al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah* (1958), p. 32.

[5] It called for "close cooperation with the Arab countries..., solving the Palestinian question in accordance with the requirements of justice..., [and] working within the framework of the United Nations." *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

[6] Joseph Shadir was the lone Kata'ib victor in both elections.

the well-being of the state. During this period, for example, the party became involved in a sequence of sectarian crises and political feuds with Lebanese Muslims and PPS members.[1] It was also instrumental in the downfall of the by·then totally discredited al-Khuri regime.

Being a party and a movement was both advantageous and disadvantageous. As a movement with a creed, its members were dedicated and zealous. Lack of campaign funds, for example, was offset by devoted volunteer labor. Because it had an ideology the Kata'ib became noted for its dedication to principle. The same features, however, were also disadvantageous: many Kata'ib members were zealots if not outright fanatics. Quite often doctrinal purity took precedence over political necessity. The structure of the party was based on the needs of the movement and occasionally served the party ill.

Positive System Challenger: 1958-1969

The 1958 civil war came close to destroying the republic's political existence. A combination of inter-acting domestic, regional, and international cross-currents plunged Lebanon into what eventually became an open sectarian war. This latter episode, known as the "counterrevolution" from September 24 to October 15, 1958, revealed, as never before, the Kata'ib's mobilization capacity, the efficacy of its para-military cadres, and the widespread support it commanded among all Maronites, many Christians, and, to a lesser extent, some Muslims mostly of the Shi'ite sect. It also brought out the party's determination to challenge any and all endeavors on the part of pan-Arabist or leftist forces to radically shift or overturn the existing political system in favor of one less neutral, more "Arab", more socialist, more revolutionary. By so doing it gained widespread popular appeal and achieved a new sense of legitimacy as that political organization dedicated to strictly Lebanese nationalist interests. Its representation in government was but one manifestation of this new recognition. Nineteen fifty-eight thus marked

[1] These included the March 14-20, 1953, sectarian feud between *al-Hay'at al-Wataniyah*, a predominantly Muslim, pro-Lebanese political organization, and the Kata'ib, the acrimonious Muslim-Christian diatribe in the summer of that year, and the Mar Marun Dynamiting incident preceding the 1953 elections. See *al-'Amal*, March 15-21, July-August, 1953.

the Kata'ib's "accession to power and active participation in the political field"[1] and its participation in the government of four[2] signaled the turning point in its political history.

Consequently the party's internal organizational structure was refined and its programmatic appeal broadened. Although the party's organizational growth will be discussed later two significant developments deserve mention here. At the party's sixth general congress in 1963 the most extensive and systematic party program to date was elaborated. Designed to supercede the 1954 program, the *Minhaj al-'Amal al-Kata'ibi* (the Kata'ib action program) established the party's programmatic guidelines for the next ten years. Its object was to explicate in rather comprehensive detail the Kata'ib's position on Lebanon's social, economic, political, and cultural needs as well as indicating some general policy guidelines for Lebanese foreign policy. It also included an elaboration of the LKP's own belief-system as it related to the broader requirements of society.

Also important was the 1966 publication of Antoine Najm's *Falsafat al-'Aqidah al-Kata'ibiyah* (the philosophy of the Kata'ib doctrine). This treatise represented the first formal attempt at elaborating the assumptions and philosophical predilections of the Kata'ib's belief-system.

Within the system the party continued to expand in both influence and real power. Pierre Jumayyil assumed several ministerial posts throughout the Shihab regime and well into the Hilu presidency, while Kata'ib candidates were frequently successful in four succeeding electoral contests. In the June 21, 1959, by-election in Jazzin the LKP candidate, Basile 'Abbud, defeated the local favorite, Maroun Kan'an,[3] in the first electoral manifestation of the party's new found status.[4] The party was often victorious in subsequent elections: six of its seven candidates were elected in the 1960 elections, four of its nine candidates in 1964, and all of its nine candidates in 1968. Jumayyil himself was a presidential candidate in 1964 and 1970 but lost in both.

By the late 1960's the Kata'ib party had evolved into the most

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[1] Sa'adah, "Présence des Kataeb," p. 15.

[2] The cabinet included two Maronites (Raymond Eddé and Pierre Jumayyil) and two Sunnites (Rashid Karami and Husayn 'Uwayni).

[3] See *L'Orient*, June 24, 1959 and *infra* for details.

[4] See *L'Orient*, June 24, 1959.

effective political organization in the Lebanese political system. Probably much of its early development could be attributed to national and political responses to systemic and sub-systemic threats arising both from within and outside Lebanon's political environment. As power and prestige gradually accrued, the party began to adapt and refine its structure and ideology to the contemporary demands of state and society.

The role of competent and dedicated leadership should also not be underestimated for it has been a significant factor in the creation of a viable political organization and a central force in attracting a devoted mass following.

Since its ascendancy in the post-1958 period, the LKP has primarily directed its efforts to legitimizing the institutional structures of the state while attempting to develop among the masses an abiding faith in the Lebanese nation. Simultaneously it has continued to prepare its para-military units for possible confrontation with revolutionary elements seeking the overthrow of the system. Finally, it has hoped to create a viable nationalist ideology which could possibly serve as the basis of a lasting national consensus.

CHAPTER FOUR

BELIEF-SYSTEM AND IDEOLOGY FORMATION IN THE LEBANESE KATA'IB PARTY

For analytical purposes we shall distinguish between a "belief-system" and an "ideology". A belief-system refers to the basic values held by an individual or society; an ethical, moral, and spiritual *Weltanschauung* usually inaccessible to change and involving both cognitive aspects of thought and empirical beliefs as well as evaluative and expressive aspects.[1]

If a political community is to be formed[2] and, once formed, sustained as a viable and stable entity, it must be founded upon a common belief-system based on bonds of allegiance, a united outlook on life, and accepted means of thinking and acting. Once established, "[s]uch a belief-system interprets for the various groups in the community the world they live in, justifies the institutions under which they live, and helps regulate relations between them."[3] By understanding the normative principles and moral determinants characterizing the Kata'ib's belief-system we may better comprehend the meaning of its ideology and the justifications for its political actions.

Although an ideology flows from a given belief-system it constitutes its own image-system or perceptual screen through which the individual views the world. As such it influences an individual's perceptions of what is, what was, what may be, and what ought to

[1] See Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 207ff. Cf. Samuel Barnes, "Political Ideology and Political Behavior," in *Ideology, Politics, and Political Theory*, ed. by Richard H. Cox (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 349ff. and Giovanni Sartori, "Politics Ideology, and Belief Systems," *American Political Science Review* LXIII (June, 1969), pp. 398-411.

[2] Political community may be defined as a "we-feeling among a group of people, not that they are just a group but that they are a political entity that works together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny." David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 332.

[3] Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 1.

be. A political ideology may be regarded as an "articulated ethical [interpretation] and [principle] that [sets] forth the purposes, organization, and boundaries of political life."[1]

An ideology serves two primary functions: firstly it gives a sense of political community to the nation. By presenting a blueprint for organizing society, usually through a part-mythical, part-rational social philosophy, an ideology can give meaning to social action and thus enable the creation of a viable political community. Secondly an ideology acts to legitimize a political system and defend it against socio-political pressures.[2] In developing polities especially legitimizing ideologies "consist of those principles and values validating a structure, its norms, and occupants in terms of images of the future, interpretations of the present, and conceptions of the past."[3]

Belief-System: The Kata'ib View of Man and Society

Early in its development the Kata'ib belief-system or ethical world-view consisted of little more than a reaffirmation of universally accepted precepts found among virtually all traditional and many modern societies: a belief in God and family. According to the party's pre-1943 *Mithaq al-Kata'ib al-Watani* (the Kata'ib National Charter) "the belief in God and family are the basic foundations of the Lebanese nation."[4] The party's motto of *Allah, al-Watan, al-'A'ilah* (God-fatherland-family) are intended as a denunciation of "purely materialistic concepts of life and nation."[5] According to J. J. Ashqar, "without God there cannot be *sufiyah*[6] which raises society above itself..., constrains lust, and fosters a moralistic sense; it is one of the pillars for the continuation of a nation."[7]

[1] Easton, *Systems Analysis*, p. 290.

[2] According to Apter ideology helps to perform two main functions: (1) a social function which binds the community and (2) an individual function which organizes "the role personalities of the maturing individual." Both combine to legitimize authority. David E. Apter, "Introduction," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. by Apter, p. 18.

[3] Easton, *Systems Analysis*, p. 336.

[4] *Mithaq al-Kata'ib al-Watani* (the Kata'ib National Charter) (Beirut: n.p., n.d.), p. 1.

[5] Jamil Jabr al-Ashqar, *al-Harakah al-Kata'ibiyah: mafhum 'aqidatiha, tarikhaha, ahdafiha* (the Kata'ib Movement: its doctrine, history, and objectives understood) (Beirut: Matba'at al-'Amal, 1949), p. 115.

[6] Literally "*Sufism* or mystic way of life" but used here more broadly to mean "spirituality" or "religiosity."

[7] Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 116.

As for the family it is regarded as the "cornerstone of all social action." The Kata'ib doctrine or world-view rejects the theory that the family obstructs true nationalism "by monopolizing an individual's highest human emotions." On the contrary, Ashqar writes, the family is where "reverence, love and devotion" are developed, and rather than "impeding patriotic and nationalist sentiments and retarding the evolution of society, [the family] helps in their development in a normal human way and subsequently strengthens the coherence of the nation." In fact, Ashqar concludes, "aren't familial interdependence and fraternal cooperation... the cornerstones of any social unit and the most effective component of a nation?"[1]

As for the fatherland, "it is the necessary link between family and nation, the intermediary between the private community which is the property of the family and the public community which is represented by the nation; it combines the introvertedness of the former with the extensiveness of the latter." According to Ashqar "the feelings generated from within the family between the children are transferred to the heart of the nation and thus become the intermediary between familial love and love among citizens."[2]

This initial enunciation of an ethical world-view represented a primitive attempt at synthesizing the movement's early Christian fundamentalism with the modern demands of an emerging nation-state. According to this interpretation human dignity, human perfectibility, and a faith in human solidarity are viewed as subordinate considerations to the larger concepts of God, fatherland, and family. While the essence of this doctrine remained basically unaltered throughout the party's development significant readjustments were gradually being introduced to conform both to the demands of a rapidly modernizing society and to the expanding Kata'ib role in the Lebanese political system.

According to Antoine Najm, the party's official ideologue, as the Kata'ib developed greater confidence in the post-1958 period as a consequence of successive parliamentary victories, active participation in government, and an expanded popularity among the masses as revealed in increased membership figures, the party gradually discarded its "dogmatism" and began to espouse a more openly "liberal" philosophy.[3] "Whereas in the past," Najm indicated,

[1] *Ibid.*
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Interview with Antoine Najm, Beirut, Lebanon, March 11, 1969.

"many of the party's beliefs were inimical to non-Maronites today it is much more willing to accept different ideas."[1] There was thus the need for a reinterpretation—not a rejection—of the Kata'ib view of man and society in light of changed circumstances.

This reinterpretation, first outlined in the 1963 *Minhaj* (program), was officially formulated in Najm's 1966 publication, *Falsafat al-'Aqidah al-Kata'ibiyah* (the philosophy of the Kata'ib doctrine). The individual has now replaced the family as the basic operative unit in society and as a "social being" has more rights, such as intellectual, religious, social, and political freedom but at the same time more obligations towards the state he lives in. The emphasis is on human dignity, both individual and collective, and on the promotion of man, and one of the Kata'ib's primary interests becomes the welfare of the individual, spiritually as well as materially. Since no harmonious society can be created without an individual's consciousness of social responsibility, human dignity, and human solidarity, both individualistic and social tendencies must be reconciled so that society, the nation, and the state can develop "in a progressive fashion."[2]

The Kata'ib, according to Najm, cannot conciliate a "totalistic view of life" with liberty of the individual.[3] While man is an integral part of society "he is not so in his totality." The Kata'ib views the individual as a "social cell in the organic body of society, while rejecting the right of any temporal body to claim trusteeship over the totality of his being." This is directed at Marxist ideology and, more specifically, at Antun Sa'adah's view that man has "no worth in himself except in so far as he is a member of society."[4] On the contrary, says Najm, while man is essentially social, he transcends society, for he has a value in and of himself.

Integral to the Kata'ib belief-system is the sense of "spiritual consciousness." As a predominantly Christian inspired organization operating within a multi-confessional society, the role of religion inevitably assumes an important position in the party's hierarchy of social values. In fact, the party's fundamental philosophic premises are derived from the strength of its religious convictions. The

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Minhaj al-'Amal al-Kata'ibi* (the Kata'ib action program) (Beirut, 1963), p. 20.

[3] Interview with Antoine Najm, Beirut, Lebanon, March 11, 1969.

[4] Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 102.

sectarian character of Lebanese society has unavoidably accentuated the religious rather than secular differentiating qualities of its citizens.

While rejecting the principles of a theocratic state and the unification of temporal with religious powers, the Kata'ib ethical perspective is in "total harmony with monotheistic religions."[1] Najm cites six parallels: (1) both "teach that man is a being with a soul and body." The Kata'ib views man in special relationship to nature; that is, while he is a part of nature he also transcends it; "he has in himself something higher than nature: he has a soul."[2] In this sense the Kata'ib doctrine is a "spiritual yet realistic philosophy" for a realistic philosophy "preaches the existence of spirit and matter;" (2) both belief-systems address themselves to man as an individual; (3) "our doctrine preaches the priority of the soul. This means that we oppose any legislation, organization, or measure which infringes upon man's spiritual or subjective values." These values can have "no reality in the absence of the human soul;" (4) both stress the supreme importance of human brotherhood and the equality of all individuals;

> (5) our belief has complete confidence in religion as an essential aid to the organization of a better social life because it urges the believer (who is simultaneously a citizen) to perform his civic duties well. The ethical principles of religion raise the ethical standards of the citizen since they teach honesty, selflessnes, love, and peace;

finally, (6) the "common basis between us and religion is our faith in God."[3]

According to Najm religious belief is a private affair and does not necessarily negate the securality of the Kata'ib world-view. While he rejects the idea of an official state religion, he is equally opposed to the total separation of religion and state since both work at achieving the same goal: citizen-man. This *homme-citoyen* has needs so numerous and complex that neither the temporal nor the spritual power alone could satisfy them. Thus, although the duties of each of the two powers should be clearly distinguished, they must still work together towards "the development of the individual."[4]

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[1] Amin Naji (Antoine Najm), *Falsafat al-'Aqidah al-Kata'ibiyah* (the philosophy of the Kata'ib doctrine) (Beirut, 1966), p. 69.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75.

[4] *Ibid.* Cf. Pierre Jumayyil's paraphrasing of Najm in *al-'Amal*, August 15,

This reinterpretation of the basic belief-system accords well with the LKP's effort at reconciling traditional values with the demands of modernity. Within Lebanon's particular frame of reference, emphasizing man's traditional religious beliefs does not necessarily make modernity more difficult to achieve. To the Kata'ib there is no contradiction between a religiously-oriented belief-system and modernity because the former is the "domain of the individual and the latter the domain of the state."[1] According to this paradigm, although modernity may evolve more slowly, once achieved it will be based on a strong foundation which can better harmonize man's individualistic needs with the social demands of the nation-state.

Along with the emphasis on the "priority of the human individual" (*awwaliyah al-shakhs al-insani*) the Kata'ib belief-system underlines the importance of two other principles: action, that is, work (*al-'amal*) and private ownership (*al-mulkiyah*).[2] Although these principles are unalterable and remain fundamental to the belief-system it does not imply that it is forever rigid or that it has "an analytic philosophic outlook on the past or a prophetic view of the future." The Kata'ib world view is a "living view;" that is, "it is adaptable to change and alteration given new circumstances."[3]

Ideology Formation

The Kata'ib's ethical world-view has been the product of an evolutionary socialization process which finds its roots both in the

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1964, and *Bayan al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil* (the statement of Shaykh Pierre Jumayyil) (Shaturah: Tenth Party Congress, September 29, 1967), p. 12.

[1] Naji, *Falsafah*, p. 132.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 79-93.

[3] Interview with Antoine Najm, Beirut, Lebanon, March 11, 1969. It is interesting to compare Maurice Jumayyil's interpretation of the Kata'ib's existential character which he defines in terms of a "bio-political current." According to him, "the Kata'ib is essentially a stream of life and spontaneous action. It is a power generator, and acts as a catalyst according to the needs of the moment...[It is] an ethic, a style of life which ensures maximum liberty and dignity to the human being, and this thanks to its basic foundations, organization, order, and discipline;...[It is] an exhaustive culture and civilization which subjects all ideologies and doctrines to the service of man instead of subjecting man to doctrines and ideologies; it is in this that it is a culture and a civilization; ...[It is] a great servant of all which is human." Within this framework the objectives of the LKP are the "triumph over the past and its sequels, overcoming the *status quo* and those it favors, and liberating the future and its promises." Interview with Maurice Jumayyil, Beirut, Lebanon, February 19, 1969 and "Intervention de Maître Maurice Gemayel," Beirut, 1966, p. 4. (mimeographed)

distinctive historical experiences of the Lebanese nation and in the peculiar religious influences of western Christianity. In this sense this particular belief-system is inextricably associated with the Lebanese "experience" and therefore should not be regarded as a deliberately created or artificially inspired philosophical doctrine used to justify and advance specific local, confessional, or ethnic interests. It has always been "there," so to speak, and the LKP's function has been, more or less, to redefine it in acceptable and modern terms and use its relatively advanced organizational structure to propagate the essential principles of the belief-system among the masses. The party's ideological development, however, has a different, less "existential" genesis.

The LKP's ideological development can be placed within a general three-phase framework. The first phase, from 1936 to 1943, was characterized by a very strong if not fanatical attachment to the concept of an independent Lebanon of which Maronite nationalism was the significant motivating force. There was little overt reference, however, to the primacy of the Maronite component although most of the leaders and followers were of the Maronite sect. In fact, it would be difficult to pinpoint a specific and structured ideological framework by which the Kata'ib chartered its political course. Rather, during the pre-independence period the LKP regarded itself and was, for the most part, regarded by others as an *ad hoc* patriotic youth movement struggling to obtain Lebanon's total freedom and political independence. Neither a fervent ethno-confessional sentiment nor the emphasis on purity, goodness, God, and family could be considered as the legitimate elements of a viable ideology. Moreover, the almost obsessive dedication to a single cause—Lebanese independence—prevented the party from undertaking any serious analysis of its political principles and objectives.

The events of 1943, however, introduced several significant elements affecting the party's ideological orientation. Namely, its consequential role in the country's pre-independence struggle, its deliberate collaboration with various political groups, and the general acceptance accorded it by the people necessitated a gradual but visible disengagement from the extreme Maronite isolationist position with which it was at first associated. Moreover, in terms of membership recruitment, party programs, and electoral participation an ideology defining the "proper behavior of mass and

elite alike, setting forth particular criteria for political legitimacy and prescribing political tactics"[1] had to be expounded. More importantly, if it was to arouse passion and instill conviction it had to perform three things: "simplify ideas, establish a claim to truth, and, in the union of the two, demand a commitment to action."[2]

The ideological doctrine adopted by the LKP was that of Lebanese nationalism or Lebanonism, a doctrine whose intellectual genesis could be traced back to the writings of Mount Lebanon's eighteenth and nineteenth century Maronite clergymen and lay thinkers. Although Lebanonism adopted many of the arguments, premises, justifications, and conclusions of Maronite nationalism and itself had numerous advocates in the contemporary period, it was the Kata'ib, of all the organized political groups in the country, which institutionalized the concept as a means of buttressing national unity and countering the disruptive influence of Arab nationalism.

Although Lebanonism has remained relatively unaltered since its adoption in the early 1940's several significant developments have occurred since 1958 when the third phase can be said to have begun. Most important has been the gradual rejection of viewing Lebanon only in terms of its past; contemporary Lebanonism likes to consider itself futuristic. There has also been a visible acceptance of interconfessionalism as an integral part of the Lebanese nationalist concept. However it presented itself Lebanonism remained, for the most part, a Christian concept created and propagated by Christians. As the LKP assumed an important power position in the state in the aftermath of the 1958 civil war and began to adopt a more serious and responsible political posture, it became evident that some type of ideological adjustment had to be made to accommodate its broadened cross-confessional support. Hence Lebanonism was secularized, expanded, and popularized.

The principal aims and objectives of Lebanonism are: (1) the resolution of Lebanon's identity dilemma by the introduction of a broadly-based nationalist ideology; (2) the legitimization of the country's multiconfessional society and its system of democratic rule; and (3) the establishment of an effective ideological counter-

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[1] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 125-126.

[2] Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 372.

poise to the widespread and popular appeal of Arabism and Arab nationalism among the Lebanese masses.

Lebanonism and Its Components

Like many nationalist ideologies of the Afro-Asian world, Lebanonism seeks to establish a system of norms on which to judge past, present, and future performances. Towards this end it places particular emphasis on historical continuity by which it hopes to promote social solidarity and impart a sense of identity to the individuals in the society. Not unlike other nationalisms Lebanonism seeks

> ...to center authority on certain aspects of tradition, asserts the continuity of society, and links the present with the past and, by so doing, asserts the immortality of the society, its on-going and life-giving characteristics. The definition of membership in the society, the sanctity of the past, and the symbolism of political forms are made explicit, reinforced, and stipulated as part of a modernizing culture.[1]

Lebanonism directs itself to two interdependent aspects of Lebanese society: the uniqueness of the Lebanese historical experience which justifies the country's independent status, and the distinctiveness of the Lebanese people which justifies their differentiation from the other peoples, races, and ethnic communities of the region.

As the product of an interaction between rational and irrational elements Lebanonism is made up of part myth, part reality, influenced by religious beliefs and superstitions, supported by legends, folklore, symbolizations, and manifestations of national traditions. It is from this perspective that the following discussion must be understood.

Lebanonism confers upon Lebanon a unique historical, sociocultural, and religious experience thereby defining it as a distinct and separate nation. According to the Kata'ib frame of reference Lebanon is a physical and historic "reality" which, although small, constitutes an irreducible entity.

Fundamental to its physical reality is the belief in its historic territorial borders. Defined six centuries ago[2] these "natural"

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[1] David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 340.

[2] Ashqar, while stating that Lebanon "is a fact of life, supported by historical

frontiers are those that have always delimited the nation. Consequently, "Lebanese reality was ensured during six centuries by the constant and methodical search for and defense of total independence and territorial integrity."[1] Although violated, altered, and almost obliterated over the centuries, in 1920 Lebanon "was re-established within its natural frontiers."[2]

Lebanon is also a "historic reality" endowed with a special "mission" and distinct vocation. This reality finds its genesis in Phoenician civilization of which modern-day Lebanon is the successor. Crucial to Lebanonism's *raison d'être* is an affirmation of the historical continuity of a non-Arab heritage.

The heritage of Phoenician civilization is conceived in terms of culture and ethos rather than politics. Therefore, it is argued, Lebanon's national existence "has no direct link with Phoenicia since modern Lebanon began to be formed towards the fourteenth century, seventeen centuries after the fall of Phoenicia." Nevertheless the Lebanese are "successors to the Phoenicians" and have inherited the latter's "liberal, peaceful, mercantile, and civilizing qualities."[3] From this flows the idea of Lebanon as a "mission"—a civilizing, spiritual, liberal, and democratic force in the Mediterranean world.

Pierre Jumayyil has expressed Lebanon's special role and "*mission civilisatrice*" in the following terms:

> Even while they were only Phoenicians ,the Lebanese already showed their sense of the universe, their attachment to liberal traditions, and a generosity of spirit and heart so great that it enabled them to love and understand even the most distant peoples.
>
> It is thus that they have contributed to the blossoming of Mediterranean civilization in the domain of art, science, religion, and material progress. Western humanism... owes to them its first foundations.
>
> The faithfulness of Lebanon to its mission and to its heritage had never been denied over the last six thousand years of history. A small

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proof, [and] a product of an ancient past," traces Lebanon's borders only to the 1860's, that is, to the period of European intervention in the aftermath of the Druze-Maronite massacres. Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 21.

[1] *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 6.

[2] *Action* (December, 1963), p. 7.

[3] *Action* (April, 1960), p. 945. Cf. Dahdah, *Evolution historique*, pp. 52-90. According to Najm "Lebanon's nationalism is not Phoenician but is a fruit of that heritage; its own personality has developed throughout its history." Interview with Antoine Najm, Beirut, Lebanon, February 18, 1969.

> land...it remains at the crossroads of human civilizations which it always seeks to know and to assimilate.[1]

Lebanon is also a "refuge," an asylum for ethnic minorities and those persecuted because of their religious beliefs. Throughout history it has played this role and will continue to do so in the future. As such it serves to liberate the soul from spiritual persecution and propagate humanism, brotherly love, and compassion.[2] However, this should not be construed to mean that Lebanon is a "no-man's land," a refugee country within which separate national groups form distinct, non-Lebanese loyalties. On the contrary, Lebanese nationality is defined in terms of a common past, the use of a common language and culture, and, finally, on a general willingness to live together.[3]

Lebanonism and Arabism

As we have already noted the rise of the LKP was in part a response to the challenge of Syrian and Arab nationalist movements with Lebanonism reflecting the ideological component of that response. While the doctrine of Syrian social nationalism often appeared threatening it always remained a localized and thereby controllable phenomenon. Much more imposing and by far more capable, however, was the rise and rapid development of Arab nationalism in the post-World War Two period. Especially forceful has been the concept of *'urubah* or Arabism which has been so effectively propagated by Egypt and, to a lesser extent, the Arab Ba'th Socialist party. It is against this ideological concept that Lebanese nationalism has directed its major attack. Arab nationalism not only resurrects past fears, threatens vital self-interests, and challenges the efficacy of long-developed western-Christian attachments, but it does so with an impunity born of repeated successes sustained across national boundaries and spanning nearly half a century. It is in terms of this phenomenal nationalist development that Lebanonism may be viewed, in part at least, as an ideological response to Arabism.[4]

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[1] *Al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah: Political Democratic Party* (Beirut, 1958), p. 22. Also reproduced in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 108ff.

[2] "Le Libanisme, une doctrine," *Connaissance des Kataeb*, pp. 61-62.

[3] *Al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah*, p. 28.

[4] Elias Rababi is much more direct: "throughout its history the Kata'ib's fundamental *raison d'être* has remained unaltered: defending Lebanon's integrity,

Lebanonism does not regard the Lebanese as belonging to the Arab "race." Historically, "before the Arabs, at the same time as them, and after them, many other peoples settled on the present territory of Lebanon, and it is for this reason of elementary logic that we [Lebanese] are not purely and unquestionably Arabs."[1]

The president of the party has been much more explicit. In answer to an interview question as to "what extent is Lebanon an Arab country," Pierre Jumayyil responded:

> Lebanon has an Arab tongue and it is Arab in neighborhood and interest, but the Lebanese are not of the Arab race. We believe in the existence of a Lebanese nationalism that equals Arab nationalism. Our ideological attachment to Lebanese nationalism is the source of our conflict with the Arab nationalists, a conflict that is strictly ideological and became now Byzantic. We believe that the Lebanese race exists as the other existing races in Europe—we are like the Italian and English races. Ours has the fundamental characteristics that make it equal to the others.[2]

There is almost unanimous concurrence on this fundamental "racial" distinction allegedly separating Lebanese from Arabs. Even among the party's younger elites, for example, there is repeated stress placed on the peculiarity of Lebanese nationhood. According to A. Najm, probably one of the youngest and most erudite of the Kata'ib's intellectuals, "Lebanon's affiliation with the Arab world is not nationalistic. The Lebanese have their own personality, that is, their distinctive nationalism. The Lebanese are Arabs just as the Danes are Scandinavians, the Rumanians Slavs or the Chileans Latin Americans."[3] Thus Arabism has no applicability to Lebanon since only a common language, "which in any case the Lebanese have always protected and propagated," binds Lebanon with the Arab world.[4] "While Arabic is our language," Jumayyil concedes, "a similar language does not assume a single nation, a common ideal."[5]

The purpose here of course is to deny the importance of Arabism as a cultural and historic reality relevant to the Lebanese ex-

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independence, and sovereignty against pan-Arabist aspirations." Interview with Elias Rababi, Beirut, Lebanon, March 13, 1969.

[1] "Evolution de la nation libanaise," p. 945.

[2] *Daily Star* (Beirut), March 2, 1969.

[3] *Al-'Amal*, March 7, 1969.

[4] Jumayyil, *Bayan, 1967*, p. 12.

[5] "Face à la question arabe," *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 113.

perience. By excluding Arabism from its proper historical context Jumayyil suggests, as Sa'adah did before him, "that fourteen centuries in the history of a nation are but a fleeting moment and are, therefore, of no consequence whatsoever."[1]

Arabism is also rejected on "religious" grounds; that is, while Lebanonism is viewed as the nationalist expression of a multiconfessional society wherein, theoretically, no single religious sect predominates or is accorded official state sanction, Arabism, it is argued, is unmistakably interconnected with Islam. "We cannot accept Arabism," Jumayyil has written, "because a specific religion, which we honor and respect, constitutes the essense of Arabism as a nationalism. As for Lebanon, it is a conglomeration of religions and races."[2]

While conceding that perhaps the Arabism of certain intellectuals is "scientific" and free of "religious fanaticism," it nevertheless is the expression of only a small minority. "This small minority reproaches us," Jumayyil states, "for not echoing its call [for Arabism]; they accuse us of isolationism, introversion, and confessionalism."[3] He rejects their appeal not because the Kata'ib is isolationist, introverted, or sectarian, "but because we have our own Lebanese nationalism" and, most revealingly, because "secularity is impossible for Arab nationalism;[4] religion is the essence of this nationalism as a result of the teachings of its leaders and ideologues."[5] In fact, according to the Kata'ib frame of reference, "the pan-Arab movement is first and foremost a pan- Islamic movement"[6] and behind the Arab idea there exists the Islamic reality. Therefore, "Arabism is Islam."[7]

It is this kind of ideological rationalization[8] which helps sustain

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[1] Zuwiyya Yamak, *SSNP*, p. 84.

[2] Jumayyil, *Bayan, 1967*, p. 12.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Cf. Clovis Maksoud, an ardent Arab nationalist, who writes that although "the Arab is not a term identical with a Muslim...the secularity of the Arab affirms the positive impact of Islam on his formation. It is not his total involvement, but Islam is part of the Arab's heritage, culture, history and civilization whether the Arab is a Muslim or not." Clovis Maksoud, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. by Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1966), pp. 247-248.

[5] Jumayyil, *Bayan, 1967*, p. 12.

[6] *Al-'Amal*, July 15, 1943.

[7] *Al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah*, p. 32.

[8] See, for example, Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York: W. W. Norton Library, paperback, 1962).

the nation-myth.[1] All too often, however, it tends to degenerate into overt religious and/or racial prejudice. Thus, the vice president of the party, in all sincerity and candor, can assert that

> each religion has its own age and in time becomes more and more spiritual. Therefore, while Christianity in the twentieth century is more spiritual than it was in the middle ages, Islam is today only in the fourteenth century although Lebanese Muslims, less fanatic than their co-religionists in other parts of the Arab world because of their contacts with Christians, are today in the eighteenth century, this in spite of their twentieth century appearances.[2]

Although most party leaders would reject such condescending generalizations Lebanonism's Christian "character" inevitably encourages such ideological perspectives. A. Najm, for example, in a polemical retort to a symposium on Christian-Arab relations, has formulated a nationalist synthesis which seeks to explain why Lebanese Christians can have no national loyalty other than to Lebanon.

Among the symposium's various resolutions was a rejection of a "Church alien to what is around it" and a demand that the Church and Christians "consider themselves as an indivisible part of the Arab world, sharing in its problems, struggles and aspirations towards liberation and building a modern society for all its members."[3] According to its spokesman, Bishop Haddad, the term "around it" is defined as the *bi'at al-tajassud* (the environment of embodiment), represented by the Arab world.

Najm begins by asking if the Arab world is the *muhit* (milieu) of the Lebanese Christians? According to him the Christian's bi'at al-tajassud is "mankind at large." Therefore the duty of the Christian towards his brother pays no regard to differences of nationality, nationalism, language, religion, or race. "The Christian knows," Najm writes, "that it is a grave matter to be self-centered, to alienate oneself from others and to give in to selfishness..."[4] Nevertheless, he adds, all humans are the offspring of a particular bi'at and the attachment which binds him to it is unlike any other attachment.

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[1] This type of historical engineering and myth-taking is a common characteristic of nationalist ideologies. This process is well described by von Grunebaum. See Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, paperback, 1962).

[2] Interview with Joseph Shadir, Beirut, Lebanon, April 18, 1969.

[3] *Al-'Amal*, March 7, 1969.

[4] *Ibid.*

Consequently, "between man's personal environment and the broader environment of humanity at large exists a nationalistic environment which is legally represented by the state."

Previously denied, the nationalist state now assumes paramount importance. To Najm there is no apparent inconsistency; on the contrary, the nationalistic environment "is the most expansive range for the potentiality of the human being" and, in fact, becomes the "window from which an individual looks at mankind." It is also a "natural threshold from which to enter into humanity." Hence, Najm concludes, "there is no contradiction between nationalism and humanity."[1]

This is all to say that the Arab world cannot be the environment of the Church and Christians of Lebanon "unless it is a nationalistic environment of the Lebanese." This nationalistic environment has its own particular expression—Lebanonism—and this is incompatible with 'urubah. For Najm the bi'at al-tajassud for Lebanese Christians is Lebanon not the Arab world and it is therefore "...impossible [for Lebanese Christians] to be of the Arab world as long as [their] national identity is Lebanese." From this Najm asserts: "let every Church in every Arab country consider that the state boundaries are the boundaries of its embodiment. Then its actions will be deeper, more comprehensive, more effective, [and] less likely of arousing anxiety and fear."[2]

Conclusion

As a nationalist ideology Lebanonism, as propounded by the Kata'ib, suffers from an inherent weakness: an implicit Christian or, more specifically, Maronite bias. In more practical terms the lack of charismatic leadership and an inability to sufficiently arouse the masses weakens its potential impact. Because of its limited scope and objectives in terms of population and geography Lebanonism has been described by some of its detractors as "no more or less than an attempt on the part of the Christians...to confront and confuse Islam with a facade of Western political idealism."[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Richard Hans Laursen, "The Kata'ib: A comprehensive Study of a Lebanese Political Party" (unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1951), p. 76.

Lebanonism cannot be dismissed so easily because it represents a force of some consequence. According to party leaders Lebanonism cannot now or in the near future, given the pluralist nature of Lebanese society, inspire the political and national allegiance of *all* Lebanese citizens. Given the historical circumstances in which it currently finds itself, Lebanonism can at best give coherence to the Christians' sense of national identity, offer an ideological alternative to those who may have become disillusioned with the tenets and performance of Arab nationalism, lay the basis for a future, broader and more fully secular nationalist ideology, and, finally, give significance and meaning to political actions within the governmental and parliamentary spheres.

In recent years party elites have begun to discard the earlier-held notion of viewing Lebanon *only* in terms of its past. Today little is written in either official publications or private statements on the importance of Lebanon's Phoenician ancestry. Rather the framework is futuristic with a goal towards national fusion and sectarian harmony.

By stressing the religious and thereby traditional component of the Lebanese life-style, it is hoped that a radical disruption of social structures can be avoided. The importance of achieving an adaptive accommodation between the conflicting demands of traditionalism and modernity is continuously repeated. No development can occur, it is argued, if potentially dysfunctional trans-nationalist ideologies compete for the loyalty of the citizen. Lebanonism, therefore, hopes to "Lebanonize" at least one segment of the population—all the Christians—as a beginning step in the process of eventually constructing a viable political community. If the Muslim and especially Sunnite population in Lebanon refrain from assuming an activist pro-Arab nationalist posture, many of Lebanonism's current objectives will have been achieved.

CHAPTER FIVE

PARTY STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Among the most distinguishing characteristics of the Kata'ib, those which clearly differentiate it from all other Lebanese political parties, whether legitimate or illegal, are its elaborate hierarchical organization governed by a modified form of democratic centralism, strict party discipline, above average cross-national membership, and an organizational longevity surpassed only by the Lebanese Communist Party.

The LKP has an effective, working, and durable national party organization whose close to 70,000 members are found throughout Lebanon even down to the smallest villages and towns. The organizational configuration is pyramidal, and the flow of messages, directives, and information is rapid, whether going to or from the top hierarchy. In ordinary times, that is, in the absence of elections or national crises the party encourages decision-making activities at the lower levels of the organization.

One can identify three general phases in the party's organizational development: (1) a strictly para-military, militia-based autocratic centralism (1936-1942); (2) a diluted form of autocratic centralism with both militia and branch constituting the basic elements or component units of the party organization (1942-1952); and, finally, reflecting the party's multifunctional objectives, (3) the inauguration of democratic centralism based simultaneously upon three component elements: militia, branch, and cell (since 1952).

PARA-MILITARISM: 1936-1942

The organizational development of the party has been in part dictated by its ideology and its own subjective interpretation of Lebanese political realities. As an essentially pre-political nationalist youth movement devoted more to athletic training for the purpose of combat than political power per se, the Kata'ib's early organizational structure was based on the militia.[1] The militia, which along

[1] *Al-Qanun al-Asasi* (the basic laws) (Beirut, May 1, 1937), article 18.

with the caucus, branch, and cell constitutes one of Duverger's four types of "basic elements," is defined as

> ...a kind of private army whose members are enrolled on military lines, are subjected to the same discipline and the same training as soldiers, like them wearing uniforms and badges, ready like them to march in step preceded by a band and flags, and like them ready to meet the enemy with weapons in physical combat. But these members remain civilians.[1]

The party's para-military structure, based on very small groups which built up into pyramids to form larger and larger units, consisted of several phalanxes of 600 men each. Each phalanx was sub-divided into two companies of 300 men each, each company into two sections, each section into six squads (twenty-five men each), and each squad into four patrols of six men each.[2] Membership was open to all male Lebanese citizens between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five who possessed the required "moral conditions and physical aptitudes." All Phalangists had to wear a uniform for training and in parades. Recruitment was the responsibility of university and school organizations with training exercises taking place at least once a week.[3]

The para-military structure operated under a form of autocratic centralism wherein all decisions came from above and their application was controlled locally by representatives of the center. The leader nominated all sub-leaders while all lower units were subordinated to higher ones. Thus, for example, the leader directly nominated the phalanx heads and, with their consultation, the leaders of the companies and sections. Likewise, upon the recommendation of the commission on games and sports, he appointed the remaining officers.[4]

Administratively the movement was directed by the party leader, its secretary-general, and various technical commissions. The leader, in accordance with his autocratic powers, nominated the secretary-general and heads of all the commissions which he alone could create.[5]

Both the para-military structure and the leadership role assumed

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[1] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York: Science Editions, 1963), p. 36.

[2] *Qanun, 1937*, article 18.

[3] *L'Orient* (Beirut), December 16, 1936.

[4] *Qanun, 1937*, article 19.

[5] *Ibid.*, articles 24 through 30.

by Pierre Jumayyil were aptly suited to the movement's early purposes and corresponded to the nationalist phases of its existence, facilitated its semi-clandestine life during the various periods of its dissolutions, and, most significantly, prepared and trained the necessary cadres for the assumption of a more "activist" role in the Lebanese political system.

AUTOCRATIC CENTRALISM TRANSFORMED: 1942-1952

On the eve of Lebanese independence several forces were operating which necessitated an organizational readjustment within the party. Specifically, although its broader ideological objectives as yet remained undefined, the party had attracted an extensive and devoted following. The paramilitary apparatus in the post-independence period would no longer suffice to retain and mobilize this increased number. Moreover, a new basic component had to be introduced if the party aspired to political longevity. The 1942 regulations therefore reflected the transitional phase of the party's structural development, redefined the autocratic authotiry of the leader, and laid the groundwork for the creation of a genuinely cross-national grass-roots organization.

The process of politicization and organizational transformation begins with the introduction of two distinctive features in the 1942 party statute:[1] (1) the establishment of a consultative council around the leader or *ra'is* and (2) the creation of the section or *qism* (pl.: *aqsam*) as the basic element of the party structure.

Theoretically the new party regulations reaffirmed the president's absolutism: "the leader controls all nominations and dismissals and he alone decides on all dispositions that are to be taken in the interest of the LKP."[2] In reality, however, since 1937, the president had always surrounded himself with an advisory group with whom he consulted extensively prior to taking any decision. The new statute, by creating a consultative council, ameliorated the president's powers and institutionalized what had already been practiced.

According to articles 23 through 26, the president was obliged to

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[1] *Al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah: al-Nizam al-'Amm wa al-Qanun al-Ta'dhibi* (the Lebanese Kata'ib: general regulations and disciplinary code) (Beirut: Matba'at al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah, November 21, 1942).

[2] *Ibid.*, article 21.

convene four kinds of consultative meetings: (1) a weekly meeting with the secretary-general and the heads of the departments (article 23); (2) a monthly meeting with the members of the departments and another with the presidents, vice-presidents, and secretaries of the Beirut territorial divisions (article 24); (3) a bi-annual meeting with the presidents, vice-presidents, and secretaries of the regional sectors and sections (article 25); and (4) a yearly general assembly of all presidents, vice-presidents, and secretaries under the chairmanship of the party leader (article 26).

The other executive organ—the secretariat—remained unchanged except for the addition of four "bureaus." The technical commissions were transformed into twelve departments (*masalih*) corresponding to ministries in a national government. A women's auxiliary[1] constituted a separate although closely affiliated thirteenth department or *maslahah.*

Probably the new statute's greatest innovation was the creation of the section (*qism*) as the component unit of the party organization. The section corresponds to Duverger's "branch" which is extensive and "tries to enroll members, to multiply their numbers and to increase its total strength."[2] As such the section was an attempt to broaden the party's geographical base while retaining the squad (*firqah*) as a subordinate yet necessary militia component. The section, as a political rather than military unit, differed from the squad in terms of number and geography. The number in the squad was pre-determined and purposely limited. Physical aptitude was the primary criteria for squad membership. The section, on the other hand, sought to facilitate and extend membership recruitment; its primary function was to increase continually. Likewise, while the squad represented no specific region and lacked a definite regional headquarter, the section was established in specifically delimited areas with every region subdivided into sections (*aqsam*).

The whole of the administrative apparatus now reflected the primacy of a political rather than a para-military base. The organizational transformation, reflecting the party's increased electoral participation, new political objectives, and still important

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[1] The auxiliary possessed its own basic statute defining purposes, programs, obligations, membership, etc. See *Al-Qanun al-Asasi li-al-Munazzamah al-Nisa'iyah al-Kata'ibiyah* (the basic statutes of the Kata'ib women's organization) (Beirut, March 1, 1941).

[2] Duverger, *Political Parties,* p. 23.

para-military role, became complete in the 1952 codes and its various amendments.

Democratic Centralism: post-1952

The change in the post-1952 organizational structure of the party marked a basic change in scope and direction. Ideologically the imperatives of upholding an independent Lebanon remained unchanged and, if anything, required intensification. Programmatically the party needed the appropriate institutional instruments to implement its highly detailed and broad-ranged programs. Moreover, as a party in search of political power, the structural mechanism necessary for successful electoral participation needed readjustment. Finally, the extensive membership distributed throughout the country required more effective mobilization, indoctrination, and training to meet the multifunctional demands now imposed upon it.

Central Administrative Organs of the Party: Al-Maktab Al-Siyasi and Al-Majlis Al-Markazi

The executive leadership of the party was transformed from an autocratic to an oligarchical centralism. According to article 13 of the general statute the *maktab al-siyasi* (political bureau) is the "decision-making organ of the party. It formulates all policies and programs. It appoints all officials and heads to the various ranks and positions... and supervises the execution of all its resolutions and decisions."[1] The maktab is a creation of the 1952 statute. Whereas all previous executive positions were by direct nomination of the party president, maktab membership now falls into three categories: (1) *de jure:* current and former ministers and deputies in the national government; (2) nominated: members nominated by the maktab; (3) elected: the president and vice-president who are elected for three years, indefinitely renewable, by the *majlis al-markazi* (central council) and five other members elected by the same body for two years also indefinitely renewable.[2]

Where authority was previously centralized in the hands of the president it has now been transferred to the maktab. The leader presides over the maktab and the majlis and represents the party

[1] *Nizam 'Amm* (general regulations) (Beirut, 1952 as amended in 1956).

[2] *Ibid.*, article 14.

before all authorities and officials bodies. He also insures the execution of maktab decisions and "enjoys for this purpose all the necessary powers."[1] Policy resolutions are adopted on the basis of a simple majority of those maktab members present, with the leader having the power to break any deadlock.[2]

The president is assisted in all his functions by a vice-president and secretary-general.[3] The latter is in charge of the secretariat of the political bureau, provides liaison between the maktab and the various party departments, and coordinates and supervises the many administrative organs of the party.[4] He is in fact the second most influential man in the party for he is able to place before the maktab the business upon which it must take action. This function alone gives him great power for if he chooses he can hold back petitions from party members and submit only those which please him. All major inter-party business must pass through his office, and while it is not necessary that he approve it before passing it on, in practice he actually does. He thus acts both as a shield and link between membership and leadership.

While local decision-making is encouraged throughout the various levels of the party organization, supreme authority resides in the political bureau. In fact the whole of the hierarchical structure operates under a modified form of democratic centralism, meaning nomination of practically all governing bodies from bottom to top, periodic accountability of party bodies to their party organizations, strict party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority, and the decisions of higher bodies are unconditionally binding upon lower ones.

The aims of democratic centralism are "to make known to the center with the greatest possible accuracy the point of view of the rank and file, so as to allow it to make vital decisions; to ensure that the decision taken by the center is applied to all levels..." Democratic centralism presupposes that "very free discussion takes place at the base *before* decisions are taken...but that the strictest of discipline is observed by all *after* the decision has been reached."[5]

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[1] *Nizam 'Amm*, articles 15 and 16.

[2] "Nizam al-Maktab al-Siyasi" (regulations of the political bureau) in *'Aqidah-Nizam 'Amm-Anzima al-Masalih-Mulhaq* (doctrine-general regulations-statutes of the departments-supplement) (Beirut, 1956), article 4.

[3] *Nizam 'Amm*, articles 18 through 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, article 20.

[5] Duverger, *Political Parties*, p. 57.

Except for the president, vice-president, and five elected members of the political bureau all subordinate party leaders are appointed rather than elected to their positions. This deviates from democratic centralism in its "pure" form as exists, for example, in world-wide Communist parties wherein all party governing bodies are elected rather than appointed. Nevertheless, it is argued, centralization is more "democratic" than autocratic by the fact that party leaders are chosen only after extensive consultation with and approval of the appropriate membership involved.[1] Therefore, an indirect but no less "democratic" system of party representation and structural coordination is theoretically achieved.

In essence the party justifies its nominating procedures in several ways: (1) the head of the section and his executive committee are not appointed except after receiving at least the majority approval of the section membership. Quite often the members themselves propose the candidates; (2) the heads of the regions, sectors, and districts and their executive committees are likewise appointed only after receiving at least the majority approval of their members; (3) "the base of the party participates, through various intermediary organs, in choosing the supreme leadership of the party." In turn, the maktab "does not make an appointment until ascertaining the desirability of the appointment on the part of those involved;" (4) the broadlines of party policy are decided by the maktab but only after consultation with the majlis "which represents the popular base of the party...;" (5) the party holds an annual congress wherein four delegates from the regions, sectors, districts, and all departments are represented.[2] Therefore, according to Joseph Sa'adah, the party's secretary-general, "the manifest tie between the party apex and the popular base gives the members a primordial role in the life of the party. This link constitutes the primary factor in the party's dynamism and unity."[3]

Intra-party elections, on the other hand, present several distinct liabilities according to Sa'adah. In response to a query during the "debates" at the 1964 party congress as to whether party nominations, rather than elections, were compatible with democratic

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[1] *Binyat Hizb al-Kata'ib* (the structure of the Kata'ib Party) (Beirut, 1962), p. 19.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

[3] Joseph Sa'adah, "Présence des Kataeb," *Septième Congrès des Kataeb* (Beirut: Action-Proche Orient, 1964), p. 50.

procedures, the secretary-general offered three principal reasons for the rejection of the electoral method:

> (1) The electoral process is an exhausting one for the party. Its application at all levels of leadership and the ensuing fights and divisions weaken the strength of the party; (2) the electoral system often prevents the renewal of party cadres. Experience has shown that the parties which elect their cadres age rapidly...; (3) elections rarely give an opportunity to the best elements, since most electors judge candidates according to public behavior and performance rather than on the basis of their presumed qualifications to handle the responsibilities of leadership.[1]

The result of this practice is a strengthening of central control over all subordinate administrative, political, and functional organs thereby reducing the opportunity for internal dissension or fragmentation at the local level.

The maktab's ultimate authority affects all aspects of party life. Especially significant is its control over party members in the Chamber of Deputies.[2] According to a 1961 decision the maktab "determines the electoral policy of each constituency. This policy serves as the basis of public and private service that the deputy will accomplish. The latter applies in the constituency this aforementioned policy."[3] The candicacy of any member running for elections depends upon the maktab and its subsidization by the department of finance and supply.[4]

Al-Majlis Al-Markazi

The majlis al-markazi or central council is the party's consulta-

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[1] For complete text of Sa'adah's reply see "Les Débats," *Septième Congrès*, pp. 48-50.

[2] The degree of party influence upon candidates is best revealed in the case of Samir Ishaq. A political unknown, Protestant, and young (31), Ishaq was chosen by the maktab five weeks before the 1968 general elections to represent the party in Beirut's first electoral district. Running solely on the reputation and program of the party along with a brief (four weeks) but efficient and well-organized campaign Ishaq won with an easy 4,000 vote plurality. "As a member of parliament [he] obeys the party 100 per cent and takes no position without prior approval of the maktab." Interview with Samir Ishaq, Beirut, Lebanon, November 6, 1968.

In 1952 one of the three party members in parliament—'Abdallah al-Hajj—was expelled from the party for failing to obey the decisions of the Political Bureau. See Karim Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb" (unpublished thesis, Université de Saint Joseph, Beirut, September 27, 1967), p. 78.

[3] *Al-Maktab al-Siyasi*, decision no. 1666, March 13, 1961.

[4] *Al-Maktab al-Siyasi*, decision no. 1767, August 14, 1961.

tive and supervisory organ[1] sometimes called the "parliament of the party."[2] It is composed of all the members of the political bureau, the heads of the departments, the presidents and vice-presidents of the regions, and the leaders of the Beirut district, with the vice-presidents of the departments having discussion but no voting rights.[3] Occasionally the maktab may permit some Kata'ib members to attend the meetings of the majlis as observers. In addition thirteen representatives of the different social cells (*khalaya*) of the party are included.

The majlis supervises the activities of all the departments, summons the maktab, puts forth suggestions, and elects the president and vice-president of the party along with five other members of the political bureau.[4] Majlis membership is of three types: plenary, participant, and observer. Table 2 indicates the distribution pattern.

As the party's permanent consultative body the majlis is to be consulted and kept informed of all maktab decisions.[5] Every Mon-

Table 2
Al-Majlis Al-Markazi:
Membership Distribution, 1969-1970

Representatives	*Plenary*	*Participant*	*Observer*
Aqalim	38	—	—
Beirut	16	13 (social cells)	—
Masalih	13	13	—
Maktab	23	—	12
Sub-Totals	90	26	12
Total	128		

Source: Karim Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb" (unpublished Mémoire de Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures de Sciences Politiques, Université de Saint Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon, 1967), n. 112, p. 127. The total represents the maximum number with many members holding several posts. Representation is unequal with Beirut over-represented (one representative for every 312 members) and the aqalim under-represented (one representative for every 1,000 members).

[1] *Nizam 'Amm*, article 44.
[2] *Al-'Amal*, November 28, 1965. (special issue)
[3] *Nizam 'Amm*, article 44.
[4] *L'Orient*, November 30, 1958.
[5] See "Nizam al-Majlis al-Markazi al-Dakhali" (internal regulations of the central council) in *Anzima, 1956*, pp. 23-24.

day the head of the party relates to the majlis the relevant events and important decisions taken by the party. After this political survey he answers questions posed to him and listens to different suggestions. The meeting also serves to keep party officials abreast of issues relative to party policy as well as to enable them to be consulted on various problems.

MASALIH (DEPARTMENTS)

The administrative organs of the party are composed of sixteen departments or masalih (see chart 2) each directed by a president, vice-president, and secretary as well as various other advisers who may be needed.[1] The departments have a dual function: guiding the administrative organization of the party and presenting reports to the political bureau and Kata'ib deputies and ministers where applicable. During "normal" times the departments insure the

Chart 2
Administrative Structure, Post-1952

Al-Maktab al-Siyasi
Al-Majlis al-Markazi
Masalih

1. Secretariat-General
2. Control
3. Doctrine
4. Women's affairs
5. Emigration and immigration
6. Elections
7. Sports
8. Finance and supply
9. Recruitment
10. Social affairs
11. Students
12. North Lebanon ——
13. South Lebanon —— ——aqalim (regions)
14. Mount Lebanon —— aqsam (sections)
15. Biqa'——
16. Beirut ——muqata'at (districts)
manatiq (sectors)
aqsam (sections)

Source: *Nizam 'Amm* (general regulations) (Beirut, 1952 as amended in 1956), articles 22 through 39.

[1] *Nizam 'Amm*, articles 22 through 39.

effective operation of all routine administrative matters of the party. However, in times of crises or emergency situations, the head of the department of Beirut takes command of the Kata'ib cadres and para-military forces under the control and direction of the maktab which assigns one of its members for this specific task.[1]

Party Congress

In late September of every year the party holds a general congress.[2] This is attended by the plenary members of the central council, the permanent bureau of the congress, two additional representatives designated by each department, region, district, and sector, and twenty other members chosen by the political bureau.[3] The congress has assumed increased importance both as a periodic consultative organ and as a propaganda forum through which party indoctrination is intensified. The presidential addresses and the reports of the secretary-general have become important barometers of party development. Like many similar party congresses around the world the annual Kata'ib congress "provides a channel of communication between the party leadership and the militants, an elective basis for the leadership's authority, and a means of securing popular endorsement—and sometimes modification—of its attitudes to major questions of policy."[4]

Basic Element: Qism (Section)

The qism or section is the fundamental structural unit of the party organization. As such it groups members according to a definite geographical location such as a village (in the provinces) or city quarter (in Beirut). There are presently several hundred sec-

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[1] *L'Orient*, November 30, 1958.

[2] The Congress was inaugurated in 1956 and was intended to be convened every two years. It was suspended during the 1958 civil war and resumed on a yearly basis in 1959. Prior to 1956 and according to article 45 of the 1952 general statute a *Majlis 'Amm* (general council) was supposed to be "convened every six months...to discuss the general affairs of the party." In fact, however, this council functioned irregularly and was soon replaced by the annual congress.

[3] "Nizam al-Mu'tamar al-Dakhili" (internal regulation of the congress) in *Anzima, 1956*, articles 4 and 5. See also *al-Maktab al-Siyasi*, decision no. 1716, May 22, 1961.

[4] Thomas L. Hodgkin, *African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 108.

tions (*aqsam*) in Beirut and 356 regional sections distributed relatively evenly according to population density throughout the country's four administrative districts (*muhafazat*) (see chart 3).

Chart 3

Regional Organization, 1969-1970

	Muhafazat	Aqalim	Aqsam	
al-Majlis al-Markazi	Mount Lebanon	al-Matn	38	
		Ba'abdah	32	
		Kisrawan	43	
		al-Shuf	25	
		'Aliyah	21	
		Jubayl	15	
		Subtotal		174
	South Lebanon	al-Zahrani	13	
		Jazzin	21	
		Hasbayah-Marja'yun	15	
		al-Nabatiyah	10	
		Bint Jubayl	15	
		Sur (Tyre)	9	
		Subtotal		83
	North Lebanon	'Akkar	6	
		al-Kurah	16	
		Bisharri	10	
		Zaghurta	12	
		Tripoli	2	
		al-Batrun	25	
		Subtotal		71
	Biqa'	Zahlah	22	
		Ba'albak-al-Hirmal	6	
		Subtotal		28
	Total			356

Source: Party mimeograph, 1970.

Regional sections are individually created by the political bureau which defines the geographical scope and operational extent of each qism.[1] In Beirut sections are created upon the recommendation of the department of Beirut according to local needs and requirements.

[1] *Dalil al-Qism al-Kata'ibi* (a guide to the Kata'ib section) (Beirut, January 26, 1961), p. 3.

Eeach section is administered by a president or ra'is assisted by an executive committee called an *'umdah* composed of at least a vice-president, secretary, and treasurer.[1] The heads of the sections are appointed by the political bureau after consultation with regional (*aqalim*) leaders.[2]

While freedom of discussion and debate is considerable within each qism and local-level decision-making encouraged, final authority resides at the top. The head of the section is primarily an administrative leader whose major task is to insure the proper organization and function of his section.

The party considers the qism as the crucial component of its whole structure. "In combination the sections form the base upon which the party rests. Any flaw in the base constitutes a threat to the foundation. [Therefore] the more solid the base, the stronger the edifice."[3] Why was the qism chosen as the party's "basic element?"

The qism corresponds to the party's search for mass support. By establishing the party's presence even among some of the country's smallest villages the party hopes (1) to mobilize large numbers of people for electoral participation on its behalf, (2) to elaborate the party's nationalist ideology through indoctrination at the local level, and (3) to prepare citizens for para-military action if and when the situation so requires.[4]

In order that the above be realized and since the "section is the main instrument to insure natural organized contact between the party and the citizenry,"[5] the party insists that each section adhere to the following guidelines: (1) view all citizens, irrespective of their political orientations or attitudes towards the Lebanese Kata'ib Party, "as potential fertile soil for party action and the dissemination of its ideals;" (2) every member of the qism and the 'umdah in particular should strive to expand and strengthen their public and personal relationships with the local citizenry; (3) since one of its primary objectives is to educate the citizenry at large on the positions, policies, and beliefs of the party, the qism should "strive to increase the number of meetings and discussions whenever the

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[1] *Nizam 'Amm*, article 48.
[2] *Dalil, 1961*, p. 4.
[3] *Al-'Amal*, April 8, 1967.
[4] *Binyah, 1962*, p. 8.
[5] *Dalil, 1961*, p. 32.

opportunity permits so that there will be occasions to explain these positions and thus invite an open exchange of opinions with the people;" finally, (4) the qism "must avoid giving the appearance of attempting to dominate its environment or of having ambitions for total control. The section's influence must be formed gradually by means of a constant cooperation between itself and the community..."[1]

In terms of actual performance, however, the qism has manifested several human and structural weaknesses. In general there is widespread dissatisfaction with the leadership performance of the section heads. This is due in part to the incomplete nature of the transitional process from para-military to primarily political organization. Former leaders of the party squad or firqah, men trained to execute rather than question commands, in most cases automatically assumed the positions of section leaders, positions requiring much greater independence of action, administrative expertise, and political acumen. The squad mentality had merely been transposed into a new form.[2]

Secondly, indoctrination has not always been comprehensive enough to fully eradicate local and particularistic interests for the benefit of higher national goals. As the secretary-general himself has indicated, "our main error during these past few years has been that we no longer base the section upon doctrine, but upon services and mundane functions."[3]

This situation has been aggravated by the centralized nature of the party hierarchy which requires strict and unquestioned obedience to all upper-level decisions, thereby coming into conflict with the Lebanese sense of individualism. Finally, in times of relative political tranquility the qism is unable to sustain the kind of commitment necessary for active member participation. It is not uncommon for monthly section meetings to have an absentee rate of fifty per cent or more.[4]

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

[2] *Taqrir al-Amin al-ʿAmm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Fifth General Party Congress, September 28, 1962), p. 19. (Party mimeograph.)

[3] *Taqrir al-Amin al-ʿAmm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Seventh General Party Congress, October 2-4, 1964), p. 8.

[4] *Taqrir, 1962,* p. 12.

Supplementary Basic Elements: Firqah (Squad) and Khaliyah (Social Cell)

The firqah is the basic element of the party's regular forces (*al-quwan al-nizamiyah*) created in the aftermath of the 1958 civil war. While the training and recruitment of para-military cadres had visibly deteriorated in the postindependence period for lack of an immediate rationale, the events of 1958 aroused as never before the need for adequate military preparation in the face of internal and/or regional threats to the political system.

Each of the 356 regional sections has a squad attached to it with the section head acting as local commander. His major responsibility is to "implement the necessary measures required to defend the security of the party and its members during emergency situations."[1] In Beirut the *quwan* or paramilitary forces are ill-defined in both human and organizational terms although, when required, large numbers of regular and irregular forces can be quickly mobilized.[2] This does not include the Kata'ib police who are organized for the limited task of protecting party property and persons in the capital as well as regulating party celebrations, parades, and demonstrations.[3]

Security force membership is mandatory for all those under twenty-one and optional for students and those over twenty-one.[4] There are approximately 10,000 members in the Kata'ib forces who, according to the regional quwan leader, George Qassab, are "in excellent physical condition and in a continuous state of military preparedness."[5] Although both military exercises and athletic training are to be performed weekly more often than not they are cancelled for lack of sufficient numbers. Likewise, Qassab's observation notwithstanding, the over-all preparedness of the paramilitary cadres is uneven. Lack of technical expertise combined with widespread apathy in times of political somnolence weakens the force's

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[1] *Nizam al-Quwan al-Nizamiyah* (statute of the regular forces) (Beirut, January 23, 1961), article 11.

[2] According to one authoritative party source, "Kata'ib sections throughout Beirut can be mobilized in less than three quarters of an hour." Interview with Maurice Jumayyil, Beirut, Lebanon, February 19, 1969.

[3] Interview with George Qassab, head of the security force in the regions, Beirut, Lebanon, January 16, 1969.

[4] *Nizam al-Quwan*, article 14.

[5] Interview with George Qassab, Beirut, Lebanon, January 16, 1969.

military efficacy.[1] Military hardware, however, is not lacking and almost all members, male and female alike both in and out of the security force, have a minimum if not altogether sufficient amount of rifle and pistol training.

In recent years the party has sought to use the quwan as a supplementary instrument for "education," that is, propaganda and indoctrination. Theoretically the force

> [is now aimed] at dissipating the attitude of indifference among the youth and developing a personality of membership while working to strengthen their spirit of manliness... Also to prepare the member to perform nationalistic and humanitarian duties to the utmost of his ability.

Practically, however, the force "has remained a tool of defense and security of the party and country...In major part this is a military cadre with military functions [which] ignores educational objectives."[2]

The khaliyah or social cell is a workplace cell which has an occupational rather than geographical basis. Created as an instrument to "combat all anti-national obstacles, confessionalism, feudalism, and exploitation in places of work...and to direct union activities away from political considerations and towards social consciousness,"[3] the social cell is the party's second supplementary basic organizational unit.[4] According to its creators it differs from its communist counterpart in that the Kata'ib cell "is not the basic unit of the party nor does it attempt to control labor unions for the purpose of inciting class warfare."[5]

> [Organizationally the cell] groups all party members in the same

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[1] The anti-Maronite pamphlet, *Moslem Lebanon Today* (1953), accused the Kata'ib military cadres of having ex-Haganah instructors. "When we examine more closely the nature of [this] semi-military organization and [its] training," the pamphlet's author, Mustafa Khalidi, wrote, "we see signs of what appears to be the Kataeb being trained along lines of the Israeli Haganah which once enjoyed instruction by British army personnel and later became the Israeli national army. It is alleged that an ex-Haganah instructor is now serving as the chief military adviser to the Phalanges." p. 13. Much to their regret the Kata'ib cadres show little sign of Haganah training.

[2] *Taqrir, 1966*, pp. 22-23.

[3] *Al-Maktab al-Siyasi*, decision no. 542, July 26, 1955.

[4] "Once the Kata'ib adopted a socially-oriented position," the secretary-general writes, "the necessity of organizing the party along vocational lines became clear. Thus, the Kata'ib created the social cell as an additional organ..." *Taqrir, 1962*, p. 11.

[5] *Binyah, 1962*, p. 7.

> profession and all workers and employees belonging to the same union irrespective of their business locale...All these constitute an organized cell. All the cells are under the jurisdiction of the maslaha of social affairs.[1]

To date cells have been organized among white and blue collar workers as well as lawyers, the only professional group thus organized.[2]

These cells aim at achieving three things: (1) arousing a sense of social responsibility among its labor members, (2) creating an alternate medium for party indoctrination and recruitment especially among labor and professional groups hitherto unattached to any qism, (3) and, by penetrating the unions, enabling the party to confront any communist or radical socialist tendencies.

With quantitative data unavailable it is difficult to assess the overall performance of the khaliyah. Although the trade union movement has been making noticeable progress in recent years the industrial wage laborers remain largely unorganized and thus unavailable for systematic recruitment into the party's social cells. Moreover, the predominantly Muslim union membership remains suspicious of the advancements of what it views as an essentially all-Christian political organization.

Conclusion

As a hierarchical system, the Kata'ib party is an organized community wherein each element is strictly defined. In fact each organ possesses its own internal statute which delimits its range of action. In principle each is well articulated with little to no entanglement or dispersion occurring. The party's centralization is exhibited by a central power which dominates the subordinate local units. While local organs have the right of autonomy, party policy is not a juxtaposition of many local often contradictory policies but the synthesis of one national policy.

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[1] *Al-Maktab al-Siyasi*, decision no. 542, July 26, 1955.

[2] *Taqrir al-Amin al-'Amm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Eleventh General Party Congress, September 20-22, 1968), p. 26.

CHAPTER SIX

MEMBERSHIP PATTERN AND PARTY LEADERSHIP

The Kata'ib is a "mass" party, inclusive with a large membership and a participation style of local organization. As such it relies on numbers to educate and select its leadership while being financially dependent upon membership dues for political sustenance. This differentiates it from a "cadre" party which groups "notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contact with the candidates."[1]

Theoretically the distinction between the two is based on their structure, not on their membership. In general cadre parties are limited largely to activists and militants and are structurally composed of informal cliques and committees. Moreover while mass parties are fully articulated with many lines of internal control and year-round activity, cadre parties are weakly articulated with unclear lines of authority and only periodic activity. Finally, the primary functions of cadre parties are largely electoral with little or no ideological inclinations, whereas mass parties tend to perform both electoral and ideological functions and are predominantly doctrinaire rather than pragmatic.

As we shall see, although a mass party in structural terms, the nature of the Kata'ib's ideological appeal circumscribes its national attraction and thus characterizes it, in spite of itself, as a "devotee" party, that is, one more open than a cadre but more closed than a mass party.[2] According to Karim Pakradouni the LKP can be viewed as an "aborted mass party." That is, "instead of recruiting among the masses, it concentrates on a limited number. Thus, it is no longer a mass party but the party of a well-determined mass."[3]

During its pre-political stage in the late 1930's and early 1940's the Kata'ib was an exclusive, tightly-knit, cadre-like organization, whose membership was limited to all physically-fit male citizens

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[1] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York: Science Editions, 1963), p. 64.

[2] For a detailed elaboration see *ibid.*, pp. 70ff.

[3] Karim Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb" (unpublished Mémoire de Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures de Sciences Politiques, Université de Saint Joseph Beirut, Lebanon, September 27, 1967), p. 72.

between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.[1] When only small numbers responded the age range was expanded to include all those between ten and forty-five.[2] Formal entrance requirements for active membership stipulated the following three basic conditions: (1) an applicant must file an official written request with the signed endorsement of two Kata'ib sponsors, (2) undergo a rigorous two-month training program, and (3) pledge allegiance to the Lebanese nation and the Kata'ib "both of which he must serve actively." Further regulatory stipulations included conscious responsibility of one's duties to himself and to the movement, cultivation of body and mind, regular attendance at party meetings, strict adherence to rules and discipline, and punctual payment of all party dues.[3]

The primacy of discipline, para-military training, and sports was intended to serve the dual function of creating a "new youth", socially conscious and nationally-inspired, and developing the rudimentary cadres for a possibly much broadened nationalist-political organization. Rejecting the "superficial or extra-nationalist" type, one whose only attachments are communal or tribal, and the "seraglio" type for whom "all words have a meaning except those of duty and professional conscience," Pierre Jumayyil appealed to the nationalist type who combines faith, sacrifice, and courage in the quest for Lebanese independence. "We have thought Lebanese," Jumayyil declared, "lived Lebanese, and acted for Lebanon,"[4] and "our primary objective is to achieve moral, cultural, and economic independence through political independence."[5]

The youthful cadres served that function well but were inadequate in terms of numbers and training to fulfill the more demanding tasks of nation-building in the post-independence era. Appropriate adjustments were thus needed to satisfy new circumstances.

Types of Membership

Starting with the statutes of November 21, 1942, and correspond-

[1] "Al-Qanun al-Asasi" (the basic laws), *L'Orient*, December 12, 1936, article 5.
[2] *Al-Qanun al-Asasi* (the basic laws) (Beirut, May 1, 1937), article 5.
[3] *Ibid.*, articles 11, 13, 12, 10, and 9 respectively.
[4] *Al-'Amal*, November 21, 1944.
[5] Phalanges Libanaises, *Adresse aux Jeunes* (Beirut: Imprimerie Dar el-Founour, 1940), p. 11.

ing to the party's initial search for broader membership three types of members were defined: active, supporting, and honorary. The addition of supporting members was made to expand association with the Kata'ib without necessitating active political involvement. Nonetheless membership was still essentially limited to Lebanese young men.

By 1952, however, entrance requirements were greatly broadened allowing any Lebanese man or woman twenty-one or over to apply for membership as an active member.[1] Moreover, "any Lebanese man or woman could become a supporting member of the party upon presentation of a written application to the Political Bureau and receiving its approval."[2] The differentiating criteria is based on the degree of party participation as revealed in local and regional meetings, recruitment, campaigning, etc.

Added to these two formal membership categories are the "friends" of the Kata'ib, an informal associational group which assists the party financially and during election campaigns, and "electors" who, while not affiliated with the party in any official capacity, vote regularly for its candidates.

Within the group of active members exists an unspecified subgroup of "militants," those members who attend party meetings regularly, pay their monthly dues punctually, and actively participate in the over-all life of the party. During normal periods this group constitutes between thirty and thirty-five per cent of the active membership although this increases dramatically (up to as high as eighty per cent) in time of severe national crisis or even during general parliamentary elections.

The party possesses a rather formal machinery for enrollment which includes, among other things, a written application by a prospective recruit, recommendation by at least two active party members, an admission approval by the political bureau, issuance of a party identity card, and taking an oath before the party's *al-Majlis al-Sharaf* (council of honor).[3]

Application for membership is supposed to be an individual act motivated by several factors: (1) patrimonial influence: a parent or

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[1] *Nizam 'Amm* (general regulations) (Beirut, 1952 as amended in 1956), article 3.

[2] *Ibid.*, article 5.

[3] "System of Application for Membership (1956)," in *Dalil al-Qism al-Kata'ibi* (a guide to the Kata'ib section) (Beirut, Janauary 26, 1961), articles 1-11.

relative who is or has been a formal party member or ardent supporter attempts to influence the decision of the member-to-be; (2) sociological aspirations: party affiliation carries with it a certain "status" among one's peers or within one's community: (3) political ambitions: the party here becomes the instrument by which to achieve political recognition either at the local, regional, or national level; finally, (4) there is the always present defensive or protectionist posture of the party to which those seeking a guarantee of Lebanese independence adhere.

The formal process of application for membership supposedly offers three advantages: juridical, by giving the process a legal if not binding character; statistical, enabling relatively accurate registration of active members; and psychological, by offering a sense of formal attachment to a "higher" institution. Theoretically enrollment is restricted but in practice anyone who wishes may become a member.

Numbers

One can hypothesize that since the Kata'ib is a Lebanese nationalist organization its membership will tend to fluctuate according to the frequency of domestic political disorders or during parliamentary and presidential election periods; that is, when the political system is on the verge of either being challenged, threatened, or altered.

Membership rose dramatically in the aftermath of the party's "baptême du sang" in November 1937 from an initial 300 in 1936 to 21,000 by 1938. The latter figure also reflects the introduction of a new category: supporting member. The rise in 1942 to 35,000 is explained by the addition of women as formal party members. While sociological considerations in terms of achieving equal status for women in the society motivated this action, the larger impetus was demographic. Concerning its ideological and programmatic appeal the Kata'ib found it exceedingly difficult, expecially with the rise of a pan-Arab sentiment, to recruit among Lebanese Muslims who constituted at least half of the total population. Recruitment was thus limited to the remaining Christian half of the populace which itself was almost equally divided between men and women. If the party sought mass support and continued political existence it had no choice but to actively recruit women into its

ranks. Today women constitute ten per cent of the total active membership and are distributed throughout the five muhafazat.[1]

With independence in 1943 part of the Kata'ib's rationale seemed to have disappeared and membership figures reflected this (an increase of only 4,000 from 1942 to 1944). Although the party participated in the March 1945 by-election in Mount Lebanon very little enthusiasm was generated among the masses for Elias Rababi's candidacy. This in part explains the party's poor performance in the 1947 parliamentary elections.

Overall membership remained relatively stable through 1948 although a figure of 40,000 attributable to an official party document seems somewhat inflated. During the party's internal identity crisis Kata'ib membership declined drastically (to 23,500 in early 1952) as did its appeal among the people in general. In short, the Kata'ib no longer seemed as relevant. This image was altered somewhat with the party's direct involvement in the 1952 *inqilab* (overturn), which saw the political demise of president al-Khuri, and its active participation in the 1953 general elections. Consequently this period was marked by a gradual but nevertheless manifest rise in the number of new recruits (to 26,500 by late 1954).

Although the 1956 Suez war had a profound impact upon Arab politics in general, as an essentially external crisis it had only a mild effect upon the party's membership growth and popularity (actually a decline of over 2,000 from 1955 to late 1956). The 1957 elections and the 1958 civil war in particular marked the turning point in the party's human development as the 1959 figure of 62,200 reveals, despite a subsequent membership drop. The LKP's crucial role in the "counter-revolution" attracted mass support even among Muslims, mostly Shi'ites. In the post-1960 election period, however, the party inaugurated a mass purge to eliminate many of the "undesirables" who had filtered through during the euphoria period of post-1958. Even the abortive PPS-led military coup in December 1960 failed to have any significant impact upon the depletion process which saw membership drop from 48,300 in 1960 to 36,000 in 1964.

Thereafter membership has steadily risen as the party has established itself as an indispensable instrument in the formal hierarchy of political power. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the

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[1] *Taqrir al-Amin al-'Amm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Fifth General Party Congress, Sept. 28, 1962), p. 8.

subsequent creation of the *hilf al-thulathi* (triple alliance of Sham'un, Eddé, and Jumayyil) has reaffirmed this pattern (63,500 in late 1967). Today (1971) the party is 65,000 strong with many more thousands of supporters and sympathizers standing by to perform those political and/or para-military acts that the current situation may require. It seems highly unlikely in light of the imposition of a crisis era in the Middle East that LKP membership will radically decline in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, projected membership for the early and middle 1970's is as high as 75,000.

Although no reliable comparative data exists on the number, composition, and distribution of other party members, a 1958 survey of selected political parties in Lebanon undertaken by the political staff of *L'Orient* revealed a one-and-a-half times difference between the Kata'ib and its closest rival, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (see table 3).

Table 3

Membership of Selected Lebanese parties According to Region, 1958

Regions			*Parties*		
	LKP	*SSNP*	*NB*	*al-Najjadah*	*PSP*
Beirut	5,000	5,500	3,392	4,000	500
Mount Lebanon	16,000	5,000	6,916	500	2,800
Biqa'	8,000	6,250	537	4,000	2,000
North Lebanon	4,200	4,500	618	—	500
South Lebanon	6,000	3,750	424	1,500	1,500
Totals	39,200*	25,000	11,887	10,000	7,300

Key: LKP = Lebanese Kata'ib Party; SSNP = Syrian Social Nationalist Party; NB = National Bloc; PSP = Progressive Socialist Party.
* = total does not include overseas membership (3,000+).
Source: *L'Orient*, December 11, 1958.

Since the abortive coup of 1960 the Lebanese government has made a concerted and undeniably successful effort at dismembering the SSNP. Today the latter is for all practical purposes a withered organization although many Lebanese youths still cling strongly to its ideals. As for the other major political groups they have failed to significantly improve upon their 1958 membership figures and in some cases—al-Najjadah, for example—have actually experienced a decline in their numbers.[1]

[1] In 1944 the Najjadah had an estimated 13,000 members, in 1958, 10,000, and in 1968, 8,500. Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, p. 176; *L'Orient*, December 11,

Table 4
Rate of Membership Turnover

Years in party	1-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-25
% of membership	76	8	6	6	4

Source: *Taqrir al-Amin al-'Amm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Fifth General Party Congress, September 28, 1962), p. 8; *Magazine* (Beirut), February 1, 1968, p. 41.

The "crisis curve" hypothesis can be further verified by analyzing the rate of membership turnover. According to Joseph Sa'adah's 1962 party congress report and Joseph Abu Khalil's 1968 analysis, slightly more than three-quarters of the membership has been in the party between one and five years (see table 4).

When the Lebanese political system seems threatened the party receives a plethora of new applications. As the seventy-six per cent figure indicates, however, with the gradual amelioration of a crisis situation members slowly and quite informally recede from the party ranks. The remaining twenty-four per cent constitute the greater part of the Kata'ib's hard-core militants.

It has been suggested that this high turnover rate "proves that the party remains young and therefore revolutionary."[1] While its "revolutionary" character may be questioned there is no doubt that the party has a rather youthful membership (average age: twenty-four). According to the former executive secretary of the party, Joseph Abu Khalil, the strength of the party lies in its youth and this is because "one cannot teach a forty year old man anything. At that age he can only be what he is."[2] Table five gives the age group distribution and corresponding percentage of membership.

Table 5
Age Group Distribution

Age group	14-20	21-25	26-45	46-60	over 60
% of membership (active)	15	26	50	8	1

Source: *Taqrir, 1962*, p. 9.

1958; and interview with a former party member, Beirut, Lebanon, March 5, 1969.

[1] *Magazine* (Beirut), February 1, 1968, p. 41.

[2] *Ibid.*

The emphasis on youth is a throwback to the party's para-military and athletic origins. Today, with almost half the membership under twenty-five (41 per cent), this emphasis serves two specific purposes: on the one hand the party seeks to inculcate Lebanese youths with an early and hopefully permanent acceptance of an independent and Western-oriented Lebanon. It is hoped that this early socialization process will facilitate the growth of a "Lebanese" consciousness leading to a consensual view of a politically integrated Lebanon. On the other hand youths serve as excellent cadres for mobilization purposes in both electoral-political and para-military terms.

The sub-leadership cadres, recruited in most part from the 26 to 45 age group (50 per cent), are also relatively young and extremely well indoctrinated. Having risen from one or several of the party's various youth organizations and departments, selected groups of these local and provincial leaders can eventually expect to be coopted into the national leadership.

The small minority of the party's 46 or over (9 per cent) reflects two general trends: first, the gradual inability to sustain the varied political, social, and physical demands required by the party, and, secondly, the natural rate of attrition caused by the failure to achieve those personal and/or socio-political expectations subjectively defined at time of entrance into the party.

Nevertheless, while older members may withdraw from formal participation in the life of the party they remain vigorous supporters of its causes often contributing impressive funds to its coffers.

As table six indicates 50 per cent of the party's regional distribution is concentrated in the predominantly Christian muhafazah of Mount Lebanon. Another fifth of the membership is found in Beirut. The remaining 30 per cent are evenly distributed (relative to population) throughout the muhafazat of North Lebanon, South Lebanon, and the Biqa'.

In recent years the party has made a concerted effort to recruit among predominantly non-Christian, underdeveloped rural areas of the south and the Biqa'. As a result, in 1968, an equal number of applications for membership were received from the South and the Biqa' combined as were received from Mount Lebanon.[1]

As a predominantly middle class party the Kata'ib has not always

[1] *Taqrir al-Amin al-'Amm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Eleventh General Party Congress, Sept. 20, 1968), p. 27.

been successful in recruiting among lower class groups. Thus in the post-1958 civil war period the party received a massive inflow of new members from the south who in the following two years, because of gradually revealed incompatibilities, had to be weeded out or purged.[1]

In Mount Lebanon membership is concentrated in five districts: Kisrawan, al-Matn, Ba'abda, al-Shuf, and 'Alayh. It is here where the party finds the majority of its recruits and where its electoral

Table 6

Membership Distribution According to Administrative and Electoral Districts, 1969

Administrative districts and major areas of concentration	*Membership* Adm.[1]	Elec.[2]	*Per cent* Adm.[1]	Elec.[2]	*Aqsam*
Mount Lebanon (45)[3]	32,810	33,465	50	51	174
—Kisrawan					
—al-Matn					
Beirut (majority of quarters)	13,124	7,873	20	18	*
—Al-Ashrafiyah					
—al-Ramayl					
—al-Sayfi					
—al-Mudawwar					
North Lebanon (25)[3]	9,843	11,816	15	13	71
—al-Batrun					
—al-Kurah					
South Lebanon (28)[3]	7,218	8,530	11	12	83
—Jazzin					
—Hasbayah-Marja'yun					
Biqa' (22)[3]	2,625	3,936	4	6	28
—Zahlah					
Sub-totals	65,620	65,620	100%	100%	356
Overseas	3,000				
Grand total	68,620				

Key: [1] determined according to current place of residence (non-registered to vote);
[2] determined according to electoral district where member is registered, usually place of birth or original place of residence (registered to vote);
[3] percentage of towns in districts where the party is represented;
* = several hundred aqsam; no specific number available (350?).

Source: *Taqrir, 1962*, p. 5; *al-'Amal*, November 28, 1965, p. 37 (special issue); and data submitted to author by Joseph Hashim, administrative secretary, Beirut, Lebanon, May 13, 1969.

[1] In 1960 the party distributed new identity cards which were required of every member. By refusing to issue new cards to those members it no longer desired the party managed to "purge" an estimated 15,000 "undesirables." Interview with Samir Ishaq, Beirut, Lebanon, November 6, 1968.

strength lies. Throughout most of the mountain villages (45 per cent) one finds a *bayt al-Kata'ib* (house of the Kata'ib) visibly situated. The party is represented in 25 per cent of all the towns and villages in North Lebanon, 28 per cent in the South, 22 per cent in the Biqa', and in the majority of Beirut's quarters.[1]

Theoretically such widespread geographical distribution sensitizes the party to local demands and aspirations, enhances inter- and intra-regional communication, and affords access to the greatest possible number of new recruits. However, as we shall shortly see, sociological and organizational limitations have weakened this theoretical principle.

The pattern of regional distribution reflects significantly on the party's confessional character. Almost all the major areas where the Kata'ib is concentrated are Christian and especially Maronite-dominated. Table seven gives percentage of membership according to religious denomination.

According to its spokesmen the party has been making a determined effort, especially since 1958, to recruit among non-Christian

Table 7

Sectarian Distribution, 1969

Religious sect	*Percentage of membership*
Maronites	80
Other Christians (Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Protestants, Armenian Catholics, etc.)	10
Shi'ites	6
Jews	2
Druzes	1
Sunnites	1
Total	100%

Sources: *Taqrir, 1962*, p. 8; *Taqrir, 1968*, p. 28; Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb," p. 135; adjusted according to author's own data obtained from interviews with Joseph Abu Khalil, Joseph Hashim, Pierre Jumayyil, Antoine Najm, and Joseph Shadir. Christian percentages are somewhat deflated, non-Christian ones, inflated. These percentages exclude non-active and overseas memberships which in the majority are Christian.

[1] *Taqrir, 1962*, p. 5. Reproduced in *al-'Amal*, November 28, 1965 (special issue), p. 37.

groups.[1] Also, in spite of its Christian predominance the Kata'ib denies any specific confessional "bias" and, instead, applies a nationalist criteria as its differentiating quality.[2] Pakradouni, for example, states that it is the LKP's nationalist stance which explains its preponderant Christian membership. He writes:

> In fact the idea of a Lebanese nation coincided in 1936, and continues to coincide, with the aspirations of the Christian community. In general one can say that the Christians are more Lebanese than Arab, while the Muslims more Arab than Lebanese. It was thus natural that the Christian community found its political expression in the Kata'ib party whose motto remains "Lebanon first, the Arab states second."[3]

As the 10 per cent figure reveals, the party prides itself in having a "respectable" number of non-Christians enrolled although it believes this proportion too low to classify the Kata'ib, in terms of sectarian representation, as a genuinely broad-based mass party. Nevertheless, vis-à-vis other political groupings in the state the LKP is the most interconfessionally represented.

Recruitment restricted to certain confessional groups is as much a reflection of conflicting political ideologies as a manifestation of society's sectarian cleavages.[4] As the events of 1958 clearly revealed, Muslim sympathy for Arab nationalism needed no Lebanese institutional apparatus for effective expression. Not so with the Maronite community who have felt especially dependent upon the Kata'ib as that last bastion of Christian defense and which has led them, since then, to feel "that they have no chance unless they can confront the spontaneous enthusiasm of the Muslims with the organized efficiency of the more modernized elements of the Christian population."[5]

It is highly unlikely that the prevailing sectarian imbalance in the party will radically alter in the foreseeable future as long as divergent views of Lebanon's national identity exist. Other non-

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[1] See, for example, Amin Naji, "Partis politiques et confessionnalisme," *Action* (January, 1964), pp. 33-34.

[2] See Amin Naji, *al-Kata'ib: hizb 'almani aw ta'ifi?* (the Kata'ib: secular or sectarian party?) (Beirut, 1964), pp. 28-29.

[3] Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb," p. 137. See, for example, Pierre Rondot, "Une enquête sur les partis politiques et le confessionnalisme au Liban," *Orient*, 18 (1961), p. 29. Cf. Ashqar, *Harakah*, pp. 46-47.

[4] *Taqrir, 1968*, p. 30.

[5] Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, p. 314.

Christian, non-Sunnite groups, however, may continue to join the party ranks relative to the degree of success or failure of the surrounding Sunni-dominated pan-Arab movement. This in great part explains the inflow of Shi'ite members in the aftermath of the 1958 civil war.

Lebanon's small Jewish community (6,000) has, for obvious reasons, sympathized with the Kata'ib although few of its members formally join the party (1 per cent). They do, however, lend their full electoral support to the party's candidates.[1] The Armenians have their own political groupings serving the community's interests although electorally the Tashnaq, the largest and most popular Armenian party, aligns itself closely with the Kata'ib. The Druze, by the nature of their exclusive and introverted society coupled with the full support accorded to the community's two traditionally-based leaderships (Arslan and Junbalat), have, in general, been outside the scope of Kata'ib influence as the 1 per cent figure indicates.

In terms of social class and occupational grouping the Kata'ib membership is predominantly recruited from among the following sectors: students, small landowners, middle-level bureaucrats and civil servants in the government, lawyers and other professional groups.[2] In recent years, however, the party has made significant inroads into the working class and among agricultural laborers. A 1965 party survey revealed that "more than 40 per cent of the Kata'ib members are blue collar workers, laborers, and small farmers."[3]

The creation of the khaliyah or social cell was initially conceived in terms of broader working class participation. Only recently, however, have the cells produced any measurable pay-off. Nevertheless, the party remains under the control of a middle class institution. "...If those of middle class income are overwhelmingly represented in the party," writes the secretary-general, "it is be-

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[1] "Too few to be represented in formal political institutions," Hudson writes, "the Jews enjoy good relations with the...Kataeb which publicly guaranteed their security during the Palestine War." Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, n. 28, pp. 48-49. In Beirut's first electoral district (Jumayyil's) there are currently 4,329 registered Jewish voters most of whom voted for the Kata'ib list in the 1968 parliamentary elections. Jewish voter registration figures are from *L'Orient*, March 22, 1968.

[2] Bahige B. Tabbarah, "Les forces politiques actuelles au Liban," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Grenoble, Grenoble, France, April 28, 1954), p. 237.

[3] *Al-'Amal*, November 28, 1965 (special issue), p. 37.

cause the majority of Lebanese are of the middle income group and because the upper class finds it unnecessary to enroll in organized, ideological parties."[1]

No meaningful statistics on occupational groupings exist although a 1962 survey of the LKP sections in Beirut and its suburbs revealed that more than 90 per cent of the party members represented 86 different occupational groupings.[2]

One may describe an average active Kata'ib member in the following terms: a male, twenty-four years of age, Maronite who has been in the party between one and five years, lives in Mount Lebanon, has completed high school, is of lower middle class origin, remains politically passive except during periods of national crisis or parliamentary elections, equates the Kata'ib with Lebanon, and idolizes Shaykh Pierre. The typical party qism, with its composition and distribution, is expressed in table eight.

Table nine, by indicating selected distribution patterns over time, highlights the transformational nature of the LKP in its numerical, regional, sectarian and occupational dimensions.

Table 8

A Typical Qism: Jazzin, 1969

Membership	*Age groups* (%)	*Sex*
70	19-24: 15	
	25-35: 40	m = 60
	over 35: 15	f = 10
	average: 30	
Years in party (%)	*Religious sects* (%)	*Education*
	Maronites: 90	*level* N %
1-5: 50	Greek Catholics: 10	univ. 12 17
6-11: 30		secon. 35 50
12+: 20		elem. 23 33
Quwan members	*Participation types* (%)	*Occupations* (%)
	militants: 60	prof.: 15
20	regulars: 40	white collar: 65
	supporter: N = 500	blue collar: 20

Source: Interview with Elham Rizq, ra'is of the Jazzin qism, Beirut, Lebanon, May 12, 1969. This qism is atypical only in its total membership which is small relative to the town's total population (8,000+) and vis-à-vis other party aqsam. Its average age (30) is also slightly higher than the party's national average (24).

[1] *Taqrir, 1962*, p. 8.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

Table 9

Selected Distribution Patterns of the Lebanese Kata'ib Party

Distribution Pattern	Year				
	1936	1943	1952	1958	1968
Membership Distribution (N)	300	38,500	23,500	42,200	64,200
Regional Distribution (%)					
Mount Lebanon	80	80	78	66	50
Beirut	8	10	12	18	20
North Lebanon	6	6	6	9	15
South	4	3	3	6	11
Biqa'	2	1	1	1	4
Sectarian Distribution (%)					
Maronites	90	90	88	84	80
Other Christians	10	10	10	11	10
Shi'ites	—	—	1	3	6
Jews	—	—	1	1	2
Druzes	—	—	—	1	1
Sunnites	—	—	—	—	1
Occupational Distribution (%)					
independently wealthy	1	1	2	2	2
professionals	14	14	16	13	15
bureaucrats and white collar	40	40	35	34	29
blue collar and urban workers	—	2	6	3	8
"middle class" farmers	8	10	13	15	15
"lower class" farmers	2	2	6	4	6
peasants	—	1	3	3	2
unemployed	—	—	1	1	—
students	35	30	18	25	23

Source: John P. Entelis, "The Lebanese Kata'ib: Party Transformation and System Maintenance in a Multiconfessional Society" (Ph. D. dissertation, New York University, 1970), pp. 113-120, *passim*.

Recruitment Problems

The traditional infrastructure of Lebanese society with its concomitant distrust of modern political associations is probably the major stumbling block to expanded party participation. As long as traditional channels continue to articulate communal and sectarian demands, recruitment into a relatively broad-based, modernist nationalist party will remain difficult. Other more specific recruit-

ment problems face the Kata'ib: (1) a relative inability to arouse public interest during periods of political tranquility; (2) too heavy a reliance upon individual initiative for membership expansion; (3) those who formerly associated the Kata'ib only with street demonstrations, para- military action, and physical force as a means to achieve political ends are visibly unenthusiastic over its post-1958 acceptance of parliamentary and legitimate institutional means by which to influence government policy. This has meant the alienation of many Maronite "zealots" who have found greater collegiality among the more "radical" Maronite groups headed by such people as Raymond Eddé, Camille Sham'un, and Sulayman Franjiyah; (4) election periods, expecially since 1960, have made the party vulnerable to severe and often acrimonious attacks by its opponents which, directly or indirectly, have influenced public images of the party; (5) the expansion of state control over the public sector has been especially deleterious inasmuch as government law forbids state employees from being official or formal members of a political party. Large private corporations have often followed the same policy with specific interdictions against overt party affiliation written into labor contracts thus adding another dimension to the recruitment problem; finally, (6) the chronic problem of inefficient leadership[1] at the regional, district, and section levels has resulted in lowered morale among recruitment personnel.[2] Specific recommendations for overcoming these problems have been elaborated at numerous party congresses with hitherto mixed results.[3]

The party seeks to educate the masses politically in order to promote Kata'ib "values" and prepare a popular leadership. Its indoctrination and educational activities are dedicated to the participation of the individual. There is an awareness of the importance of broad participation, and thus efforts are strong and determined in seeking to increase the political knowledgeability of the rank-and-file member and supporter. Party indoctrination transcends the political sphere with the "educational" process assuming

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[1] According to Sa'adah, although the selective rather than elective process for choosing local leaders is preferred, it tends to make difficult the removal of long established leaders who have become, over time, stagnant and inefficient. Interview with Joseph Sa'adah, Beirut, Lebanon, June 9, 1969.

[2] *Taqrir al-Amin al-'Amm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Ninth General Party Congress, September 23, 1969), pp. 11-12.

[3] See *Taqrir, 1962, 1966 and 1968.*

four specific objectives: a national education which "seeks to correct the misconceptions which disfigure the reality and mission of Lebanon;" a civic education which enables the Kata'ib "to act as a model of civic responsibility and to fulfill its obligations towards nation, state, and society;" a political education which "frees all peoples, regardless of their political coloration, of lies and ruses;" and a disciplinary education which "teaches each Kata'ibi to work according to rules and regulations."[1]

The primary objective is to transmit a set of norms about the political system to the membership. This socialization process assumes several forms. At time of entrance into the party a fairly elaborate and solemn initiation ceremony[2] takes place before the Majlis al-Sharaf wherein each new member swears "to God and by [his] honor to be loyal to Lebanon and to the Lebanese Kata'ib Party and to obey its decisions faithfully."[3] Thereafter the regular meetings of the various party organs (weekly maktab and majlis meetings, bi-monthly section meetings, monthly regional meetings, and the annual party congress) serve to articulate individual and group opinions on procedural issues while reasserting the primacy of the party doctrine. The appropriate departments—doctrine, propaganda, recruitment, and students—act as the coordinating organizational units through which intensive indoctrination occurs. This is complemented by para-military training sessions, especially the annual "boot" camp in late August. The various party publications also act as very important socialization instruments.

Al-'Amal (Action), the party's Arabic daily newspaper founded in 1939,[4] is the primary medium through which the party conveys its ideas and opinions. It is a political tool acting to educate the masses "properly" while furnishing a unified explanation of the thought, action, and organization of the party.

A decision of the 1966 party congress made subscription to *al-*

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[1] *Taqrir, 1966,* p. 17.

[2] See *L'Orient,* November 30, 1958.

[3] "System of Application for Membership and the Oath," article 8 in *Dalil,* p. 34.

[4] Issued from 1939 to 1946 as a bilingual (Arabic-French), bimonthly, and later weekly newspaper, *al-'Amal-Action.* From 1946 to 1948 the French *Action* was dropped and replaced by the Arabic daily *al-'Amal.* Starting from October 3, 1948, *Action* reappeared first in weekly then in monthly form becoming the party's medium for intellectual political discussion and analysis. In early 1968, however, because of financial difficulties, *Action* was suspended.

'*Amal* compulsory for all members.[1] This had a financial as well as ideological motivation. As a party perpetually in debt,[2] depending primarily on subscription and party dues and donations from Kata'ib supporters and friends, it has been forced to expand the sources of its revenue whenever and wherever possible. One method has been mandatory subscription to *al-'Amal* combined with suspension of the party's French monthly journal, *Action.*[3]

From November 1960 to late 1964 the party published a strictly internal Arabic monthly circular, *al-Bayan al-Tawjihi* (guidance report) addressed exclusively to the party masses. It sought to explain the party's political positions concerning various issues as well as elaborating the principles and operations of the Kata'ib. More specifically it had three objectives: (1) unify the political thinking of the membership, (2) act as an educational instrument, and (3) serve as the basic material for discussion at qism meetings.[4] Like *Action* four years later, it was unable to support itself financially and subsequently had to be suspended.

Theoretically, as the party's official ideological publication, Najm's *Falsafah* is to be "read in all cultural, social, and civic groups."[5] In practice, however, the *Falsafah* is beyond the everyday comprehension of the majority of the membership and critically viewed by some of the party's intellectuals. Maurice Jumayyil, for example, who, until his untimely death in November 1970, was probably the party's most "modern" and scientifically-inspired thinker, categorically refused to have any association with what he called a "pre-scientific attempt at explaining reality."[6] Nevertheless it remains the party's first serious effort at elaborating its belief-system.

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[1] See *Taqrir, 1966.* Annual subscription to *al-'Amal* is about $ 9.50 excluding the regular yearly membership dues of $ 4.50. Because the total of $ 14.00 is generally high most members are delinquent in their payments.

[2] All party leaders interviewed insisted that the party has never, or ever will in the future, accept donations from foreign sources, private or governmental. This of course does not include "legitimate" emigrant remittances.

[3] According to the secretary-general *Action* was unable to cover its operating expenses. Faced with the choice of using *al-'Amal* funds to finance *Action* it was decided to concentrate on the Arabic daily as the primary political organ of the party. In any case, *Action* "had always been directed less at the masses than at society's intellectual elites both within and outside the party." *Taqrir, 1968,* pp. 35-37.

[4] Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb," p. 94.

[5] *Taqrir, 1967,* p. 12.

[6] Interview with Maurice Jumayyil, Beirut, Lebanon, February 19, 1969.

The party leadership has hoped that a relatively comprehensive indoctrination program would facilitate the implementation of the members' three primary functions: electoral participation and mobilization, para-military preparedness and vigilance, and the spreading of the Kata'ib doctrine. Performance, however, has been relatively uneven. The party's rural representation is often beyond the regular influence of the party and not infrequently remains attached for simply emotional or personal reasons. Even in large towns and cities the percentage of militancy is influenced by relative degrees of stability or instability in the political system.[1] There also remains a wide chasm between what Pakradouni calls a "traditional infrastructure" (the Lebanese masses) and a "modernist superstructure" (the modern party leadership and its younger subleaders).[2] The party masses are only slowly beginning to accept the LKP's social and political responsibilities and remain, in the majority, attached to the party's "protectionist" image.

National Party Leadership

The Kata'ib national leaders are an extremely homogeneous group. Their long inter-personal association has developed in them a rather cliquish sense of identity. Even throughout the various evolutionary stages of the party's executive development, from the single man rule of autocratic centralism to the more inclusive consultative council and finally to the more broadly-based Political Bureau, there has always remained that essential core of close friends and advisers around the party leader ever influencing the executive machinery of the party.

As will be recalled within three years after founding four of the

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[1] Pakradouni, based on personal observations, has suggested several interesting although untested hypotheses on the variability of militancy in the party: "(1) wherever the party leads an electoral campaign, its number of militants increases. Elections would be a good way to gain militants; (2) the more bourgeois the milieu, and the more liberal professions it includes, the less militancy there is. The bourgeoisie dislikes political activism; (3) the younger the environment the higher the militancy...; (4) militancy is higher in Beirut than in the countryside. Peasant conservatism distrusts political parties; (5) militancy is higher in the cells than in the sections. The conception of the cell along with the workers' mentality encourages collective action; (6) where the party organization is well developed the number of militants increases..." Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb," p. 102.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.

original five founding members, because of various political ambitions, quietly and rather inconspicuously withdrew from the Kata'ib. In their place entered other more committed members who were to be decisive in the early development and later growth of the party. As original architects of the party's structure and ideology this *camarilla* has, throughout the party's thirty-five year history, retained its oligarchical influence over the totality of the Kata'ib political organization.

The maktab al-siyasi, the party's highest executive organ, is today composed of twenty-one members classified, as will be recalled, into three categories: de jure—ministers, deputies, and former deputies; nominated—advisers nominated by the maktab; and elected—the president, vice-president, and five other members elected for three years, indefinitely renewable, by the party's majlis al-markazi (see table 10).

The oligarchical nature of the party elite with its long-developed associational status is best revealed by looking at table ten. More than three quarters of the present membership have been in the maktab ten or more years, and it seems unlikely that they will voluntarily withdraw or get elected out in the near future. Since its official establishment in 1952 the maktab has had only thirty-two different members with an average tenure of 10.5 years. Today's members, who average twenty years in the party, have an average tenure period of thirteen out of a possible eighteen years in the political bureau.

All this clearly reveals the extremely low rate of leadership turnover at the party's highest level. This has tended to institutionalize the existing oligarchy and make access into its ranks quite difficult. While political mobility within and between local and regional units is relatively easy, entrance into the majlis al-markazi, circumscribed as it is by the various demands of social and economic status, is extremely difficult while entrance into the maktab is limited to the very select few.

The age distribution confirms this existing pattern of membership longevity. The average age of the members of the political bureau is 47.5 years with close to 50 per cent over 50 years of age. This compares with the average age of 24 for the rank-and-file members revealing the twofold generational distance between leadership and membership. Thus, as Pakradouni correctly observes, "a basically young party is directed by rather old leaders or, more accurately,

Table 10

Al-Maktab Al-Siyasi: Distribution Patterns, 1970

	De jure	*Nominated*	*Elected*	*Total*
Composition	8	6	7	21*

	N	%	*Average years in party*	*Years in Maktab*
Membership according to tenure	9	42.9	30	18
	1	4.8	28	16
	4	19.0	19.5	14
	2	9.5	14.5	10
	1	4.8	20	9
	2	9.5	18	6
	2	9.5	10	2
	21	100	20!	13!

	Age Group	%
Age	30-35	8
	35-40	27
	40-70	65

	Religious Sect	*N*	%
Sect	Maronite	16	76.1
	Greek Catholic	2	9.5
	Greek Orthodox	1	4.8
	Armenian Catholic	1	4.8
	Protestant	1	4.8
		21	100

	Occupation	*N*	%
Occupation	Lawyers	10	47.6
	businessmen	4	19.0
	journalists	3	14.2
	economist	1	4.8
	pharmacist	1	4.8
	physician	1	4.8
	educator (Ph.D.)	1	4.8
		21	100

Source: Questionnaire distributed by the author, January, 1969, Beirut, Lebanon.

Key: * = a decrease of two from the 1968-69 figure as expressed in the preceding chapter;
! = overall average.

by leaders who have grown old...The energy potential represented by the young has not been fully exploited while old age continues to spread among the leaders at all levels."[1]

The bureau's religious make-up, on the other hand, reflects quite accurately the confessional composition of the party rank-and-file. This in the final analysis may be more important than the existing generational gap since, given the sectarian basis of the society, religious identification tends to strengthen functional ties even where theoretically stronger dysfunctional elements—occupational, social, generational, and educational distance, for example—seem to exist. As table ten indicates all bureau members are Christians with over 75 per cent being Maronites. In fact there has never been a non-Christian member of the maktab. This sectarian pattern affirms the homogeneous nature of the leadership while giving further proof, if any were needed, of the party's Christian orientation.

In terms of social class origin, occupational make-up, and educational level again one sees the tightly-knit character of the ruling elite. Whereas most rank-and-file members are of lower middle class origin the leaders are, in the majority, of well-to-do families. Occupationally these are strictly bourgeois men of the establishment. Significantly they represent "modern" occupational groups which theoretically should orient them towards modernist goals since they owe no visible allegiance to any traditional groups or leaders.

Following an almost universal law in politics close to 50 per cent (47.6) of the bureau is composed of lawyers with another third consisting of journalists and upper income businessmen. The maktab's occupational composition reflects the group's strong commitment to the system's relatively free-wheeling laissez-faire economy. On the whole these men are not intellectuals or revolutionaries but rather soberminded pragmatists who seek evolutionary political change commensurate with the needs of social and economic justice.

Almost all the members are of upper middle class origin (broadly defined) with their fathers representing such diverse occupational groups as tailors, merchants, civil servants, industrialists, lawyers, businessmen, *et al.* Although no income data is available the majori-

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

ty of the members, based on their life-styles, appear affluent. A few of them are exceptionally wealthy and contribute generously to the party treasury.[1]

This is a highly educated group with all members possessing at least one university degree. Moreover, each is fluent in at least two languages, some in three or more.

A factor that has aided the bureau's cohesiveness has been the relative absence of serious internal schisms. In fact throughout the party hierarchy serious internal crises have been largely avoided. Two of any import can be cited. In 1951 a "socialist" wing composed of young activists, highly ideologically oriented, sought to transform the Kata'ib into an openly socialist organization. They reproached the party for its "lack of an ideology," its "alliances with rightist elements and the absence of a program."[2] After a series of confrontations this group was forced to withdraw from the party. This rupture had no long term consequence upon the party's development, however, since it left no internal bitterness in its wake.

In 1956 a less important but no less real dispute arose. A small group of party militants sought, quite unsuccessfully, to "arabize" the Kata'ib by "de-isolating" it from the Arab world.[3] Within the Kata'ib framework this was nothing more than an ephemeral trend, a pseudoschism whose demise was as swift as it was inevitable.

Today an intellectual polarization between mild "ideologues" and "technicians" has developed as reflected in the political thinking of Antoine Najm on the one hand and Karim Pakradouni on the other. However this is more of a pluralist tendency within the existing structure rather than a serious deviation from the underlying belief-system of the party.

Probably the leadership's greatest weakness has been its inability to alter significantly the party's traditional base. This in part is a consequence of a deficiency in its structural apparatus with its overly centralized and topheavy organization which permits only limited vertical mobility for the rank-and-file. More important has been the exclusive nature of the political bureau which, as we have seen, constitutes a long-established political elite.[4] If the Kata'ib

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[1] One may cynically interpret this as the reason for their inclusion into the political bureau.

[2] Pakradouni, "Structure des Kataeb," p. 87.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Samuel Huntington, in describing the adaptability of an organization,

espouses genuine mass party status it will have to allow broader participation at the local and regional level and greater access to political power at the national level. This will also entail a direct process of political socialization enabling the masses to qualify for positions of authority and influence.

Table 11

Al-Majlis Al-Markazi: Distribution Patterns, 1970

	Age Group	*N*	%
	20-30	16	10.2
	30-40	101	64.3
Age	40-50	24	15.3
	over 50	16	10.2
	Totals	157	100%
	Years in Party	*N*	%
	1-10	16	10.2
Tenure	10-20	125	79.6
	over 20	16	10.2
	Totals	157	100%
	Educational Level	*N*	%
	university	70	44.6
Education	secondary	70	44.6
	elementary	17	10.8
	Totals	157	100%
	Religious Sect	*N*	%
	Maronites	118	75.1
	Greek Catholics	20	12.7
	Greek Orthodox	15	10.0
Religion	Armenian Catholic	1	0.6
	Shi'ites	2	1.0
	Druze	1	0.6
	Totals	157	100%

Source: Questionnaire distributed by the author, January, 1969, Beirut, Lebanon and interview with Joseph Hashim, party secretary, May 13, 1969, Beirut, Lebanon.

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suggests age as a relevant measure. One way age can be measured is generational. "So long as an organization still has its first set of leaders," he writes, "so long as a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt." Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April, 1965), p. 396. Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

AL-MAJLIS AL-MARKAZI

The majlis al-markazi is the Kata'ib's principle consultative organ whose 157 members (a twenty-nine member increase over the 1968-69 figure) represent the party's various national, regional, local, and sectional sub-elites. Although all the members of the political bureau are plenary members of the majlis and the president of the party chairs all its meetings this group genuinely reflects the party's subordinate leadership cadres.

As table eleven indicates this is a relatively young group (average age: 35), well-educated, and confessionally homogeneous. Since all majlis members are selected according to devotion to and superior performance in the party as well as "proper" social background it is from here that potential maktab members are recruited. In social composition it differs little from its superior organ although its broader representation is not commensurate with the relatively limited power accorded it.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE

The LKP's attitude towards and participation in Lebanon's representative institutions (Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet) reflects one important dimension by which we can assess the efficacy of the over-all transformational process. We shall therefore identify the relevant components of the political system's electoral mechanism and present a detailed analysis of the party's electoral and governmental performances over the last twenty-seven years emphasizing in particular the changing status of the party as a consequence of its increased victories at the polls.

Electoral Mechanism

Along with the Mithaq and a presidential system of government the country's representative system has worked to institutionalize Lebanon's traditional pluralism. Officially provided for in article 95 of the 1926 constitution and reflecting Lebanon's political culture, parliamentary seats are assigned in proportion to the size of a given community's population in the country. The electoral system requires a fixed confessional ratio of deputies in Parliament; a ratio which over time has remained constant. The distribution of seats between Christians and non-Christians, for example, has always been six to five corresponding to the country's population breakdown as revealed in Lebanon's first and only official census compiled in 1932. Thereafter each electoral district, reflecting as nearly as possible the confessional make-up of its constituency, is allocated a specific number of communal representatives.

To accomplish this two-fold representative task electoral lists in each district are formed. These lists force the entire electorate in any one district to vote in all the local races regardless of sect. Consequently, a Sunni Muslim voting in a district where there are also Maronite, Druze, and Greek Orthodox seats at stake chooses among the Maronite, Druze, and Greek Orthodox candidates as well as among his own, and so on for the members of the other communities.

Traditionally electoral lists have been formed by the most powerful za'im from the majority sect of each district who, according to Hudson, try "to find as co-listers for the minority sect seats those who will attract the largest possible share of votes from those communities. The potential co-listers, in turn, if they are ambitious, want to affiliate with the most powerful notable of the majority sect."[1]

In terms of system maintenance this process has several functional consequences. By forcing members of each community to compete against one another rather than against rivals of a different sect a pattern of inter-confessional coalitions develops which helps to moderate sectarian conflict. Since electoral contests are in great part determined by connections and coalitions developed among members of different communities a type of common power interests grows up further encouraging sectarian moderation. Similarly, by forcing candidates to moderate their positions on communal issues in order to win the votes of other confessional groups a blurring of confessional differences naturally develops. Thus, instead of communal strife, communal cooperation between the candidates tends to develop. In effect, this amounts to a kind of "federalism of communities."[2]

This moderation is carried over into the Chamber itself where parliamentary blocs are almost always the result of inter-communal coalitions. Rarely have a group of deputies organized themselves in Parliament on a strictly communal basis since this would weaken the future electoral strength of a given candidate whose own future political victory would depend on cross-confessional support. Invariably, this system has strengthened the position of certain notables and political bosses of the majority sect. The fact that this has not occurred at the expense of the minority sects has ensured relatively strong relations among the various ethno-confessional groups while guaranteeing in practice the principle of communal equity.

Probably as important a consequence has been the necessity to organize politically. This is especially crucial in the rural areas of Lebanon where political parties have been weak agents for politic-

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[1] Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 213. See also Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (January, 1969), pp. 251-252.

[2] Iliya F. Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution in the Middle East," p. 13.

al mobilization and organization. Rural notables, by organizing their constituencies, become "traditionalist substitutes for parties in establishment politics."[1] The list system, therefore, "has been a kind of gearbox, harmonizing a national political system... with the complexities of traditional pluralism." Moreover, this system encourages a "pattern of stable and competitive bifactionalism."[2]

In terms of long-range prospects for the political system, however, this electoral mechanism has some obvious shortcomings. First, the system, by harnessing "traditional notables and their cliques to the state apparatus..., raises a barrier to the expanding politically relevant elite. It cannot integrate many of the increasingly popular movements into the formal governmental structures." Secondly, because the list system "perpetuates and reinforces the local power of notables," it is extremely difficult for modern political party organizations to develop. Thirdly, the very mechanism that "encourages sectarian moderation does so by exploiting sectarian tension. Sectarian moderation in election campaigns is the product of latent fears as to the consequences of immoderation."[3] Finally, the list system, for Lebanon as a whole, has made difficult the development of programmatic politics since deputies owe allegiance to districts, sects, and clientele groups rather than to a nation-wide reformist program.[4]

The ever-changing electoral laws represent the most detailed institutional application of the confessional principle.[5] While the total number of deputies in the Chamber has fluctuated considerably it has always done so in multiples of eleven thus insuring the permanent proportion of six Christians to five non-Christians.

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[1] Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, p. 213.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[4] Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization," p. 252.

[5] For a detailed discussion of the system's electoral mechanism and its political consequences see, among others, Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, pp. 212-219; Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization," pp. 251-253; Harik, "Ethnic Revolution," pp. 13-14; Pierre Rondot, *Les institutions politiques du Liban: des communautés traditionelles à l'état moderne* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947); Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. by Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 127-141; Jacob Landau, "Elections in Lebanon," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (March, 1961), pp. 124-127; Kerr, "The 1960 Elections," pp. 268-271; Nicola A. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960," *Middle East Journal*, XIV (Autumn, 1960), pp. 368-369; and George E. Kirk, "Elections in the Lebanese Republic: The Prospects Surveyed," *World Today*, XIII (June, 1957), pp. 260-265.

From 1943 to 1951 the Chamber numbered 55, elected from five constituencies, and from 1951 to 1953, 77 deputies from nine constituencies. Multi-seats constituencies were abolished by the electoral law of November, 1952 and in their place 22 one-seat and 11 two-seat constituencies were introduced. The number of deputies was consequently decreased to 44. The electoral law of April, 1957, altered anew the subdivision of the constituencies and raised the number of deputies to 66 (25 districts). A new electoral law was passed by Parliament on April 26, 1960, creating 99 seats divided geographically into 26 constituencies, each of which elects from two to eight deputies of specified communal affiliation (only the district of Sidon elects a single deputy, a Sunni). The last four general elections (1960, 1964, 1968 and 1972) have been conducted under this latest electoral law (see table 12).

Table 12

Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect, 1943-1972

Sect	*Year*								
	'43	*'47*	*'51*	*'53*	*'57*	*'60*	*'64*	*'68*	*'72*
Maronite	18	18	23	13	20	30	30	30	30
Greek Orthodox	6	6	8	5	7	11	11	11	11
Greek Catholic	3	3	5	3	4	6	6	6	6
Armenian Catholic	2	2	3	2	3	4	4	4	4
Minority	1	1	3	1	2	3	3	3	3
Sunnite	11	11	16	9	14	20	20	20	20
Shi'ite	10	10	14	8	12	19	19	19	19
Druze	4	4	5	3	4	6	6	6	6
Totals:									
Christians	30	30	42	24	36	54	54	54	54
Non-Christians	25	25	35	20	30	45	45	45	45
Totals	55	55	77	44	66	99	99	99	99

Source: Camille K. Chehab, *Les élections législatives de 1968* (Beirut, 1968), pp. 30-32.

Let us now turn to an analysis of the Kata'ib's electoral and governmental performance, compare it with the performances of other selected political groups, and evaluate its long-range significance both for the party and for the maintenance of the political system. The party's electoral history can be divided into two general phases corresponding to its degree of electoral success.

Phase I: 1943-1958, Failures at the Polls

The party's decision to present the candidacy of Elias Rababi for the March 4, 1945, by-election in Mount Lebanon[1] was the result of two factors: Internally the party was seeking organizational form and political direction. Externally there was the need to have its position known on Arab-Lebanese relations, especially on the proposed League of Arab States. As early as February 1944 Jumayyil was on record as saying that the party "judged that in its current situation it was necessary to get involved directly and effectively in power in order to more efficaciously defend its cause."[2]

In any case the decision to participate was taken with much hesitation and Jumayyil was quick to point out that "although taking this step, the Kata'ib remained faithful to its well-known principles which aimed at the creation of a free people in a free country."[3] Towards this end Rababi's campaign sought to emphasize the non-political and nationalist character of the Kata'ib and therefore a vote for the LKP was a vote for "al-Watan" (the homeland). Moreover, there was to be no distinction between the party's behavior inside parliament and its actions outside of it.

However, with grass roots support lacking and a primitively organized and poorly funded campaign the LKP candidate, one of Jumayyil's close associates and a leading editorialist for *al-'Amal*, was easily defeated by the candidate of the Dustur, Philippe Taqla. *Al-'Amal* accused pro-government forces of having manipulated the elections writing that "government agents interfered openly and with insolence into the whole election procedure; it intimidated voters."[4] According to one party leader the LKP was defeated "because Lebanese political opinion was not yet sufficiently enlightened."[5]

For Jumayyil, however, Rababi's defeat was more personal. He pledged himself never to enter the political ring as a candidate for

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[1] The existing electoral system was based on the "grand list" wherein each of Lebanon's five muhafazat—North Lebanon, South Lebanon, the Biqa', Beirut, and Mount Lebanon—was a single constituency.

[2] *Al-'Amal*, February 16, 1944.

[3] *Connaissance des Kataeb*, p. 152.

[4] See *al-'Amal*, March 1-10, 1945, Ashqar, *Harakah*, p. 81, and Tabbarah, "Les forces politiques actuelles au Liban," p. 238.

[5] Antoine Mouarbes, "Le parti et le pouvoir," *Action* (November, 1956), p. 510.

office. He claimed that he preferred to stay outside of active political life so that he could at all times maintain an independent position on matters of public interest. He called for "men of principle, doctrine and courage;" men who could lead but not be led.[1]

The relatively pro-Kata'ib and Christian-directed *L'Orient* was less pessimistic about the results. George Naqash, the paper's editor-in-chief and one of the original founders of the party, cited the indeterminate nature of Taqla's 23,000 votes which were obtained from a loose coalition of various pro-Dustur individuals and groups. While the elements of Taqla's victory could not be clearly discerned, Rababi's 13,300 votes actually belonged to the Kata'ib and would be theirs again whenever needed. Therefore, according to Naqash, the election results were not a failure but proof of the Kata'ib's new strength which would reveal itself in the next elections.[2] The elections of May 25, 1947, were so fraudulent, however, that they could not genuinely reflect the strengths or weaknesses of the LKP's electoral appeal.

President al-Khuri dissolved parliament in April 1947 to prepare the country for the May 25 elections. The Kata'ib announced four candidates: Joseph Shadir (Beirut), Elias Rababi and Joseph Sa'adah (Mount Lebanon), and Jacques Shadid (North Lebanon).[3] Jumayyil justified his party's active participation in the electoral process on the basis of "new circumstances."

> In our view [he wrote in early 1947] representation is a means not an end; we rejected it in the past because it had been distorted, exploited, and corrupted; we look at it today as an ideal which serves and assists the public interest... The coming elections will be a test for the system; a test which will show whether or not the accusations of corruption, ineptitude, and exploitation are justified... We hope the officials will conduct the elections in an atmosphere of freedom and trustworthiness. If the results are honest we will be thankful; if they are fraudulent we will assume a new posture. For us there are only two ways of serving the country: through legal electoral means or through violence. Although we firmly espouse the first method we do not reject the second.[4]

It is not our purpose here to investigate the widespread accusations of fraud that were directed at the al-Khuri regime in the after-

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[1] *Action*, August 16, 1946, and *Connaissance des Kataeb*, pp. 191-194.
[2] *L'Orient*, March 8, 1945.
[3] See *al-'Amal*, May 7, 1947.
[4] Ashqar, *Harakah*, pp. 88-89.

math of the elections. According to most reports, however, many coercive tactics were used by pro-government forces to influence the voting. Only in Mount Lebanon was there any semblance of a freely-contested electoral battle. *L'Orient*, a former supporter of al-Khuri, accused the government of so manipulating candidates and groups that all meaningful opposition was effectively eliminated. With all the electoral districts packed with pro-Khuri candidates in weakly contested or uncontested areas "the bulk of the government's forces – the police and army – could be concentrated in Mount Lebanon."[1]

All four Kata'ib candidates lost and *al-'Amal* joined with other opposition groups to protest loudly the election results.[2] Some of the specific allegations made by the LKP included the use and reuse of Kata'ib members' identity cards obtained illegally in their absence by pro-government electors in Ghustah.

Jumayyil himself wrote an open letter to the Lebanese president demanding the "dissolution of Parliament and the formation of a neutral government to supervise free and true elections."[3] The party even instituted legal proceedings against government-appointed election supervisors in various voting headquarters in Mount Lebanon for alleged election irregularities.[4] All this came to nought, however, and the "Puppet Chamber of 1947"[5] became an instrument for the further advancement of al-Khuri's presidential ambitions.

The LKP's electoral defeat could not be blamed wholly on government fraud and manipulation. The party itself possessed no substantive program, its organization and structural chain of commands remained ineffective especially at the sectional and regional levels, and, finally, it was competing against well entrenched traditional forces which successfully exploited the primordial sentiments and communal loyalties of the people.

The party was in fact confronted with two serious failings: an almost obsessive preoccupation with "principles" and their uncompromisibility under any condition, and, secondly, the failure to form tactical alliances and coalitions with like-minded groups and

[1] *L'Orient*, May 24, 1947.
[2] See *al-'Amal*, May 16, 29, 30, 1947, for representative examples of the editorial criticisms made by the LKP against the government.
[3] For complete text see *al-'Amal*, June 16, 1947.
[4] *L'Orient*, June 17, 1947.
[5] N. A. Ziadeh, *Syria and Lebanon*, p. 208.

individuals for the purpose of broadening its electoral appeal. Flexibility and pragmatism were essential political approaches the LKP had to adopt if it was to advance beyond its "boy scout" level. The results of the 1951 elections revealed a beginning awareness of these fundamental political principles.

In preparation for those elections, to be held on April 15, president al-Khuri designated Husayn al-'Uwayni as caretaker premier. His specific task was to guarantee, as much as possible, free and undisturbed elections and to prevent a repetition of the chaos and corruption which characterized the 1947 elections. Towards this end al-'Uwayni prohibited mass meetings and the display of nominees' pictures on posters fearing that destruction of these posters by opponents might cause clashes as they had in previous campaigns. The army was mobilized to maintain order and trustworthy inspectors appointed at the polls, which had been considerably increased in numbers, and, finally, the National Bloc and communist party nominees were released from prison.[1]

Jumayyil, rejecting his own vow to remain outside the electoral battle, headed a list of five Kata'ib candidates in the 1951 elections. Regardless of its past performances the party had determined that its future effectiveness as a political organization required its active participation in parliamentary elections, and after over a month of deliberations the party had nominated the following five candidates: Shadir (Beirut), Dahir Mattar (Kisrawan), Jean Skaff (Biqa'), Albert Hajj ('Akkar), and Jumayyil (al-Matn).

Although each ran under the party label, the strength of certain traditional notables and their electoral lists were more important in determining eventual outcomes. Thus, while Shadir, Skaff, and Hajj all won in their respective districts their victories were more a consequence of list-confessional considerations than strictly party identification. In Kisrawan Mattar lost decisively while Jumayyil was barely defeated in al-Matn in a hotly contested run-off election against the National Bloc's Pierre Eddé (Iddah).

"The Battle of Matn"

In the regular elections in al-Matn no single candidate received the minimum one-third of the total vote required for election to the

[1] See Gideon Tadmor, "The Lebanese Elections," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, II (June-July, 1951), p. 247.

fifth Maronite seat allocated to the district. According to the electoral law, however, any Maronite candidate receiving at least 15 per cent of the vote was eligible to participate in the run-off election to be held one week later. Under this stipulation eight candidates were permitted to run.[1] Of the eight it was felt that most would withdraw their candidacy and that the "battle" would probably be fought between Jumayyil, Wadi' Na'im of the Dustur, and, perhaps, Habib 'Aql of the National Bloc. The two Dusturian candidates (Na'im and Khalil Abu Jawdah) withdrew their nominations and ostensibly gave their support to Jumayyil. It was thought that "in the spirit of national unity"[2] the NB would do the same. Instead, 'Aql and Edward Hunayn withdrew in favor of Pierre Eddé. Similarly, strongly anti-Khuri forces like Kamal Junbalat[3] and his colisters in the Shuf—Camille Sham'un, Emile Bustani, Ghassan Thuwayni, and Anwar Khatib—joined the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, a long-time adversary of the Kata'ib, in encouraging Eddé's candidacy.[4]

Even though Junbalat and Sham'un actively campaigned throughout Matn for the NB candidate it was assumed that Jumayyil would be elected since he had the support of his party, that of the Dustur, and was a native of Bikfayah, one of the larger Maronite towns in Matn.

The first serious defection occurred when Abu Jawdah, who had remained in contention with Eddé and Jumayyil until the very last moment, finally gave his formal support, surprisingly, to the National Bloc leader.

The abbreviated two-day campaign was extremely intense and bitter and terminated in a bloody clash between Kata'ib, communist, and SSNP forces on election day. An estimated three persons were killed and twenty seriously wounded.[5] Most of the pro-Eddé forces were mobilized by the SSNP from its Matn stronghold at Duhur al-Shumayr. Five days earlier Junbalat had made no secret of his visit to Damascus to confer with 'Isam Muhayiri, vice president of the SSNP, on obtaining the latter's support for Eddé

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[1] For names, party affiliations, and first round votes see *L'Orient*, April 18, 1951.

[2] *Ibid.*, April 22, 1951.

[3] Junbalat, once a strong supporter of al-Khuri, had broken away after Lebanon achieved its formal independence.

[4] See *L'Orient*, April 20-22, 1951.

[5] *Ibid.*, April 23, 1951.

against Jumayyil. Muhayiri subsequently issued a formal statement to all SSNP members in Lebanon to actively support Eddé's candidacy.[1]

When the final vote was counted Eddé had defeated Jumayyil by a slim 149 vote plurality (9,776 to 9,627). *Al-'Amal* immediately accused Eddé's campaign of corruption and fraud and called for new elections.[2] The reasons for Jumayyil's defeat, however, could be found in less "conspiratorial" causes: (1) Dusturian candidates and supporters did not actively campaign for the LKP leader; (2) K. Abu Jawdah, contrary to his informal commitments, told his supporters to vote for Eddé; (3) W. Na'im released his electors, the majority of whom abstained from voting altogether when it was assumed that they would throw their support to Jumayyil; (4) except for Bashir 'Awar, no Druze Dusturian (e.g., Majid Arslan) campaigned in behalf of the LKP leader; (5) the majority of Jumayyil's co-listers and their sympathizers in the April 15 elections either abstained from voting or voted against him; (6) Junbalat and Sham'un vigorously campaigned in behalf of Eddé, remaining in the Matn district until the very end of the voting; finally, (7) there were numerous allegations, probably only half true, that vote buying had been organized on a large scale especially in Burj Hammud.[3]

In spite of Jumayyil's defeat the LKP managed to have three of its candidates elected to the new Chamber. This was discerned as a "new" trend in Lebanese party politics. As one commentator indicated, "the 1951 elections showed for the first time the influence of political parties."[4] Although institutional and traditional forces still handicapped party candidates and organizations with ideologies and programs it was evident, if only slightly, that a shift was occurring.

This tendency towards greater political party involvement and participation could have continued and probably expanded if, among other things, a new electoral law had not been promulgated in November 1952. Seeking to break up the pro-Khuri coalitions elected in the 1947 and 1951 parliaments, the newly-installed president, Camille Sham'un, forced upon an unwilling Chamber a significantly altered electoral law, reducing the number of deputies to 44.

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[1] See *ibid.*
[2] See *al-'Amal,* April 26-27, 1951.
[3] See *L'Orient,* April 24, 1951, for details.
[4] Ziadeh, *Syria and Lebanon,* p. 208.

Ironically, while Sham'un's overt intention was to reduce the traditional power base of rural feudal elements, the indirect effect was the blurring of ideological and programmatic distinctions, where they existed, between various party groupings. Electoral redistricting, by its suppression of many former seats and rearrangement of constituency lines, forced the creation of seemingly irrational coalitions and mixed tickets.[1]

With the number of parliamentary seats reduced and having suffered an embarrassing defeat in Matn two years earlier, the Kata'ib decided to present only two candidates for the 1953 elections: Shadir for the minority seat in Beirut's fifth district (Minat Husn-Dar Muraysi-Port) and Maurice Jumayyil for the single Maronite seat in the capital's second electoral district (Ashrafiyah-Ramayl-Sayfi). Jumayyil lost to a popular former president of Lebanon, Alfred Naqash, by almost 1,800 votes while Shadir barely won against Edmond Rabbath, the candidate of the National Appeal Party.

Maurice Jumayyil ran with Nasim Majdalani of Junbalat's Progressive Socialist Party against Naqash and Ghassan Thuwayni, then closely associated with the SSNP. The whole campaign was marked by a bitter rivalry which manifested itself in accusations and counter-accusations, scattered acts of terrorism,[2] and finally culminated in the kidnapping of six LKP members by the SSNP.[3] After the government had, on Pierre Jumayyil's request, intervened to obtain their release, the elections were conducted in a relatively calm atmosphere.

According to the Kata'ib, Maurice Jumayyil's defeat was caused by an alliance "against the party composed of high officials, money interests, and the high clergy."[4] The party's relatively poor performance, however, could be traced to more fundamental internal weaknesses.

> What we lack [Mu'arbass wrote in 1956] is ambition, motivation, and preparation necessary for success in parliamentary life. To date we have failed to bring forth possible candidates, to prepare and educate them for this important and necessary task that they must fulfill as representatives of the party in parliament. We have failed,

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[1] For example, in both Beirut and the Shuf the LKP joined the SSNP in forming electoral coalitions. See *L'Orient*, July 2, 1953.

[2] For details of the Mar Marun dynamiting incident see *L'Orient*, July 9, 1953.

[3] See *al-'Amal*, July 10, 1953 (special supplement).

[4] Mouarbes, "Le parti et le pouvoir," p. 510.

> moreover, to present one candidate in regions where we have many followers and supporters, causing some of them to leave, if only temporarily, the ranks of the party.[1]

Another more practical explanation for the party's failure to put forth more candidates was the lack of necessary funds to conduct an effective electoral campaign. A candidate's deposit, vote buying and other "corrupt" although acceptable practices, as well as legitimate campaign expenses have traditionally eliminated all but the very wealthy from participation in parliamentary elections. The LKP was at that time in no financial position to support several candidates. Unwilling to accept contributions from foreign governmental sources, and with its own revenues limited by the nature and number of its dues-paying membership as well as the irregular pattern of emigrant remittances, the party was forced to choose its prospective candidates carefully and selectively.

The next test of the party's electoral strength came in the general elections of June 9–30, 1957. After a new electoral law raised the number of parliamentary seats to 66, Pierre Jumayyil announced in a May 22 press conference the candidacy of five party members[2] and expressed his support for the parliamentary system and the important role of political parties in that system. He concluded with a general elaboration of his party's program on various social, economic, and political issues. Undoubtedly, then, the party felt secure enough with its nation-wide strength to commit itself fully to the electoral battle. As will be recalled, internally, the party had refined its organizational structure, expanded its popular base, and diluted Jumayyil's autocratic powers in behalf of a larger and, in the main, more competent decision-making group. Unfortunately the 1957 elections proved to be inauspicious for the LKP and Lebanon in general.

Anti-Sham'un sentiment had been developing as early as 1955 and assumed a loose organizational form with the creation of the United National Front (UNF) in April 1957 just preceding the general elections. The UNF was eventually to group a wide spectrum of political tendencies including Beirut's two leading Muslim politicians, al-Yafi and Salam, Junbalat, the Najjadah, National Organization, Ba'th, Dustur, and the National Appeal Party as well as clan followers of particular rural notables. A one day strike

[1] *Ibid.*
[2] *Al-'Amal*, May 23, 1957.

by the Front on May 30 calling for the creation of a neutral interim cabinet caused several deaths and many injuries.[1] However, by June 2 peace had been restored and the elections were permitted to proceed on four successive Sundays beginning on June 9.[2]

Although the LKP was a mild supporter of the Sham'un regime its candidates fared poorly in an otherwise sweeping victory for the government: Of all the LKP candidates only Shadir, running in Beirut's second district, won. 'Abduh Sa'b had withdrawn his candidacy a few days before the elections while Jean Skaff, the party's Greek Orthodox representative from Zahlah, lost to his cousin, Joseph Skaff. Maurice Jumayyil was defeated in Matn by 277 votes, and William Hawi, the Greek Orthodox candidate in Beirut's first district failed even to receive the minimum 20 per cent of the votes and thereby forfeited his $ 1,000 campaign deposit.

As in 1947 widespread allegations of electoral irregularities and government manipulation of votes were made after the 1957 elections. No doubt the defeat of such popular and anti-government candidates as Junbalat (first defeat in an election), Thuwayni, Salam, al-Yafi, and Ahmad al-As'ad caused serious speculations as to the honesty of the results. Eighteen of the twenty deputies elected in Mount Lebanon and ten of the eleven Beirut deputies elected were either allies or close supporters of the Lebanese president. Jumayyil himself, when asked about the legality of the newly-elected Chamber, answered: "...the parliament which has just been given to us, represents in my opinion, only ten per cent of the population of the country—at the moment the real parliament is in the street."[3]

In any case the elections were perceived by the opposition as being neither free nor totally honest. These accusations and the violence that ensued were contributory causes of the downfall of the Sham'un regime and the start of the 1958 civil war.

Part of the Kata'ib's own deficiency could be attributed to the causes cited above but, more realistically, the failure to ally with the "right" list and the relative inefficiency of the party's electoral machinery were once again important in explaining its defeat.

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[1] According to unofficial reports there were 7 dead, 60 wounded, and 200 arrests. For details see *L'Orient*, May 31, 1957.

[2] This practice was instituted in order to economize in the use of security forces which, by being concentrated in one part of the country a week at a time, would lessen the chances of violence and disorders.

[3] *Le Soir* (Beirut), July 15, 1957. Cited in Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 58.

Undoubtedly the watershed in the LKP's history occurs after 1958 with its participation in the counter-revolution and the popularity gained therefrom. In electoral terms a noticeable shift in favor of the LKP could also be observed.

PHASE II: 1959-1968, VICTORIES AT THE POLLS

The first electoral test of the Kata'ib's newly gained status came in the by-election in Jazzin on June 21, 1959. A parliamentary seat became vacant in Jazzin with the death of Farid Quzma in May 1959. The LKP proposed the candidacy of Dr. Basil 'Abbud, a faithful party member for over twenty years, to run against Marun Kan'an, a pro-Sham'un candidate. P. Jumayyil, as minister with four portfolios, requested permission to be relieved of his governmental duties while the election campaign was going on so that no question of government influence or manipulation could be made. This was rejected but his call for an "irreproachably honest election" was, for the most part, heeded. According to Jumayyil this was to be a test of Lebanon's democratic parliamentary system. As he indicated, "the Jazzin by-election must be a preparation for the forthcoming general elections [1960], when we can show the whole world that we are a free people with a proper conception of democracy and freedom."[1]

The LKP candidate had the local support of the popular Maronite leader Henri Khuri, who had withdrawn his own candidacy forty-eight hour before the voting in favor of 'Abbud. Also supporting the Kata'ib nominee were Jean 'Aziz, lawyer, poet, and political orator who himself had been elected for the first time in 1957, Ahmad al-As'ad, the south's leading Shi'ite za'im, and Ma'ruf Sa'd, the leading Sunnite notable of the area. As for Kan'an he had the backing of Joseph and Nicholas Salam, the latter being overwhelmingly victorious for the Greek Catholic seat in the South Lebanon district in 1957, and former president Sham'un. Although unsuccessful in his previous election attempts Kan'an remained popular with the local citizenry.

The campaign aroused widespread interest with 66 per cent of the electorate voting on election day (a relatively high percentage for Lebanese elections). 'Abbud defeated his pro-Sham'un oppo-

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[1] *Al-'Amal,* June 17, 1959.

nent by nearly 3,000 votes and the victory was termed by the Kata'ib president as a "victory for Lebanon."[1]

Most non-partisan observers could point to two significant factors contributing to the Kata'ib's victory: first, of course, was the residual impact of the events of 1958. More important, perhaps, was the party's creation of a highly efficient and disciplined electoral machinery. As one journalist on the scene indicated:

> the party's campaign organization deserved special attention: at the entrance of each village [in the electoral district], Kata'ib camps were set up where young men in khaki shirts and blue jeans stood ready to provide transportation for the voters, transmit messages and handle last minute administrative formalities. In front of the polls, other Kata'ib members guided the voters as they arrived in the cars—private for the most part—put at their disposal by the party. Everywhere it was felt that these young men were working for a cause much more than for a candidate.[2]

'Abbud himself best summarized the important components of his victory: (1) a "magnificently organized" electoral campaign; (2) the "profound impression" made on Lebanese public opinion by the Kata'ib-sponsored 'Month of National Unity' (following the 1958 crisis); (3) the "support given my candidacy by a large number of political leaders both in and outside of Parliament;" and (4) the "profound desire of the Lebanese people to break the chains of feudal leadership."[3]

Those factors contributing to the LKP's victory in 1959 were very much in evidence in the 1960 general elections.

A few weeks after the electoral law of April 26, 1960, was passed President Shihab dissolved Parliament, a year before its term was officially due to expire, and announced that new elections would be held on four consecutive Sundays beginning on June 12 (19, 26, and July 3), 1960. Rashid Karami's "conciliation cabinet" resigned on May 14 and a special interim cabinet headed by Ahmad Da'uq was formed to supervise the elections and ensure their neutrality. On May 10 the LKP president, speaking in behalf of the political bureau, announced the candidacy of seven party members.[4] Six of these candidates were successful in their electoral contests.

The new electoral law had redivided Beirut into three relatively

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[1] *L'Orient*, June 22, 1959.
[2] *L'Orient*, June 22, 1959.
[3] *Ibid.*, June 24, 1959.
[4] *Al-'Amal*, May 11, 1960.

homogeneous districts: one overwhelmingly Christian, one predominantly Muslim, and one mixed. Jumayyil headed the first list in Beirut's Christian district against his National Bloc opponent of 1951, Pierre Eddé. Shadir, the party's popular Armenian Catholic representative, was also on the same list.

Eddé had the support of Sham'un who had broken with Jumayyil after 1958 when the Kata'ib leader assumed a prominent position in the government of former insurgent Rashid Karami. Moreover, Sham'un's hastily created Liberal Nationalists Party assumed an attitude of Maronite extremism while the LKP was now being acknowledged as a moderate and popular organization working with different factions and sectarian groups for the betterment of Lebanon. It even no longer seemed far fetched to consider Jumayyil as a future presidential candidate.

In electoral terms the LKP's new acceptance was reflected in its landslide victory over the National Bloc list. With the active collaboration of the Armenian Tashnaq party Jumayyil's list was propelled to victory with more than two-thirds of the total vote by what one commentator has called "the implacable efficiency of its machine."[1]

The Sham'un-Kata'ib rivalry was also evident in al-Matn where both the Dustur and Tashnaq allied with the LKP to defeat three of the five candidates on Sham'un's list. The Kata'ib list was headed by Maurice Jumayyil who received the highest percentage of total votes cast (56 per cent). In Ba'abdah the LKP joined the NB and the Liberal Nationalists in defeating four of the five Dusturian candidates. This type of seemingly irrational alliances and counter-alliances among competing groups is a common and "accepted" pattern of behavior in Lebanese politics.

Abduh Sa'b, running for the first time, was the party's victorious candidate in Ba'abdah. In Kisrawan, Dusturians were internally split and the Kata'ib candidate ran as an independent. Surprisingly two notable-types, Maurice Zuwayn and Clovis al-Khazin, were defeated while Louis Abu Sharaf, representing the party in an election for the first time, succeeded in obtaining the highest percentage of total votes cast (58 per cent). A young and erudite university professor Abu Sharaf had both the organization and national appeal of the LKP behind him.

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[1] Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, p. 158.

Basil ʿAbbud repeated his victory in Jazzin and like his party colleagues in al-Matn and Kisrawan obtained the most votes of all the candidates (six ran, three were elected). Only in Batrun did the Kata'ib meet defeat. According to Ziadeh, "the Kata'ib failed in Batroun because of the Kutlah-supported candidate [Camille ʿAql] whose life had been spent with the people and for the people."[1]

The 1960 parliamentary elections marked a new step in Lebanese political development. One can cite three significant results from this election: (1) a new sense of political awareness on the part of the electorate. Candidates could no longer assume certain political "givens" about the masses but instead had to employ genuine electioneering methods including going to the people and presenting specific platforms and programs; (2) concomitantly the election results manifested a turning away from zaʿim-leadership and a gradual adherence to "modern" forms of leadership; (3) finally the bloc "parties" identified with the early traditional leadership of the state lost ground to the more ideologically-motivated and programmatically-based party organizations like the Kata'ib, PSP, and Baʿthists.[2]

This latter development could be observed in the election of the largest number of party representatives in parliament ever. The LKP especially manifested a clearly superior electoral organization. Where other groups and individuals depended upon the services of "electoral brokers" (*qabada'is*) or "election keys" (*mafatih al-intikhabat*) who act as local intermediaries between the candidate and the electorate, usually for some substantial reward, financial or otherwise, the LKP had organizational influence all the way down to the village and ward levels. Moreover, party solidarity and cohesiveness continues to characterize the Kata'ib's actions in and out of Parliament to a degree almost unknown among other groups and organizations. It was in the 1960 elections that these significant characteristics of the party's organizational structure and electoral appeal came out fully.

Most important perhaps was the effect of the 1960 electoral victory on the party's ideological and political orientation. Having tasted power, first in the streets during the 1958 disturbances then in government in the "cabinet of four" and, finally, within parliament from 1960 on, the LKP began to moderate some of its ideolo-

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[1] Ziadeh, "Lebanese Elections," p. 376.
[2] Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, pp. 165-166.

gical rigidity in favor of compromise and cooperation with its political opponents. By so doing the party became more effective as an institution of popular and now greater legitimate appeal.

It must be remembered that a major reason for the LKP's expanded popularity at the polls was a consequence of its performance in the 1958 civil war. That is, as already indicated, support for and increased membership in the Kata'ib is directly related to the degree of stability or instability that the system is experiencing: high instability, increased membership and support; low instability, decreased membership and falling support. By 1964 Fu'ad Shihab had successfully normalized Lebanon's political life. His wide range reformist policies modernized much of Lebanon's administration and government. Moreover, he had managed to narrow, if only temporarily, existing political and communal cleavages by securing the broadest possible base of political support. Towards this end he sought and received the active cooperation of such diverse groups and leaders as the LKP, the As'ad bloc, Junbalat, the Dustur, and many of the leading Sunnite notables of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon.[1]

Similarly Lebanon's external relations were marked by a relatively high degree of inter-Arab conciliation and cooperation capped by the successful Arab summit conference of January, 1964. Thus, on the eve of the April-May 1964 general elections Lebanon was experiencing a sustained period of political non-interference from abroad and political stability from within. The last serious threat to the system had been the abortive coup by the SSNP in December 1961 which the Shihab regime had successfully if not ruthlessly suppressed.

Many of the LKP's own socio-economic programs and policy proposals elaborated by P. Jumayyil in his various ministerial capacities were implemented by the Shihab regime. Thus with no apparent threat to the system existing and many administrative, governmental, and social reforms already enacted, the LKP found it difficult to inspire renewed support in its behalf. In fact, the 1964 elections witnessed few serious political issues dividing the candidates.

The Kata'ib nominated nine candidates for the elections with

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[1] See Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, p. 301. Cf. Michael W. Suleiman, "Elections in a Confessional Democracy: The Lebanese Case," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (February, 1967), p. 114.

at least one representing each muhafazah. Unlike its past performances, however, it was singularly unsuccessful in areas where theoretically it had the greatest strength. Thus two of its three candidates were defeated in predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon while one of its Greek Catholic candidates was triumphant in Zahrani, South Lebanon, an area traditionally outside the scope of Kata'ib influence.

In Beirut's first district P. Jumayyil and Shadir obtained an uncontested victory, and in an unexpected development Rashid al-Khuri, running in an area where the party had only moderate influence, was victorious in Zahrani. It was not as successful in other areas however. While M. Jumayyil barely won in al-Matn, all the other Kata'ib candidates (Dr. Emile Hukayam in Batrun, George 'Aql in Zahlah, Louis Abu Sharaf in Kisrawan, 'Abduh Sa'b in Ba'abdah, and finally Basil 'Abbud in Jazzin) were defeated.

The Kata'ib's relatively poor performance could be attributed to those factors cited earlier as well as to the increased strength of local notables. In fact the 1964 elections witnessed the general decline of party influence in Parliament. The National Organization and the Najjadah lost their single representative from 1960, the LKP lost two from four years earlier, the National Bloc four, and the Liberal Nationalists one. If anything, traditional forces were reasserting their influence upon parliamentary life. Since political issues were not clear cut and a general sense of complacency, if not indifference, born of a prosperous period seemed to prevail, partisan political organizations found it difficult to inspire enthusiasm and support.

It was thus somewhat of a surprise when the Kata'ib proposed the candidacy of Pierre Jumayyil for the August 1964 presidential elections. It is uncertain whether the party had serious expectations of winning or whether it was merely testing its national popularity via the Chamber of Deputies. According to many people, even though Jumayyil's performance in government had enhanced his image as a potential national leader, the LKP's principal role was still one of defense and development and not the actual exercise of power.

However after extensive deliberations with Kata'ib supporters and friends in Parliament and government the party's maktab submitted Jumayyil's name as a candidate for the presidency.[1] He

[1] See *al-'Amal*, July 10-11, 1964.

naturally accepted the bureau's decision and thereby joined the ranks of nearly a dozen presidential aspirants. A political neutral with no strong ideological identities was eventually elected president. Jumayyil received his party's four votes plus that of the pro-Kata'ib Muslim za'im Sami al-Sulh while Charles Hilu, one of the original founders of the LKP, received the overwhelming endorsement of the Chamber.[1]

While it seemed certain that Jumayyil could not possibly win, he remained a candidate "for the sake of principle."[2] According to party officials it was important for the Kata'ib leader to present himself as a presidential candidate so as to inspire national support for the LKP and thereby alter forever its traditional image as an exclusively sectarian organization. Similarly, after the events of 1958, this attempt could manifest the party's institutional, non-violent approach towards solving Lebanon's political and social problems. In other words, this was another dimension of the LKP's long-range effort to guarantee support for the system and insure its continued maintenance.

In August 1970 Jumayyil, with strong support from his allies in the *hilf al-thulathi* (triple alliance), Raymond Eddé and Camille Sham'un, and his own party's rank-and-file, once again presented himself as a presidential candidate to run ostensibly against the former president and popular military leader, Fu'ad Shihab, a man with whom Jumayyil had little ideological or personal differences.

After considerable political maneuverings in the antirooms of the Chamber and a near riot within it a "Lebanonist" candidate, Sulayman Franjiyah, was elected president much to the satisfaction of the Kata'ib and other Lebanese nationalists who shared Franjiyah's strong anti-commando stance and "Lebanon first" principle.

As in 1964 Jumayyil's candidacy could only have been regarded as a symbolic gesture designed to enhance the party's prestige at home and abroad and, not incidentally, to affirm its long-range determination to achieve ultimate political power in the state.

The 1968 general elections took place less than a year after the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. One of the immediate consequences of that war was the creation of the hilf which brought together Lebanon's three major Christian-dominated political organizations:

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[1] The final vote was: 92 for, 5 against, and 2 abstentions. For details see *L'Orient*, August 19, 1964.

[2] *Al-'Amal*, August 13, 1964.

the Kata'ib, National Bloc, and Liberal Nationalists. Originally established to counter "increasing socialist tendencies"[1] in Lebanon, especially as they became manifest after June 1967, the hilf eventually evolved into a cohesive electoral machine.

The electoral successes of that alliance can be revealed in the results of the March 24, 31, and April 7, 1968, parliamentary elections. Whatever conflicting presidential ambitions existing among the three Maronite leaders were temporarily submerged for the benefit of a guaranteed presence of a substantial "pro-Lebanese" faction in the Chamber. In various pre-election meetings the hilf set out a coordinated campaign strategy. By February 2, 1968, at a meeting at the home of Kathim al-Khalil, vice president of the LNP, the hilf could announce that "full electoral agreement" had been reached.[2]

Aside from two minor conflicts which arose within the coalition[3] the alliance lists formed in Kisrawan, al-Matn, and Ba'abdah were extremely strong. In all three districts the hilf registered sizeable victories bringing into Parliament three members of the NB, three from the LKP, and three LNP members.

In other parts of the country alliance candidates were equally successful. In Beirut Jumayyil's list, which included two other Kata'ib members—Shadir and the party's Protestant (minority) representative, Samir Ishaq—scored a landslide victory for its LKP and Tashnaq candidates although the two independents on the list—Fu'ad Butrus and Antoine Sahnawi—were defeated. In Zahlah, Jazzin, and Batrun each of the three Kata'ib candidates easily won their elections. Sham'un and Eddé regained their seats lost in 1964 (actually Eddé had regained his seat in a 1965 by-election in Jubayl).

While all three alliance parties scored impressive victories only the LKP could guarantee that its parliamentarians would strictly abide by the programs, policies, and decisions reached collectively by the party's executive organs.

Several factors help explain the LKP's successful performance: (1) the defeat of the Arabs in 1967 and the consequent surge of

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[1] Interview with Samir Ishaq, LKP deputy and member of the maktab, November 6, 1968, Beirut, Lebanon.

[2] *L'Orient*, February 2, 1968.

[3] For details see *al-'Amal*, January 24, 1968, and *L'Orient*, February 3, March 15, 16, and 19, 1968.

Arab nationalist sentiment, especially as expressed in the popular support of Palestinian commando organizations, aroused renewed fears among Lebanese Christians about the future viability of Lebanon. As in similar past experiences the LKP has become the organizational focus around which Christian sentiment coalesces for support and leadership. One manifestation of this expanded support was visible in increased party membership; another direct indication was its electoral popularity. (2) The Triple Alliance, itself a creation of post-1967 events, likewise assisted the Kata'ib's effort in maximizing its electoral potential by broadening its political base among the Christian electorate. (3) Finally, and maybe most importantly, the party's own electoral mechanism was especially efficient in mobilizing broad, popular, and, not insignificantly, cross-confessional support.

Sa'adah, as part of his report to the Eleventh Annual Party Congress, revealed some of the components of the Kata'ib victory. As early as September 1967 the party had convened the council of department heads (*al-majlis ru'asa' al-masalih*) to a special session to establish the broad administrative guidelines for the upcoming electoral campaign. Some of its general recommendations included: (1) designating the council for department heads as the central administrative organ of the campaign; (2) relinquishing most of the secretary-general's administrative duties in order to enable him to assume the effective leadership of the campaign; (3) assigning the department of elections the primary organizational task of enforcing majlis decisions and ensuring constant liaison between local and regional party organs.[1]

In light of these objectives the party's administrative structure was decentralized enabling local and regional party organs to organize and direct their own campaigns with the advice and assistance of the national office only when required. Prior to this, frequent meetings between heads of the departments, presidents of the regions, and with prospective candidates took place in order to map out an efficient campaign strategy consonant with local demands. Concomitantly, a series of regional conferences were held to evaluate prospects and possibilities in a given region. The head of the department of elections was given the primary technical task of coordinating the overall campaign. In the regions each party council

[1] *Taqrir al-Amin al-'Amm* (report of the secretary-general) (Shaturah: Eleventh General Party Congress, September 20-22, 1968), p. 6.

(*majlis al-aqalim*) established specific services (*makatib*) to carry out the campaign: transportation, registration lists, balloting, visits, etc.[1]

Weakening this electoral structure and campaign strategy, however, were leadership conflicts at the regional level where in some instances heads of the aqalim were themselves candidates for parliament and at the same time responsible for administering the party's campaign in their regions. Consequently, a party representative from Beirut was assigned the administrative tasks of the electoral campaign in the aqalim enabling regional heads to concentrate on their electioneering. For the most part friction was kept to a minimum between "outside" leaders and their immediate subordinates in the aqalim. According to the secretary-general of the party, Joseph Sa'adah, part of the LKP's success could be attributed to the efficient operation of the regional campaigns as directed by dedicated party workers and subleaders from Beirut.

In general, the party was satisfied with its overall performance, although by its own admission its electoral propaganda was inadequate because of (1) "the political stituation in the country, (2) insufficient budgetary allocations, and (3) the lack of adequate information on each constituency."[2] The latter point was especially true in non-Christian districts of the south and north.

The recommendations put forth for improving the party's electoral apparatus included uplifting the quality of leadership in the department of elections, conducting inter-election visits and group meetings in all the constituencies, convening regular meetings between the deputies and their constituents in the districts, and strengthening, "by all scientific means possible," the department of propaganda and information.[3]

In essence the Kata'ib victory at the polls in 1968 highlighted the sophisticated and well-organized nature of its electoral machinery, the quality, competence, and popularity of its candidates, and the substantive character of its programs and policies. Moreover, where it once scorned electoral alliances and tactical coalitions it now was in the forefront of such pragmatic practices deemed essential to achieving meaningful representation in the Chamber of Deputies. It is along the electoral dimension that the Kata'ib's transformational process best reveals itself.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

AL-KATA'IB IN GOVERNMENT

Although the Kata'ib had twice been represented in interim and short-lived cabinets[1] it was not until October 1958, that the party assumed a leading role in governmental power.

The 1958 crisis appeared settled with the election on July 31 of Fu'ad Shihab as Lebanon's new president when two specific events triggered the LKP's counter-revolution. First, the abduction and presumed murder of Fu'ad Haddad, assistant editor of *al-'Amal*, on September 19 inflamed the party and its supporters. In protest it declared a nationwide strike to begin on September 22. Even before then LKP para-military forces (*quwan*) had taken to the barricades in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Zahlah, and other Christian-populated regions. Secondly, the party was dissatisfied with the essentially pro-insurgent Karami government formed by president Shihab on September 24.[2] Thus, for twenty-two days, from September 24 to October 15, the Kata'ib-directed strikes and demonstrations were almost 100 per cent effective in paralyzing commercial and public life in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. It was only with the formation of the "conciliation cabinet of four," which included Pierre Jumayyil along with Karami, Raymond Eddé, and Husayn al-'Uwayni, that the crisis could be considered formally over.

This was an especially important breakthrough for the party. It was not unlike the events of November 1943 which saw the Kata'ib legitimized among the masses as a nationalist movement of some consequence. Now it assumed a broadened political dimension wherein it could begin to share in the formulation of government policy. Similarly, long-range social and economic reforms instituted by the party could have a greater chance of implementation now that it had a voice in the distribution and expenditure of public funds. Finally, the Kata'ib would now be in a better position to promote its nationalist ideology and guarantee the continued operation of the multiconfessional principle.

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[1] Jean Skaff, Greek Orthodox deputy from the Biqa', was included in the May 12-August 18, 1953, interim cabinet created to supervise the 1953 elections. Joseph Shadir was appointed Minister of Finance in the short-lived Sami al-Sulh cabinet of March 1958, formed as a desperate effort by a collapsing Sham'un regime.

[2] Of the eight-member cabinet, four belonged to the opposition United National Front, three to the "Third Force" which, in effect, was in opposition, and one was neutral.

From October 1958 to November 1969 the LKP, in the person of Pierre Jumayyil and sometimes also Maurice Jumayyil, has been represented in every government formed except three.[1] This does not include three provisional cabinets established to supervise parliamentary elections in which P. Jumayyil was not included and one abortive cabinet in which he was included but refused to participate.[2]

It seems no longer possible that a Kata'ib representative can voluntarily be excluded from any government formed. In this respect the party's coercive powers are best exemplified in the "politics of cabinet formation" wherein each political group, bloc, party, or individual seeking one or more seats in a proposed cabinet maneuvers to obtain the most important or influential portfolios.

This task has become more delicate since the formation and further cohesion of the Hilf. Now, under the pressure of radicalized Arabist elements the LKP has been seeking equal representation for its two political allies in any proposed cabinet. Thus when ʿAbdullah al-Yafi formed a new government on October 12, 1968, a government which included P. Jumayyil but excluded any representative of either the NB or the LNP, the LKP president and two pro-Alliance ministers (Nasri Maʿluf and Sulayman Franjiyah) refused to participate in the government. The Hilf accused the new government of being unrepresentative of the national will since five of the eight appointed ministers were pro-Nahjists (*nahj:* straight path) that is, deputies aligned with or supporting the Parliamentary Democratic Front, a loose coalition of parliamentarians identifying with the policies and objectives of former Lebanese president Fu'ad Shihab. Jumayyil called for the creation "of an expanded coalition government that was truly representative of all parliamentary factions and not limited to only a few;"[3] he demanded a "cabinet of national unity."[4]

For one week continuous deliberations and political maneuvering

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[1] This fact contradicts Hudson's statement that the LKP "is only occasionally represented in the cabinet." Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization," p. 257.

[2] He was excluded from the following governments: Daʿuq, May 14, 1960-July 31, 1960; al-ʿUwayni, February 20, 1964; and al-Yafi, March 1, 1968-October 9, 1968. He refused to participate in the al-Yafi cabinet of October 12-20, 1968.

[3] *Al-ʿAmal*, October 13, 1968.

[4] *L'Orient*, October 16, 1968.

took place in an attempt to satisfy the contradictory interests of those who sought the exclusion of a Sham'un representative in the cabinet and the hilf which wanted a more "balanced" political distribution.[1] The issue was ultimately resolved in a not untypical Lebanese fashion: both the president and prime minister abruptly announced their resignations. After a "spontaneous" outcry of anguish on the part of populace and politicians alike both Hilu and al-Yafi withdrew their resignations and a four-man cabinet, reminiscent of 1958 and including three of the same four politicians, was immediately established.[2]

An identical problem arose with the resignation of al-Yafi's government in the aftermath of the Israeli raid on Beirut's international airport on December 28, 1968. When Karami attempted to form a new cabinet on January 15, one which again saw the inclusion of Jumayyil but noticeably excluded any LNP member, he was confronted with a challenge from the Hilf. The resulting crisis and the Kata'ib's response will be discussed in the following chapter.

Conclusion

As we have seen the Kata'ib's participation in Lebanon's representative institutions has significantly increased in the decade following the 1958 civil war. As table 13 indicates, the party has been consistently successful in having its candidates elected to the Chamber of Deputies especially in phase two of its electoral development.

In broader terms this reflects a new pattern of development in Lebanese politics. For example, the Hilf alone has 26 members in the 1968 Chamber which constitutes over half of the total party/bloc membership represented. Similarly, the 41 party/bloc members is the highest representation of such groups in Lebanon's parliamentary history (see table 14).

As one Lebanese political observer has indicated, "perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the 1968 election results has been the success of organized political parties."[3]

Unquestionably notables still exert considerable influence upon

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[1] See *al-Nahar*, October 19, 1968.

[2] For details see *L'Orient*, October 13-21, 1968, *al-'Amal*, October 13-21, 1968, and *La Revue du Liban*, October 19, 1968, pp. 8-10.

[3] Camille K. Chehab, *Les élections législatives de 1968* (Beirut, 1968), p. 57.

Table 13

LKP Performance in Parliamentary Elections, 1943-1968

Year	*Number of candidates*	*Number elected*	*Per cent elected*
Phase I: 1943-1958			
1943	0	0	0
1945*	1	0	0
1947	4	0	0
1951	5	3	60
1953	2	1	50
1957	4	1	25
Subtotals	16	5	31
Phase II: 1959-1968			
1959*	1	1	100
1960	7	6	86
1964	9	4	44
1968	9	9	100
Subtotals	26	20	77
Grand total	42	26	61

Key: * = by-elections

Table 14

Affiliation Patterns in Parliament, 1960-1968

Political Affiliations	*Representatives*			
	1960	*1964*	*1968*	*Total*
Parties and Blocs:				
Progressive Socialist	5	10*	7*	22
Liberal Nationalists	5	6*	11*	22
Lebanese Kata'ib	6	4	9	19
National Bloc	6	2	6	14
Dustur	5	8*	3*	16
Tashnaq	4	4	4	12
al-Najjadah	1	0	1	2
National Appeal	2	0	0	2
National Organization	1	0	0	1
Sub-total	35	34	41	110
Groups:				
Karami	11	11	27*	49
As'ad	7	10	6	23
Salam-Franjiyah	5	6	4**	15
J. Skaff	5	5	4	14
Arslan	0	0	3	3
Dandash	0	3	0	3
Sub-total	28	35	44	107
Independents	36	30	14	80
Total deputies	99	99	99	297

Key: * = includes supporters who are strongly identified with an individual or group without necessarily being permanent or formal members;
** = Salam only.

Lebanese politics and constitute the majority force in Parliament. Nevertheless, certain discernable patterns indicating a change in this situation have been observed such as (1) "a substantial increase in voter participation," (2) a "gradual broadening of the recruitment process, as indicated by the changing occupational background of deputies," and (3) a growing "competitiveness in parliamentary elections contests."[1]

That these trends are at all discernable is undoubtedly the outcome of continuous pressures upon, challenges to, and threats against the Lebanese political system by modernist organizations like the Lebanese Kata'ib Party. The LKP's own transformation along the various dimensions discussed in this part have made it sensitive to the need for concomitant systemic change corresponding to the demands and aspirations for greater democratic participation by a rising mass of politically-conscious Lebanese. How the Kata'ib works to challenge and maintain the Lebanese political system within its multiconfessional democratic framework will be our next concern.

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[1] Michael C. Hudson, "The Electoral Process and Political Development in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal*, 20 (Spring, 1966), p. 174.

PART THREE

SYSTEM CHALLENGE AND SYSTEM MAINTENANCE

INTRODUCTION

System maintenance assumes two analytically distinct forms in Lebanon. *Dynamic system maintenance* implies conscious and positively exerted effort at preserving Lebanon's social, economic, and political systems. The dynamic maintenance process goes beyond nominal commitment to the existing regime; it entails a positive effort to legitimize political structures and institutions and mobilize support for the system on a mass basis. Moreover, Lebanon's ideological and territorial permeability requires the tacit if not overt support of the system by influential regional powers. Dynamic system maintenance therefore involves both an intra-systemic effort at broad-scale legitimization and an extra-systemic effort at minimizing dysfunctional external pressures or, preferably, gaining direct regional and/or international support in behalf of the system.

While dynamic system maintenance works to achieve an active or vigorous equilibrium, *static system maintenance* implies an unyielding commitment to the status quo or a stationary equilibrium. That is, while those engaging in dynamically maintaining the system are prepared to accept and even induce societal change in order to further broaden the system's legitimacy, static maintenance signifies a rigid attachment to existing social and political structures with an unwillingness to see them altered in any major or minor way.

A concurrent process is that of system transformation which also has two relatively distinct analytical varients. Those engaging in *passive system transformation* exhibit a reluctant and often unenthusiastic support for the Lebanese system in its present form while actually harboring a desire to transform the system either partially or totally. Either because of ideological impotence, lack of sufficient organizational and/or physical capabilities, or limited popular appeal those engaging in passive system transformation are unable to bridge the gap successfully between themselves and more active transformers.

Those involved in *active system transformation* reject the existing system altogether and actively pursue its overthrow in the name of a superior one whether it be Baʿthist, communist, socialist, Nasserist,

pan-Arabist, or pan-Syrian. They are usually ideologically committed, well organized and disciplined, command an often small but dedicated following, and have tacit or overt support from elements outside of Lebanon.

While each process finds a certain degree of mixed sectarian support it may generally be said that Christians, and Maronites in particular, both masses and elites alike, actively support the system, a majority of Muslim elites and most of the Muslim masses passively do so, and a not insignificant Sunni minority rejects it altogether.

Of all the organized political groups in Lebanon only the Kata'ib has sought consistently over three decades to go beyond static forms of system maintenance and develop an abiding legitimacy to the existing boundaries and institutions of Lebanon. Even avowedly pro-Lebanese Maronite leaders like Bisharah al-Khuri and Camille Sham'un "appeared to be ready and only too willing to sacrifice the system in return for the continuation of their own incumbancy of the presidential office."[1]

Among the significant actors engaging in static system maintenance, that is those advocating a "don't-rock-the-boat" approach towards political development and social change, one may include the Maronite clergy, the military establishment, many local political bosses and semi-feudal rural notables, traditional political groups, high civil servants, and a varied number of middle level elites composed of professionals, bankers, and businessmen.

In general those involved in passive forms of system transformation include left-wing political leaders and organizations like Kamal Junbalat and his Progressive Socialist Party, the National Organization, and other predominantly Muslim middle level elite groups and individuals who are in but not of the system. Here also can be included numerous urban political bosses of whom Sa'ib Salam, Husayn al-'Uwayni, and Rashid Karami are outstanding examples. These leaders constitute a "twilight zone" within the Muslim elite who, although long-recognized as vocal pan-Arabists and currently employing the revolutionary rhetoric of the Arab masses, are basically unwilling to sacrifice their elite status for any form of radical socio-political change.

While many system transformers, both passive and active, are aware of the relative advantages to be derived from Lebanon's

[1] Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. by Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 308.

pluralist system they nevertheless are unable to give full support to the state. Three basic factors are involved in explaining this attitude: (1) a Muslim inferiority complex toward Christians in Lebanon; that is, a psychological and social discomfort in being "second class" citizens; (2) the immense attraction of extra-national appeals, especially pan-Arab ones; and, finally, (3) the absence of an effective, predominantly Muslim-populated political institution created for the specific purpose of mobilizing Muslim support in behalf of the system.

Active attempts at destroying the Lebanese system are limited to the various semi-clandestine political organizations like the PPS, Lebanese Communist Party, Arab nationalists, and Ba'thists. Newly inspired Palestinian resistance movements in Lebanon may in fact wish to see the system radically altered but are primarily involved in creating a national identity in regard to their former homeland in Palestine. Nevertheless, inasmuch as they contribute a further stress to an already fragile system they are consequential actors in the system transformation process.

The very precariousness of the system and its weak legitimacy among political *antagonists* (those involved in passive system transformation) facilitate their transition from antagonist to *radical* (one involved in active system transformation) when the system is confronted by severe stress or involved in prolonged crisis situations. Given the prevalence and frequency of such conditions the passive system transformation process assumes greater negative or subversive qualities and thus presents a continuous challenge to the whole existing system. Under "normal" conditions, however, those actively seeking the overthrow of the system are relatively few in number.

Concomitant to maintenance and transformation is the system challenging process. Two major variants of system challenging may be identified: the *negative system challenging* process and the *positive system challenging* process. Accordinging to Binder, the essential distinction between the two "lies in the goals of the actors and the degree of their alienation from the system."[1] Negative system challenging seeks to alter the system, or, at minimum, to indicate an unwillingness to cooperate with the system in any way.[2]

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[1] Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 286.
[2] *Ibid.*

Positive system challenging does not involve alteration of the system but rather the search for some specific benefit or reward. Positive challenging is a "kind of bargaining tactic in which the possibility of causing some deprivation is substituted for the promise of a gratification under a mutual arrangement." The positive challenger is "always ready to withdraw his threat and to work within the rules of the system, if gratified."[1] This process involves two forms of political action or alternatives: the refusal to bargain and the use of coercive rather than accommodative methods of resolving systemic conflict.

> Refusal to bargain as a positive rather than negative tactic, is the equivalent of holding out for better terms. Its effectiveness is dependent upon the willingness of the actor to forego benefits to himself, and its rational employment implies that the second party stands to gain more out of the bargain than the holdout.[2]

Under non-crisis situations the coercive aspect of positive system challenging does not involve the use of force. However, positive challengers may employ force, but with the aim of entering and preserving rather than altering the system. In general, then, the ultimate purpose of positive system challenging is to derive greater benefits from the system rather than to change it.

The following three chapters will apply the theoretical constructs described above to selected activities of the Lebanese Kata'ib Party. This will direct our attention to the following questions: why, how, and under what conditions does the Kata'ib challenge the system and what elements are involved in the dynamic and static system maintenance processes? Of particular significance will be to see how the gradually changing system has caused the LKP to shift, in spite of itself, from dynamic system maintenance to static system maintenance. The case study of the first fida'iyin crisis of April 1969 will be used to illustrate the party's static response to systemic change.

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER EIGHT

POSITIVE SYSTEM CHALLENGER

The Kata'ib challenges the Lebanese system in order (1) to oppose or frustrate government policies or political tendencies which it perceives are against the best interests of the country; that is, to insure the continued maintenance of the system; (2) to improve its power position vis-à-vis other political groups in the state; and/or (3) to force government commitment to developmental goals designed to modernize the state. This implies an unwillingness to accept government immobilism as an excuse or substitute for stability. According to the Kata'ib, stability and evolutionary social change need not be contradictory.

Pre-1958 challenges were only mildly effective and often confessionally dysfunctional since they exacerbated existing ethnic cleavages and polarized sectarian sentiments.[1] After 1958 LKP challenges were more "positive" and systemically functional since they emphasized not only the preservation of the system and its cultural pluralism but also induced governmental action towards meaningful social and political change in order to further guarantee its long-term legitimacy.

The consequences of the LKP's challenges, especially since 1958, have been to improve the standing of the party in the eyes of the masses, to expand its political importance in the system in real institutional terms, and to guarantee effective support for Lebanon's Christian communities.

In terms of the system as a whole, one can say that the LKP's readiness to defend and defy the regime based on its concept of the nature and direction of political developments has enabled Lebanon

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[1] For example the frequent encounters with militant Muslim and Arab nationalist groups which often degenerated into ugly confessional feuds like that in 1953 with the publication of *Moslem Lebanon Today*, and the subsequent "Shaqar incident" which resulted from an allegedly offensive statement made about the prophet Muhammad in a mildly anti-Muslim brochure, "Pains and Hopes." For the Kata'ib's reaction to the latter incident see *al-'Amal*, August 1, 1954. See also *L'Orient*, July 30-August 5, 1954; Jean-Pierre Alem, *Le Liban* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1963), p. 81; and the *Arab World* (Beirut), August 2-9, 1954.

to survive the recurrent attempts of radical groups to fragment or transform the system. Pre-1958 pressures from the "revolutionary" wing of the Arab world upon Lebanon were not so grave that the system's "traditional" institutions could not handle them. Post-1958 pressures, however, especially from Nasserite, pan-Arabist, Baʿthist, and Palestinian guerilla forces, necessitated the employment of a modern political instrument that could take direct action in behalf of the system. Such was the role of the Kata'ib after 1958.

While it has been willing to form various electoral alliances to increase its chances in legislative elections the LKP has been extremely hesitant to form even semi-permanent coalitions with other political groups or organizations for fear of diluting its effectiveness.[1] Temporary, *ad hoc* alliances of the type formed with the Najjadah in 1943 and 1952 to achieve specific national ends (independence and the ouster of President al-Khuri respectively)[2] and with the PPS in 1958 to increase both qualitatively and quantitatively the paramilitary cadres supporting the Shamʿun regime, for example, have also been acceptable means of pursuing specific short-run political objectives. Even with the Dustur, National Bloc, and Liberal Nationalists Party, with whom it shares many ideological propensities, the LKP has been unwilling to fuse into a larger, almost all-Christian organization. Moreover, since 1958, it has felt confident about its own capacities to independently challenge the system.[3] In

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[1] See "Il y a pour nous des collaborations impossibles," *Connaissance des Kataeb* (Beirut: Imprimerie Jeanne d'Arc, 1948), pp. 211-212.

[2] For the joint Najjadah-Kata'ib effort to achieve independence see chapter three. On the Najjadah-LKP coalition expressing their early grievances against the alKhuri regime see "Najjadés et Kataeb s'adressent aux responsables," *Connaissance des Kataeb*, pp. 195-196. Cf. also the Najjadah-Kata'ib cooperation manifested in the "Flag incident" of April 27, 1944, which saw the clash of pro-French and anti-French elements in front of Parliament and the arrest of sixty demonstrators, the death of four, and the wounding of nineteen. For details see *L'Orient*, April 29, 1944; *Connaissance des Kataeb*, pp. 130-131; *Al-ʿAmal*, April 28, 1944; and Eugenie Elie Abouchdid, *Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria* (1917-1947) (Beirut: Sader-Rihani Printing Co., 1948), pp. 228-243.

[3] This should not imply that the LKP has voluntarily isolated itself from other political groups in Lebanon. On the contrary, as it gained self-confidence it became more willing to compromise and meet half way with groups it hitherto regarded as expressing extremist Muslim tendencies. This has been especially true in its relations with the Najjadah and al-Hay'ah al-Wataniyah. In 1960, for example, one of its third congress resolutions called for "coordinating the efforts of the LKP with other national parties for the purpose of achieving constructive projects in order to develop our society organically and comprehensively." *Al-Mu'tamar al-ʿAmm al-Thalith* (the third general congress) (Shatu-

general this evaluation of its organizational and human capabilities was relatively accurate in the decade after 1958.

The events of June 1967, however, significantly altered this pattern of development. Rewards and benefits accrued to state and society over the past ten years now seem threatened in the aftermath of the Arab defeat and the subsequent rise of a Palestinian national consciousness. The noticeable radicalization of the political process and the growth of a revolutionary ethos has tended to dilute the over-all effectiveness of the LKP's challenger role. Consequently, the Kata'ib has been forced, for the first time, into a relatively binding political coalition with the almost exclusively Maronite NB and LNP. Simultaneously, those elements, both internal and external to the system, who are indulging in active forms of system transformation appear to be gaining in popularity and appeal among the Lebanese masses. Therefore, now more than ever before, an effective system challenger is needed if the system is not to be transformed or severely fragmented. In this instance, the LKP alone lacks the requisite human and organizational resources necessary to defend the system and defy its adversaries. By collectively pooling their resources the *Hilf al-Thulathi* seems now better prepared to assume the delicate task of preserving the system against its many antagonists.

Al-Hilf Al-Thulathi (Triple Alliance)

The Hilf is the result of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.[1] While Camille Sham'un, Raymond Eddé, and Pierre Jumayyil have al-

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rah: September 30, 1960) in *al-Mulhaq Raqm 5: Tawsiyat al-Mu'tamarat al-Sittah/al-Sabiqah* (supplement number five: resolutions of the six previous congresses) (Beirut, 1965), p. 1.

[1] According to Elias Rababi the Hilf's birth can originally be traced to March 2, 1967, when Jumayyil addressed an open letter to Hilu in *al-'Amal* calling for "a halt to the open intervention of foreign ideologies in Lebanese affairs" and their "possible destructive impact upon its independence and sovereignty." Supposedly Sham'un and Eddé fully concurred with Jumayyil's assessment and thereafter agreed that all three join together to establish a common front against "anti-Lebanese forces." See Elias Rababi, "Hikayah Hilf" (story of an alliance), *Al-'Amal*, March 11, 1969. For the complete history, development, statutory formulations, resolutions, and political profiles of the Hilf see the small but comprehensive book by Fu'ad Karam, *Al-Hilf al-Thulathi wa-Lubnan* (the triple alliance and Lebanon) (Beirut, 1969). It includes the complete text of the Brummana resolutions of March 7-9, 1969, pp. 53-84. Partially reproduced in *L'Orient*, March 10, 1969.

ways shared the common desire to defend the national integrity of Lebanon, it was not until after the third Arab defeat that they felt it necessary to join into a concrete political alliance. Relationships between the three have not always been amicable inasmuch as each was competing against the other for the political leadership of Lebanon's Maronite community.[1] Moreover, Eddé and Sham'un espoused conservative almost reactionary notions about Lebanese development and the nature of the confessional equilibrium. They seemed unwilling to compromise their dogmatic vision of "Christian Lebanon" for the sake of improving inter-sectarian cooperation.[2] The Kata'ib, on the other hand, had long ago discarded its radical Maronite image and had come to benefit from its broadened political appeal to an ever increasing cross-confessional constituency. The fact that it finally decided to join the LNP and NB indicated that systematic pressures had exceeded its capacities to control or direct them.

Initially conceived as a loosely organized "nationalist" alliance established to counter "socialist and communist currents in Lebanon,"[3] the Hilf gradually evolved into a rather cohesive political coalition cooperating on several fronts. One of its first manifestos, published on July 10, 1967, sought to counter Arab demands for the suspension of diplomatic relations with the major Western powers especially the United States which had been accused of giving direct aerial support to Israeli operations in the Jordanian and Egyptian campaigns. In a partially censored article the Hilf called for the continuation of all forms of relations with the West since "the Western world has the same faith as we do, in one God, in a parliamentary democratic system, in the rights of man, his liberty and dignity, as well as in economic liberalism."[4] In essence the collective effort was directed at coordinating a common foreign policy not inimical to the West and, simultaneously, to oppose a takeover of Lebanon by radical wings of Arab nationalists.[5]

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[1] For one dimension of that competition—electoral—see *Magazine*, February 1, 1968, pp. 16-19. Even within the Alliance inter-party competition continues.

[2] See for example the *Daily Star*'s interviews with Sham'un and Eddé: "Chamoun Favors Commando Escalation," February 9, 1969 and "I will Never Make any Compromise Whatsoever, says Deputy Raymond Eddé," March 9, 1969.

[3] Interview with Samir Ishaq, Beirut, November 6, 1968.

[4] *L'Orient*, July 11, 1967.

[5] *Ibid.*

The Alliance, however, developed far beyond that. Initial expectations that Lebanese politics would soon return to their "politics as usual" were quickly dashed as month by month the radicalization of Arab-wide politics increased rather than diminished and inevitably had an overflow effect on Lebanon. The rise of Palestinian resistance movements, the downfall of a republic and a monarchy in the Sudan and Libya respectively to be replaced by "revolutionary-socialist" military elites of the Revolutionary Command Council pattern, and recurrent internal crises in Lebanon over the role and function of Palestinian commandos in the country were all major indications of this radicalization. The Hilf was therefore forced to coalesce even further. Electorally, as we have already seen, the three parties presented a common front which proved to be highly successful.

Thus, the Triple Alliance gradually evolved into a strong system challenger. For example each government formed since the 1967 war, under the Sunni leadership of either 'Abdullah al-Yafi or Rashid Karami, has sought to involve Lebanon more closely in the Arab struggle against Israel. For its part the Hilf has consistently challenged such action and forced Arabist elements in and out of Lebanon to acknowledge, tacitly at least, the country's neutrality and to refrain from intervening in its internal affairs.[1] As Jumayyil indicated the Hilf "is a guarantee of the present and the future for all the Lebanese."[2]

To indicate how the Triple Alliance perceives a disadvantageous political situation and initiates a semicoercive, "refusal to cooperate" form of positive system challenge we shall now analyze its performance in the aftermath of the December 28, 1968, Israeli raid when Rashid Karami attempted to form a new cabinet subsequent to the resignation of the three-month old al-Yafi government.

System Challenge: Withdrawal of Support

From the Hilf's perspective the Arab defeat in 1967 had several deleterious consequences for the Lebanese political system: (1) the

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[1] On the ideological justifications of Arabist intervention in the affairs of other Arab states see I. William Zartman, "Intervention Among Developing States," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXII (1968), pp. 188-197.

[2] *Bayan al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil* (statement of Shaykh Pierre Jumayyil) (Shaturah: Eleventh General Party Congress, September 20, 1968), p. 3.

noticeable rise of Russian influence in the Arab world tended to encourage communist and socialist elements in Lebanon. Consequently, there was a concerted effort to mobilize anti-Western support and weaken Lebanon's friendly relations with the west; (2) a new revolutionary fervor spearheaded by Palestinian commando activities inspired renewed enthusiasm in the "revolutionary" model as the most efficacious means of transforming the social order and eliminating "Zionist" and "neo-imperialist" influence in the Arab world. To many young "radicals" not only infused with revolutionary passion as never before, but also prepared to become directly involved in the Palestinian "revolutionary struggle," Lebanon's system seemed particularly anachronistic and reactionary. As Nasser had radicalized the Arab masses a decade earlier under the banner of pan-Arabism today Palestinian revolutionism aroused widespread enthusiasm among masses and elites alike; finally, (3) a renewed polarization between essentially pro-Western Christians and pro-Arab, pro-Russian Muslims was again materializing. If Lebanon was to continue in its essentially liberal democratic path, avoid being dragged into a situation of direct military confrontation with Israel, and prevent a takeover by militant Arab nationalist elements, a direct effort towards this end was very much needed. The Hilf's successful electoral coalition was one dimension of this supportive effort for the system; strong representation in government was another.

According to Alliance leaders it was especially important that the Hilf's political status be further institutionalized in the form of collective representation in government. With almost one third of the Chamber populated with Hilf deputies it seemed justifiable that it be equitably represented in any government formed. The October 12-20, 1968, crisis had resulted in major part from the failure to include a member of Sham'un's party in al-Yafi's cabinet. The problem's temporary resolution—the creation of a cabinet of four with Pierre Jumayyil, Raymond Eddé, Husayn al-'Uwayni, and al-Yafi—did not eliminate the more fundamental political conflict underlying the crisis. It was to reappear in January when Karami attempted to form a new government in the aftermath of the December 1968 Israeli helicopter raid on Beirut's international airport.

The Israeli attack inflamed Lebanese passions. Humiliated by its audacity and consequent devastation (the total destruction of 13

Lebanese aircrafts) many Lebanese demanded an immediate upgrading of the country's manpower capabilities and called for universal military conscription. A vocal minority urged Lebanon to directly involve itself in the struggle against Israel irrespective of the consequences. Some rightist elements like Raymond Eddé, requested that United Nations troops rather than the Lebanese army be stationed at the country's southern frontier. The immediate conflict of what steps Lebanon should take to defend itself against future Israeli attacks was but a subordinate issue to the larger problem of what in fact should Lebanon's role be in the ongoing Arab "struggle" against "Zionism" and "imperialism." Again the fundamental problem of Lebanon's political identity was being raised although not in explicit form.

Reacting to strong pro-Arabist sentiments the Lebanese president, Charles Hilu, appointed the popular Arab nationalist and strongly anti-Israeli political boss from Tripoli, Rashid Karami, as the new prime minister. On January 15, 1969, Karami succeeded in forming a 16-man cabinet which included two representatives of the Hilf, Eddé and Pierre Jumayyil. The new cabinet represented the various major political groups in the country with the exception of the LNP although one of its supporters, Nasri Ma'luf, was appointed minister of tourism. According to Karami the cabinet was to be a "work government" intended to achieve the following objectives: (1) the realization of universal military conscription, (2) the fortification of border villages in southern Lebanon, (3) coordination of Lebanon's foreign policy with the rest of the Arab countries, (4) an adherence to the policies of the Arab League and the Arab Summit Conferences, and (5) "serving Lebanon's highest ideals." To avoid dissension he abstained from any direct mention of support for commando activities in Lebanon.[1]

Sham'un immediately boycotted Karami's cabinet accusing Kamal Junbalat of intentionally vetoing the inclusion of any LNP member in the new government. The PSP was itself represented by a close Junbalat supporter though non-party member, Bahij Taqi al-Din. Since 1958 Junbalat had succeeded in excluding "Chamounists" from government participation. His continued insistence that the LNP be omitted from governmental power was especially resented by the Hilf. The PSP leader had opposed the Alliance from

[1] *L'Orient*, January 16, 1969.

its inception and his own radicalization into a strong pro-commando advocate further widened the chasm separating these two opposing political currents.

The Hilf felt confident that it was bargaining from a clear position of strength when Jumayyil and Eddé refused to participate in the new government. It was assumed that by withdrawing this essential support Karami would be forced either to dissolve his cabinet, as al-Yafi had done three months earlier, or accept the terms of the Alliance. What had not been estimated was the growing public dissatisfaction with continued political instability and the transfer of personal grievances to the national level. Jumayyil, aware of this national discontent, was therefore hesitant to commit his party to a policy which would exacerbate already existing political tensions. In their discussions prior to withdrawal Jumayyil had underlined to Sham'un that "it was not possible, in light of internal and external difficulties, to allow Lebanon much longer without a government."[1] Even the pro-Hilf *L'Orient*, in an editorial entitled "Assumez vos Responsabilités!" castigated the Alliance for shirking its national responsibilities and indulging in a personal feud with Kamal Junbalat.[2] Sham'un, however, reminded the Kata'ib president of the Hilf's formal agreement[3] that no Alliance member would participate in a government that did not equally represent the other two especially if Junbalat or his allies were represented.

The need to present a unified front and thereby insure the future effectiveness of the Hilf caused Jumayyil and Eddé to resign their ministerial positions a day after the new cabinet's formation. Jumayyil asked for the "formation of a national coalition cabinet"[4] and refused to cooperate so long as a third member of the Hilf was being excluded. The LNP opposed the Karami government "because it did not respond to the needs of the hour and did not represent the formula of national-unity..."[5]

The struggle centered around two opposing approaches towards Lebanese political development: those seeking to sustain the institutional structures of the state (Hilf) and those determined to see its alteration in order to achieve a new "social consciousness"

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[1] *Ibid.*, January 17, 1969.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] See Karam, *Al-Hilf*, pp. 18-19.
[4] *Al-'Amal*, January 17, 1969.
[5] *L'Orient*, January 19, 1969. See also *La Revue du Liban*, January 19, 1969, pp. 8-9.

(Junbalat).[1] Undoubtedly Junbalat represented a "revolutionary" force whose legitimate presence within the system and possible links with "subversive" elements outside of its necessitated a vigorous challenge by those opposing such a tendency. To Jumayyil, Karami's cabinet recalled the events of 1958 which "consecrated the victory of one political tendency over another." He later alluded to the fact that "only a counter-revolution had been able to overthrow this imbalanced government and establish a cabinet of four."[2]

The initial Hilf challenge failed to achieve its desired end as Karami, ignoring Hilf demands, appointed four new ministers to replace Jumayyil, Eddé, and two Hilf supporters.[3] Preliminary withdrawal of support failed as a challenge tactic mainly because the Hilf had misjudged the public temper and had overreacted to what it perceived was a marked political imbalance in the new government. Under "normal" circumstances the Hilf challenge would have been pursued within parliament in an attempt to mobilize sufficient support to eventually precipitate the cabinet's downfall. Now, however, such an "evolutionary" approach seemed singularly ineffective as political and military events within and outside Lebanon appeared to radicalize the masses in support of a more revolutionary approach towards internal change and external conflict. This at least was the Hilf-constructed scenario upon which subsequent actions were predicated.

Withdrawal of support was transformed into "constructive opposition" with the threat of the use of force included as a last effort possibility. Implicit in his recollection of the 1958 civil war was Jumayyil's determination to resort to extra-institutional means of challenging the system. Three means of action were envisaged: (1) a one-day general strike, (2) mass rallies in designated regions, (3) and public demonstrations in Beirut.[4] Karami's manifest indifference to the initial Hilf challenge resulted in a further deter-

[1] René Aggiouri, "Prisonniers des Jeux," *L'Orient*, January 22, 1969.

[2] *Al-'Amal*, Janaury 24, 1969. See also *L'Orient* and the *Daily Star*, January 24, 1969, and *La Revue du Liban*, Janaury 25, 1969.

[3] Habib Kayruz, from Bisharri and a member of the Franjiyah bloc, replaced Jumayyil; Khalil al-Khuri, president of the Dustur, took Eddé's place; Yusuf Salam, an independent from Zahrani, succeeded Nasri Ma'luf; and Muhammad Safi al-Din, a Shi'ite deputy from Tyr and former head of the executive council of the pro-government Parliamentary Democratic Front, replaced Husayn Mansur. See *L'Orient*, January 26, 1969.

[4] *Al-'Amal*, January 26, 1969.

ioration of government-Hilf relations. Consequently, a concerted effort developed to bring down the Karami government by any means possible. This served to further "radicalize" the Hilf's opposition role as Jumayyil publicly reiterated his unwillingness to limit himself to parliamentary means of opposition since, in this instance, "the street would be more effective than the Chamber."[1] He called for a one-day, non-violent general strike for January 30.

According to *al-'Amal* the strike's primary objective was "not the toppling of the present government but the restoration of democratic principles...; the secondary aim of this campaign is to make the extremists understand that the Lebanese cannot and will not kneel down to their demands..."[2] This, in fact, revealed the strike's true intention which was to counter the alleged "communist peril." In defending the strike actions against critics from both the left and the right, Jumayyil "referred to the fact that there was wide infiltration of communist and leftist elements in the country."[3] Other groups, however, did not perceive the "danger" in these terms and were critical of the Hilf's use of provocative street demonstrations as a means of registering their political discontent. Jumayyil's views reflected the anxiety of the LKP and its Hilf allies who, although stronger now than at any other time since 1958, considered the present struggle in ultimate terms.

The one-day strike was peaceful and moderately successful with the predominantly Muslim al-Bastah section of Beirut almost unaffected while essentially Christian and fashionable Hamra was practically shut down. According to the Hilf the strike "confirmed the opposition of a large majority of Lebanese to demagogic tendencies."[4] Opposition groups were less convinced. In fact, on the day of the strike Karami's 16-man cabinet, overriding Alliance opposition, received parliamentary confirmation (61-30-8 absent).

The immediate Hilf objective was thus frustrated. If anything the strike, although non-violent, worked to further polarize opposition groups. When the struggle assumed a sectarian coloration, especially after the Maronite Patriarch, Paul Pierre Ma'ushi, came out in full support of the Hilf, the LKP initiated a series of executive-level meetings with the Najjadah and the Hay'at al-Wataniyah (National

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[1] *Ibid.*
[2] *Ibid.*, January 28, 1969.
[3] *Daily Star*, January 30, 1969.
[4] *Al-'Amal*, January 31, 1969.

Organization) to explain the reasons and nature of the strike and that "it was neither meant as a challenge nor did it have confessional implications."[1] According to Jumayyil, "any solution which did not recognize an equality between the LNP and Junbalat was rejected in advance...; either the Liberals were represented like the Junbalatists or both were equally excluded. We cannot accept that this government remain indefinitely."[2] He then threatened to call for a nation-wide strike in the event that negotiations failed.

Fearful that events might eventually overcome actors and system alike Sham'un announced the LNP's readiness to end its insistence on government representation in return for the "adoption of a clear political program which could bring back stability to the country." He indicated his party's acceptance of exclusion from government "so long as the LKP and NB remained represented to continue serving the goals of the Hilf."[3]

Karami responded by offering the Alliance two cabinet seats as a way out of the current political impasse. According to the sectarian distribution of cabinet portfolios the prime minister requested two Hilf deputies, one Sunnite and the other Maronite. Since only the LNP had a Sunni deputy ('Isam Hajjar) and the Kata'ib before all others had to be represented this resulted in the non-participation of the National Bloc and therefore a return to the previously unacceptable situation.[4]

The Jumayyil-Karami dialogue initiated a month earlier to find a common ground to resolve the crisis was abruptly suspended, and the Hilf, under Jumayyil's leadership, reasserted its aggressive challenge. Plans were made to call for general strikes and other forms of civil disobedience. Also contemplated was an *en masse* resignation of all Hilf deputies in the Chamber. After a meeting with president Hilu, Jumayyil expressed very clearly the Hilf's intransigent position: "the only solution to the crisis is the cabinet's resignation; no other alternative is possible."[5]

What had initially begun as an attempt to achieve a position of dominant influence in the new government gradually developed into an aggressive system challenger role wherein the Hilf's effort

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[1] *Ibid.*
[2] *Ibid.*, February 3, 1969.
[3] *L'Orient*, February 6, 1969.
[4] *Ibid.*, February 8, 1969.
[5] *Al-'Amal*, February 14, 1969.

was not only at government participation but more at challenging political trends through popular appeals and demonstrations. The objective was to arouse national consciousness against what the Hilf perceived as a developing socialist-revolutionary trend among Muslim forces in Lebanon. Towards this end, the Hilf convened a major strategy conference in early March in the popular Christian summer resort town of Brummana in Mount Lebanon. According to Hilf spokesmen

> It was no longer a question of participation in the government but one of political program. In this sense it was now prepared to support the present government or any other which accepted the Hilf's ideas and sought to achieve these national objectives in the political, economic, and social fields.[1]

The Brummana conference was meant to explicate publicly the Hilf's national priorities.

After a three-day meeting (March 7, 8, and 9, 1969) the conference produced a full length set of proposals and programs that it felt the government should adopt.[2] According to Hilf leaders current political decay in Lebanon was the result of a number of internal factors: (1) "disequilibrium in the delegation of constitutional powers, (2) sterility of the parliamentary system, (3) paralysis of democratic institutions, (4) administrative corruption, (5) exploitation of government for personal ends, and (6) oligarchical rule."[3] It warned that if these conditions persisted the Hilf would be obliged to assume a direct role in their amelioration. Its pattern of action would consist of submitting a memorandum to the president of the republic outlining its demands and calling for the formation of a national unity cabinet, escalating parliamentary opposition, calling for mass rallies and demonstrations, initiating nation-wide strikes, and undertaking specific acts of civil disobedience.[4] The concluding communique of the conference made veiled threats about civil disobedience if its resolutions were not heeded.[5]

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[1] *L'Orient*, March 7, 1969.

[2] For full text of resolutions see Karam, *al-Hilf*, pp. 51-84. See also *L'Orient*, March 10, 1969; *Al-'Amal*, March 10-11, 1969; Muhammad Bayhum, *Lubnan bayna Mashriq wa Maghrib, 1920-1969* (Lebanon between East and West, 1920-1969) (Beirut, 1969), pp. 200-214.

[3] *Al-'Amal*, March 10, 1969.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] When asked by a Beirut newspaper whether the LKP was anticipating the use of civil disobedience in order to reshuffle or change the government, Jumayyil answered: "Civil disobedience is the last method we resort to after we have

According to *al-'Amal* the Brummana conference highlighted the Hilf's role in the Lebanese system.[1]

> The Alliance [because of the unity and strength shown at Brummana] can now take a leading role in Lebanon [Rababi wrote in an editorial]; it will continue to be a strong political force... This is the only way by which the Hilf can challenge allegations made against it whether they be of a sectarian or political nature. The Alliance is an instrument made to serve the regime, to correct and improve all that goes ill. It is not intended as a personal challenge to others...[2]

To many, however, the Brummana conference and the strong support given it by the Maronite Patriarch was a source of uneasiness inasmuch as it was perceived as a confessional challenge to non-Maronite groups in Lebanon. A five-page communiqué jointly published by 'Abdullah al-Yafi and Husayn al-'Uwayni after the Brummana conference, for example, accused the Hilf of having "purposely exaggerated the communist threat," saying that its resolutions constituted a "denunciation of the Mithaq by its call for foreign protection," and that a primary collective effort should be made at supporting the Palestinian-Arab cause.[3] According to Junbalat, "the Alliance aimed at instigating some sects in the country, strengthening the confessional schism, and causing internal divisions."[4] And when the Hilf followed up its Brummana statements with a declaration that "nothing would be gained from 'ordinary' methods of opposition," and that extra-institutional forms of opposition would be needed, Hilu reminded its leaders to "respect the rules of the game."[5]

As the crisis began to polarize political opinions among "Lebanonists" and "Arabists" along sectarian lines, the Kata'ib sought to

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exhausted all other possibilities and we fail in achieving our goals...; I am mostly concerned with changing the political atmosphere of the country one way or another." The *Daily Star*, March 2, 1969.

[1] See also René Aggiouri, "Le Mérite de Broummana," *L'Orient*, March 11, 1969.

[2] *Al-'Amal*, March 8, 1969.

[3] *L'Orient*, March 18, 1969. *Al-Muharrir*, for example, condemned the Hilf for seeking to "separate Lebanon from the Arab world, using the Palestinian cause as an excuse for the economic crisis in Lebanon, and separating Lebanon from the Palestinian war effort." *Al-Muharrir*, March 19, 1969.

[3] *Daily Star*, March 23, 1969.

[4] *L'Orient*, March 18-19, 1969.

[5] *Al-'Amal*, April 2, 1969.

retreat from its previously adamant position. Jumayyil reopened his dialogue with Karami and called for "the protection of Lebanon's stability."[1] Subsequent *al-'Amal* editorials encouraged "moderation" and a shift from toppling the Karami government to emphasizing its political grievances. The Hilf, according to *al-'Amal*, was now convinced that "its purposes would be better served if it allowed the political crisis to drag on instead of attempting to meet it head on."[2] Moreover, it rejected bringing down the government "through a popular uprising because the Hilf placed the security and safety of the country above everything else, including the premiership and the presidency."[3] Consequently, Jumayyil reopened his political dialogue not only with the premier but with the Najjadah and the Hay'at al-Wataniyah as well, meeting with Amin 'Uraysi, president of the HW, on several occasions after the Brummana conference.[4]

The Hilf, under the LKP's directive, had exhibited its capacity and willingness to compromise when conditions so necessitated. As a positive system challenger it was unwilling to push the crisis beyond manageable limits or permit the system to become vulnerable to forces of political disintegration.

In most instances positive system challengers have at their disposal two forms of political action. The first is a simple refusal to cooperate in order to achieve a desired change in policy. This refusal to bargain or holding out for better terms is positive in that the challenger is always willing to compromise. The positive challenging process has a second, more potentially dysfunctional or "negative" dimension as well. This is the use of coercive rather than accommodative methods which may or may not involve the use of force.

Challenge Radicalized: The Use of Force

In only one instance, the civil war of 1958, has the Kata'ib employed large-scale force as a means of challenging the system. Neither before nor after this war, when Lebanon was on the verge of political disintegration, has the LKP felt the need to go beyond its usual institutional or semicoercive means of challenging the system.

[1] *Ibid.*, April 18, 1969.

[2] *Ibid.*, April 18, 1969.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] See *Le Jour*, April 21, 1969; *L'Orient*, March 7, 13, 16, 20, 23, 1969; *Daily Star*, March 16, 1969.

The events of 1958 were of consequential importance both to the Kata'ib's own internal development and to its ever increasing role within the Lebanese system. First of all the LKP's successful performance in the civil war and its crucial role in the resulting political compromise was indication of a major power realignment; the defense of Lebanon's national integrity (in ideological rather than strictly military terms) and the guarantee of its future viability in its current multi-confessional form now passed from the hands of traditional notables to a modern political organization.[1] Secondly, after the experience of 1958, the Kata'ib was transformed from a narrowly sectarian parochial organization looking exclusively to the West for support and protection into a broadly-based nationalist party seeking to fuse Christian and Muslim elements in a uniform acceptance of a Lebanese nation-state. There was now an awareness that Lebanon's political future had little chance of survival if Muslims were not fully integrated into the system and shown the benefits that could be derived from it.

Simultaneously, however, there was a renewed resoluteness not to permit the transformation of Lebanon into another Arab state with all its social, political, and economic implications. While the ends remained essentially unaltered the means assumed a new form. This attitude of compromise and cooperation served the Kata'ib well as it succeeded in enhancing its power position in the state and gaining national prestige in the process.

Civil War and Counter-Revolution

A number of international, regional, and internal crosscurrents combined to result in what has alternatively been called the "crisis," "revolution," and "civil war" of 1958.[2] For our purposes

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[1] See Arnold Hottinger, "*Zu'ama'* and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958," *Middle East Journal*, 15 (Spring, 1961), pp. 137 and 140.

[2] For a detailed account of the 1958 events in English see Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961). For a critical review of the book see Nabih Faris, "The Summer of 1958," *Middle East Forum*, 38 (January, 1962), p. 32. The best documentary account of the crisis is recorded in M. S. Agwani (ed.), *The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965). The personal accounts of the period in English, French, and Arabic include Camille Chamoun, *Crise au Moyen-Orient* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963); Desmond Stewart, *Turmoil in Beirut* (London: Wingate, 1959); Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964); Kamal Junbalat, *Haqiqah 'an al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah* (the truth about

we are mostly concerned with the LKP's perception of the crisis, how it responded to it, and the consequences of its actions for itself and the system.

A confluence of three major factors precipitated the 1958 civil war: (1) the widespread belief that President Camille Sham'un intended to amend the constitution and thereby enable himself to run for a second consecutive term. The fraudulent general elections in 1957 which resulted in landslide victories for pro-government candidates undoubtedly helped foster this belief since it is the Chamber of Deputies that has the legal authority to amend the constitution. Moreover, there was uneasiness among many traditional notables who saw in Sham'un's actions an attempt to expand his influence at their expense; (2) the government's excessively pro-Western leanings concretely revealed in Lebanon's unconditional acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the only Arab state to do so; the Lebanese president was accused of abandoning Lebanon's traditional neutrality; (3) the attempt of outside Arab nationalist forces, under the leadership of Nasser and with the support of strongly anti-Lebanese Syrian elements, to overthrow the pro-Western regime and install a pro-Egyptian government or, at least, one unfriendly to the West. Sham'un's unwillingness to suspend diplomatic relations with France and England after the 1956 Suez war had earlier aggravated Lebanese-Egyptian relations.

Sham'un himself had become an object of hatred and denunciation. Opposition forces accused him of being an "imperialist lackey" unworthy of occupying the presidential office. To many he had become a symbol of all that the "progressive" Arab world rejected and found odious—imperialism, capitalism, crass material-

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the Lebanese revolution) (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr al-'Arabiyah, 1959); Henri Pharaon, *Au Service du Liban et de son Unité* (Beirut: Le Jour Press, 1963). A critical review of Arabic books written by some of the participants in the crisis is found in Malcolm H. Kerr, "Lebanese Views on the 1958 Crisis," *Middle East Journal*, 15 (Spring, 1961), pp. 211-217. Other important studies on the crisis include Leila M. T. Meo, *Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965); Charles Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), chapters 1-2; Jean-Pierre Alem, "Troubles insurrectionnels au Liban," *Orient*, 6 (1958), pp. 40-48; Francis Nour, "Particularisme libanais et nationalisme arabe," *Orient*, 7 (1958), pp. 29-42; Simon Jargy, "Réalités libanaises," *Orient*, 9 (1959), pp. 41-51; Kamal Salibi, "Lebanon Since the Crisis of 1958," *The World Today*, 17 (January, 1961), pp. 32-42; Hottinger, "*Zu'ama*' and Parties," pp. 127-140; and Katia Nehmé, "Esquisse d'une histoire des Kataeb," *Action*, 22 (December, 1964), pp. 8-21.

ism, anti-Arabism. It was thus not surprising that when an outspoken Sham'un critic was assassinated on May 8, 1958,[1] the opposition's United National Front joined with other groups in demanding Sham'un's resignation. When a strike failed to bring down the government armed rebellion ensued.[2]

From the LKP's perspective the crisis represented more than a leadership or succession conflict; it involved the very nature of Lebanon's national identity. According to party leaders the issue of presidential succession was but a pretext used by pan-Arab and Nasserite forces in an effort to fragment, destroy, and then reconstitute the Lebanese political system into something approximating other "revolutionary" Arab states.

While the Kata'ib was a mild supporter of Sham'un it did not regard supporting his regime, as Fahim Qubain would have us believe, as a "sacred duty."[3] On the contrary, the party was steadfastly opposed to any attempt at amending the constitution;[4] while Sham'un was expendable the system was not. Nor was it particularly happy about the resulting sectarian coloration of the conflict. While there were important cross-confessional affiliations there was little doubt that most of the pro-government forces were Christians and most of the insurgents non-Christians. What support the LKP extended to Sham'un's regime was but a carryover from its formerly isolationist position; a position which was slowly being transformed even before the conflict had reached revolutionary proportions.

Fearful of Nasser's annexationist designs on Lebanon, the LKP was among the few enthusiastic supporters of the Eisenhower Doctrine which it saw as an effective defensive instrument against Arab nationalist and communist ambitions in Lebanon. A month

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[1] Nasib al-Matni, a Maronite Christian, was publisher and owner of the Beirut Arabic daily, *Talagraf*. He was a consistent critic of Sham'un's administration as well as an advocate of increased Lebanese-UAR relations. Even before his assassination he had been involved in disputes with the government concerning his vehemently anti-Sham'un articles. Seven months earlier he was stabbed twice in the face while leaving his office.

[2] Alem, "Troubles insurrectionnels," p. 42.

[3] Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 84.

[4] Writing in *al-'Amal* on May 29 Jumayyil stated: "We have always been against renewal [of the president's term] and we remain so today as well as in the future. I can assure you that the president of the republic has no intention of renewing his mandate even if it were offered to him on a silver platter." *Al-'Amal*, May 29, 1958.

prior to the outbreak of the civil war Jumayyil had led a Kata'ib delegation to Mexico and the United States to gain support from Lebanon's emigrant communities as well as official commitment from United States authorities regarding Lebanon's struggle to remain independent and free.

This tour, which met with the government's approval, clearly put Jumayyil in the Sham'un camp and gave further grounds to opposition accusations of the government's extensive pro-Western leanings. Even *L'Orient*'s chief editorialist rebuked Jumayyil for his overtly pro-government stance and his loyalty to a "discredited regime which was attempting to propagate itself illegally." He warned that the Kata'ib "must make an important decision if it was to avoid bloodshed and the possible break-up of Lebanon."[1]

Privately Kata'ib officials questioned the advisability of so closely aligning the party with Sham'un's regime; a regime whose honesty and credibility had earlier been compromised. There was little choice, however, as the conflict soon polarized into pro-Arab nationalist, anti-Sham'un—and for the Kata'ib, by implication, anti-Lebanon—forces and Lebanese nationalist elements. Subsequent alliances, however, were not so clear cut as a variety of groups and individuals sided against the regime for a variety of personal, ideological, and political reasons.

In a press conference almost a month after Matni's assassination Jumayyil identified some of the factors contributing to the crisis: he accused "foreign elements" of directing the conflict;[2] according to him the civil war was a "continuation of the November 1956 crisis;" he warned that "Lebanon's sovereignty and independence were being directly threatened;" he chided opposition groups for using the issue of constitutional amendment as a "pretext for revolt and takeover;" finally, he warned the international community of a possible "Lebanese Munich."[3] The solution of the crisis, he stated, could only be found in a "return to law and order" and direct United Nations intervention to prevent the United Arab Republic, formed on February 1, 1958, from taking over Lebanon.[4]

There was much truth to Jumayyil's accusations. Both Egyptian

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[1] Georges Naccache, "Lettre à Pierre Gemayel," *L'Orient*, May 6, 1958.

[2] The Kata'ib accused opposition forces and Cairo of trying to arouse religious hatred among the Lebanese. See *al-'Amal*, June 3, 1958.

[3] *Ibid.*, June 5, 1968. See also Pierre Gemayel, "Attention à un Munich libanais," *Action* (June, 1958), pp. I-IV.

[4] *Al-'Amal*, June 5, 1958.

and Syrian press and radio attacks on the Lebanese government bordered on hysteria. Also, arms, munitions, and men from Syria crossed the Lebanese border daily in active support of opposition forces.[1] In any case the central issues of the conflict were soon subordinated to the immediate task of military combat which saw the country subdivided into numerous territorial enclaves controlled either by loyalist forces or insurgent notables.

Sham'un had the backing of the Kata'ib, SSNP, Tashnaq, and National Bloc organizations as well as some leading notables like Sami al-Sulh, Na'im Mughabghab, and, for a time, Majid Arslan.[2] With the army remaining neutral and the insurgents well equipped and supported, much of the country's defense against the rebels was assumed by armed volunteer groups and para-military sections of the SSNP and the Kata'ib.

Although it joined with the SSNP, national police, and gendarmerie in opposing the insurgents, the LKP did not particularly enjoy its para-military role. According to party leaders this civil conflict, by weakening the internal structures of the state, afforded outside forces greater opportunity to undermine Lebanon's national integrity.

While involved in some battles in the countryside the Kata'ib forces, in general, limited their activities to Beirut and the Christian strongholds of Mount Lebanon. Even in the capital and other major cities the LKP did not do much more than assist the police in patrol duties.[3] It was left to the SSNP to assume the major burden of the fighting.

The SSNP had little long-run interest in Lebanon's stability and, in fact, its very ideology negated the existence of an independent entity called Lebanon. Banned in other Arab countries for its vehement anti-Arabism and subversive attempts at overthrowing existing regimes, the SSNP looked to Lebanon for asylum and support. The Sham'un-SSNP alliance was thus a mutually expedient arrangement designed to sustain each party under crisis conditions. The SSNP consequently fought with viciousness and determination irrespective of long-range effects on the system.

The LKP, on the other hand, while it fully opposed the insurgents, was unwilling to permanently sever itself from an important

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[1] It has been estimated that along Syria's 205 milelong boundary with Lebanon government forces controlled only fourteen miles.

[2] Alem, "Troubles insurrectionnels," pp. 40-42.

[3] Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, p. 84.

segment of the Lebanese political elite. It was thus not surprising to see opposition literature much less critical of the Kata'ib role in the conflict than it was of Sham'un and the SSNP. For there was never any question of the LKP's position: Lebanon's defense and development. This could not be said of either Sham'un or the SSNP each of whom fought to preserve and further personal political gains at the expense of the system.

With the United States' military intervention, Sham'un's willingness to step down from office at the termination of his mandate on September 23, and the election of General Fu'ad Shihab on July 31 as Lebanon's new president, the three-month old civil war appeared to be settled. Several further developments, however, forced the Kata'ib into an active challenger role causing the political crisis to be revived.

CHALLENGE RADICALIZED: COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The conflict's resolution was theoretically to be based on the principle of "no victor, no vanquished" (*la ghalib wa la maghlub*) and the Kata'ib had hoped to see this applied in the formation of the new government. While the LKP supported Shihab's election it would not tolerate a return to "politics as before" or permit the formation of a nationally unrepresentative government. If anything the "revolution" had taught the Kata'ib the dangers of political passivity; while there were many internal and external groups eagerly willing to upset Lebanon's precarious equilibrium, few could be relied upon actively to preserve the system's balance. Hence the Kata'ib sought effective political power commensurate with its para-military strength, organization, and large following.

The spark which revived political tensions and brought the Kata'ib to the fore was the abduction and presumed assassination of Fu'ad Haddad of *al-'Amal* in the early afternoon of September 19. The Kata'ib gave opposition forces two hours to release Haddad and in the meantime kidnapped a number of opposition men as a reprisal. For their part the insurgents abducted several pro-government people as a counterreprisal. The party's clandestine radio station, *Sawt Lubnan* (Voice of Lebanon), previously suspended with the election of Shihab, now resumed transmission with threats of severe reprisals if Haddad was not released.[1] On September 20 the

[1] *Al-'Amal*, September 20, 1958.

LKP called for a general strike to begin on September 22; a forty-eight hour reprieve was granted in order to give mediators time to find and release the kidnapped newspaperman.

Although the three alleged kidnappers were soon apprehended and Sa'ib Salam, as head of the insurgents in Beirut, publicly denied any involvement in the abduction, the party went ahead with its strike plans. The situation further deteriorated when another party member—Cesar Bustani—was killed in Furn al-Shubbak (a predominantly Maronite suburb of Beirut) on the night of September 20. Attempts by Sham'un, Shihab, and opposition leaders to convince Jumayyil to call off the strike proved fruitless.

On September 22, the Kata'ib and its supporters erected barricades in Beirut's Christian quarters. The army immediately imposed a curfew on the capital which forced the suspension of all newspapers for nearly a week (September 22-27).

The strike proved almost 100 per cent effective as all principal businesses in Beirut and Mount Lebanon remained closed. The strike continued through September 23 even while Shihab was being sworn in by the Chamber as the new president. Throughout Beirut and its suburbs armed clashes between the Kata'ib and insurgents continued to take place with a steadily increasing death toll.

On the morning of September 24 several Muslim-owned stores in downtown Beirut (Place des Canons) opened for business in defiance of the LKP's strike orders. When Kata'ib members sought to close them an armed clash between Muslim demonstrators from al-Bastah and the Kata'ib ensued causing the eventual death of between fifteen and forty people with over 100 wounded on both sides.[1]

While the Kata'ib continued to erect barricades on the principal routes leading to the Shuf and al-Matn, president Shihab appointed a new eight-member cabinet under the premiership of Rashid Karami, leader of the insurgents in Tripoli. This cabinet was composed of men who had either sided with the rebellion or had been neutral in the conflict, with no representation of the former loyalist elements.[2] This gave rise to a violent protest movement by

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[1] *L'Orient*, September 28, 1958.

[2] Rashid Karami, premier, minister of interior and defense; Philippe Taqla, minister of foreign affairs; Charles Hilu, minister of economy and information; Muhammad Safi al-Din, minister of education and health; Yusuf Sa'adah, minister of justice and labor; Rafiq Naja, minister of finance; Farid Trad, minister of public works; and Fu'ad Najjar, minister of agriculture and post. *L'Orient*, September 28, 1958.

the LKP which viewed the new government as a clear victory for the rebel forces. From the party's perspective, if it did not act forcibly to challenge the composition of Karami's cabinet, Lebanon's equilibrium could possibly be upset in favor of Muslim-Arabist elements to the prejudice of the country's Christian communities or the "archaic mentality" of traditional notables would reassert itself. From this point on tensions steadily increased as Kata'ib strike orders were more rigidly enforced and barricades continued to be erected in Beirut, Zahlah, and Mount Lebanon.

For three weeks the country was engulfed in a vicious and often bloody sectarian war; frequent confrontations occurred between security forces and the Kata'ib "storm-troops;" mass anti-government demonstrations, especially in Mount Lebanon, became daily occurrences; kidnappings and, not infrequently, gangster-like murders characterized much of the conflict which eventually degenerated into an open Christian-Muslim war.

While the Kata'ib leadership wished to avoid a distinctly sectarian conflict many irresponsible Christians, usually acting without the consent of higher party authority, kidnapped and tortured Muslim victims causing Muslim mobs to initiate their own counter-reprisals against Christians. In general, however, Kata'ib actions gained the widespread support of Lebanon's Christian population.

Although publicists and journalists soon dubbed the Kata'ib actions as a "counter-revolution" Jumayyil preferred to view the crisis in terms of a protest movement against government failure to adhere to the compromise solution to which the opposing parties had pledged themselves. As he stated in a November 28 interview with *L'Orient*:

> Public opinion and responsible citizens are witness to the efforts we are making to save this country...We neither want a revolution nor conflict with the army; our strike is peaceful; we do not wish to kill people or terrorize the population...[But] we shall be satisfied only when the formula of "no victor, no vanquished" is strictly applied.[1]

While frantic efforts by Shihab, Karami, and both Christian and Muslim leaders continued in the hope of achieving an acceptable compromise, the level of actual violence accelerated rather than diminished. On the tenth day of the strike Jumayyil met with United States ambassador Robert McClintock and supposedly

[1] *Ibid.*

requested United States assistance in mediating the conflict.[1] This was subsequently denied although the Kata'ib leader would probably have favored direct American intervention in the crisis. The fact that McClintock refused to become involved coupled with the exemplary non-partisan behavior of United States occupation troops brought home a very important lesson to Jumayyil and other Christian leaders: Lebanon could no longer depend upon outside Western support to defend Christian interests; future political differences would have to be resolved internally among the participants themselves.

It was a lesson the Kata'ib learned well and immediately adjusted to: it sought to broaden its national appeal, began to cooperate and compromise more frequently, and worked to establish a meaningful Christian-Muslim synthesis as the basis of a lasting Lebanese nationalism. This could not be said of other Christian groups and leaders like Patriarch Ma'ushi, Sham'un, Eddé, Franjiyah, *et al.* who continued to adhere to a primitive form of Maronite parochialism.

Intense political negotiations among various clan and party leaders during the crisis period finally began to bear fruit when, on October 10, 1958, Jumayyil, for the first time in over three years, conferred with Prime Minister Karami for more than two hours. A solution based on the "no victor, no vanquished" formula was apparently agreed upon, and that same day, writing in *al-'Amal*, Jumayyil made a national appeal for harmony and cooperation and the end of all agitation and disorders.[2]

Finally, on October 14, 1958, Karami announced the formation of a new four-man cabinet representing a genuine compromise.[3] A day later the Kata'ib called off its strike which had lasted for twenty-two days, removed its barricades, and, with a farewell broadcast, suspended its clandestine radio station. On October 17 Karami's cabinet received a unanimous vote of confidence and immediately thereafter the country began to return to normal.

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[1] *Al-'Amal*, October 2, 1958.

[2] For the complete text of Jumayyil's speech see *al-'Amal*, October 10, 1958.

[3] Karami: premier, minister of finance, economy, defense, and information; Husayn al-'Uwayni: minister of foreign affairs, justice, and planning; Raymond Eddé: minister of interior, social affairs, and post; Jumayyil: vice-president of the council of ministers [cabinet], minister of public works, education, health, and agriculture. *L'Orient*, October 15, 1958.

LESSONS AND CONSEQUENCES

In terms of the LKP's own internal development the events of 1958 had several important consequences. First of all, there was a surge of membership into the party. Secondly, much of the party's internal organization was restructured to meet the demands of a much expanded electoral role that the party was soon to assume. Finally, there was a subtle but nonetheless discernable ideological shift in favor of a broadened Christian-Muslim nationalist synthesis.

In terms of its relation to the system the Kata'ib learned some important lessons. As indicated earlier there was a shocking realization of how relatively isolated Lebanon remained within the international community; with the final withdrawal of American troops on September 25, Lebanon was left alone to resolve its own internal conflicts and defend its national integrity.

Since the role of the army was essentially limited to defending the country against external aggression it was left to the Kata'ib, of all the major organized political groups, to preserve the system's cohesion and internal viability. For the Kata'ib this viability depended upon the willingness of all communities to be unified by a common purpose. Jumayyil emphasized this point when asked about the lessons he thought could be learned from the recent crisis. He answered:

> The crisis was certainly the most serious lesson in our whole history. Every Lebanese, whatever his religion, has learnt that he must not, and cannot, depend on anyone except himself. We have learnt, too, that Lebanese unity and understanding among us all is the most important thing. Also that no one group can impose its will upon the others. I repeat, we must understand each other.[1]

Most important of all was the party's political ascendancy as reflected in its increased representation in government and Parliament. Now in a position of political responsibility, willing to cooperate and compromise with a wide range of political tendencies in quest of a national entente, and supported tacitly by a majority of Christians and many non-Christians and overtly by almost all the Maronites, the LKP could no longer be considered the extremist Christian counterpart of the Najjadah or of Junbalat. That role was now assumed by the likes of Sham'un, Eddé, and Franjiyah while the Kata'ib shifted to a middle position.

[1] "Forum Interviews Pierre Gemayel," *Middle East Forum*, XXXIV (March, 1959), p. 30.

For a decade thereafter the Kata'ib enjoyed broad popular support. As we have already noted the party's history in that decade was marked by a relatively successful effort at implementing the LKP's developmental goals. Each sectarian community developed and prospered although not always evenly. There was also a partial resolution of the identity dilemma as Lebanese increasingly began to identify themselves as such.

It is uncertain how far these trends might have developed if the June 1967 war had not broken out, which introduced an added and potentially destructive dimension to the system's already fragile equilibrium. The rise of a Palestinian national consciousness in the form of a revolutionary resistance movement among Lebanon's over 200,000 Palestinian refugees reinforced by the overt support of many of Lebanon's disaffected Muslim masses, students, leftist intellectuals, and radical political groups posed a grave danger to the system's future existence.

Part of the Kata'ib's motivation in creating the Hilf has been to combat these tendencies and reassert the primacy of an independent, neutral Lebanon. Towards this end it has concentrated its energies on challenging any government action that would encourage guerrilla activities in Lebanon and thereby give Israel an excuse to invade the south. This task, however, has been extremely ambitious and potentially counterproductive as the struggle over the degree and range of commando activities begins to assume distinctly sectarian lines with most of the Muslim population supporting such activities and an equal number of Christians opposing them. The possibility of renewed civil war therefore seems more likely now than at any other point in the country's history.

CHAPTER NINE

SYSTEM MAINTENANCE: DYNAMIC

For the better part of its thirty-five year history the Kata'ib has been involved in dynamic forms of system maintenance. Dynamic system maintenance has usually been pursued on two interrelated levels: an intra-systemic effort at rectifying society's glaring social and economic inequalities usually by means of legislative reforms, programs, policy proposals, recommendations, and whatever other legitimate methods deemed necessary to enhance the degree of congruence between the political system's democratic aspirations and its socio-economic realities.

Simultaneously there has been an extra-systemic effort at gaining the active cooperation of regional Arab states while encouraging Lebanon's wide-ranging emigrant communities to contribute to the modern development of the state either through direct economic assistance or by indirect political pressures on local leaders in behalf of Lebanon. Admittedly both efforts have not always been successful or consistently dynamic. Nonetheless, unlike most other organized political groups in the state, and in spite of its own structural and ideological limitations, the LKP has sought to go beyond a nominal commitment to state and society.

Intra-Systemic Dimension: Social Democracy—The need for Social and Economic Justice

Central to the LKP's concern is the way by which meaningful socio-economic and political change may occur without disrupting the system's stability. To escape immobilism and instability the party emphasizes the need for incremental change or balanced growth; that is, visible social change achieved within an evolutionary framework free of political excesses, inflated promises, and revolutionary rhetoric.

Early in its development the party recognized that no lasting national unity could be achieved or a liberal spirit sustained as long as grave economic and social disparities existed in the state. That there are marked socio-economic differences in Lebanon

reinforcing sectarian lines is the result of several historical consequences. Firstly, owing to political factors and uneven geographical conditions such as location, natural resources and communications, the levels of educational, social, technological, and economic development varied from one community to another. Secondly, there existed throughout the country and in the towns a large and rather poor tertiary sector fully attached to traditional values and averse to any type of social or occupational mobility. Whatever effort was made to alleviate their situation by redistributing incomes through taxation and public expenditure was not effective. All this along with the existing pluralistic social structure, traditional forms of association, and state institutions resulted in the development of private interest groups.[1]

Since then, although the overall economy has prospered, the degree of economic disparity among communal groups and social classes has increased. While there is no abject poverty to speak of and both the urban working class and the peasants have enjoyed a marked increase in their standards of living, the nation's rich have become conspicuously richer. For the most part this increase in inequality has been an inevitable concomitant of rapid and uncontrolled economic development carried out within a relatively liberal framework.[2]

Notwithstanding improved economic conditions, it was estimated in 1960 that while 14 per cent of the population could be classified as "well-off" and 4 per cent as "rich," over 40 per cent (41.2) was classified as "poor" and another 8.8 per cent as "wretched."[3] Moreover, Lebanon's bourgeoisie are unwilling to live frugally or reinvest their income but instead indulge in crass forms of conspicuous consumption. The most noteworthy consequence of such a situation is the aggravation of inter-communal tensions especially since, in general, most of the rich are Christians and most of the poor and wretched Muslims. Social and political dysfunctions resulting from such a condition have created an urgent need to change this state of affairs.

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[1] See C. Rossillion, "Cultural Pluralism, Equality of Treatment and Equality of Opportunity in the Lebanon," *International Labour Review*, 98 (September, 1968), pp. 229-230.

[2] See Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Liberalism in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal*, 18 (Summer, 1964), p. 287.

[3] See Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Political Liberalism in Lebanon," in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, pp. 69-83.

Given the state's traditional inability or unwillingness to act directly on behalf of its underprivileged, the LKP has assumed as one of its social tasks the creation of a climate wherein all the communities forming the nation will have equal opportunity for economic and social progress. Towards this end the party, reconstituted officially in 1956 as *hizb dimuqrati ijtima'i lubnani* (Lebanese social democratic party), emphasizes the need for social and redistributive justice. "There can be no freedom in its true sense," a 1963 party resolution states, "unless there is social justice, no social justice except through economic prosperity, and no prosperity except through security and stability; and security and stability are the product of national unity."[1]

As a reformist party the LKP seeks to avoid falling into the trap of the Arab radical or revolutionary whose primary aim is to polarize politics by presenting a view of political life as a mere division between the forces of "progress" and those of "reaction." While Arab revolutionaries work to cumulate cleavages, the LKP seeks to ameliorate them or, at minimum, accommodate them to the system-at-large. In short, while the reformer promotes fluidity and adaptation in politics the revolutionary seeks rigidity.[2]

Consistent with its social and political orientation the Kata'ib's reformist objectives aim at constructively controlling social change. This usually has meant aiming at meaningful but progressive rather than total change, gradual rather than convulsive change. While it is not forever committed to the status quo it rejects the revolutionary's formula that "anything which disrupts the status quo is of some...value."[3] According to the Kata'ib perspective neither attitudes nor institutions nor social conditions can be meaningfully altered within a revolutionary environment.

> Social justice [writes Pierre Jumayyil] has no definite or final form which can be settled in a specific time and place; it is a noble ideal and we must therefore take inspiration from it and continue to seek its realizatizon...There can be no stagnation, arrestation, or petrification; only a constant striving to overcome the status quo and in an atmosphere of freedom and stability. Our call for stability,

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[1] *Al-Mu'tamar al-'Amm al-Sadis* (sixth general congress) (Shaturah: September 27, 1963), in *Mulhaq*, p. 4. Cf. *Minhaj*, p. 38.

[2] Adapted from Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 345.

[3] *Ibid.*

> however, does not mean adherence to corruption. We want stability not inertia.[1]

While Lebanese elites of various political coloration are aware that reform must entail a change in the direction of greater social, economic, and political equality, a broadening of participation in society and polity,[2] there is disagreement as to the direction of change as well as its scope and rate. Situated in a "revolutionary-socialist" environment it was only natural that leftist groups in Lebanon would advocate a socialist or even communist solution to the problems of socio-economic disequilibrium. For its part the LKP has remained a steadfast supporter of the laissez-faire system which has made Lebanon into one of the most economically prosperous and socially-advanced nations in the Arab world. According to the party, what needs to be changed is not the system but social attitudes and patterns of economic distribution. A proper civic education must therefore begin to reformulate fundamental beliefs in the direction of humanitarianism and social responsibility.[3]

In programmatic terms the party has elaborated a set of comprehensive economic and social reforms, proposals, and recommendations. In some cases, like the social security code for example, the party has become the main force in the implementation of needed social and economic legislation. While the idea of a social security code was explicitly envisaged in article 54 of the Labor Law of 1946 and unratified draft legislation was proposed in 1952 and again in 1956, it was not until 1962, under the Shihab presidency, that the LKP took an active part in the fight for social security legislation.[4] As early as 1953 in a party congress on social studies the Kata'ib cited the need for a social security law. Later, when the Lebanese social security code was finally promulgated by presidential decree on September 26, 1963, and actually implemented on May 1, 1965, it closely resembled the party's own draft legislation submitted to the government in 1959.[5]

The party has authored numerous other proposals related to the

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[1] *Nass Bayan al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil* (text of the statement of Shaykh Pierre Jumayyil) (Shaturah: Ninth General Party Congress (opening speech) September 23, 1966), p. 2.

[2] See Edouard Saab, "Les 'Kataeb' et la nouvelle portée du progressisme libanais," *Les Conférences du Cénacle*, 8 (January, 1954), pp. 63-81.

[3] *La Revue du Liban*, September 21, 1968, p. 12.

[4] See Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, n. 50, p. 335.

[5] *Action*, February, 1967, pp. 2-3.

socio-economic development of the state not all of which, of course, have been implemented into law. At every party congress resolutions have been adopted concerning the need for accelerated economic development upon which an enduring social justice can be established. In the 1963 minhaj for example, the party called for more efficient, rational, and scientific exploitation of the country's natural resources including tourism and agriculture for the purpose of increasing national income.

Other policy proposals have included a nation-wide health insurance program, low-income housing projects for Beirut and Tripoli, governmental guarantees of foreign capital investments in nationally-beneficial projects broadly defined, creation of free trade zones close to Lebanon's major ports, greater state control over banking practices and other fiscal transactions that affect the nation's economic health,[1] and similarly-related economic recommendations aimed at achieving a workable balance between the system's economic liberalism, the long-recognized individualism of Lebanese entrepreneurs, and the need for governmental control and regulation of vital national industries, communications, transportation systems, etc. The concomitant call for a direct attack against fraud, corruption, and dishonesty in public life highlights the paradox involved in attempting to achieve increased economic development within a traditional laissez-faire capitalist system while seeking to ameliorate social and economic ills by means of greater governmental involvement in the life of the individual, the state, and society.

For the Kata'ib greed, avarice, dishonesty, and fraud, both in public and private life, are not necessarily inherent to a system of private initiative and economic liberalism. In fact, "true" social justice, it is argued, can better be achieved within a democratically-inspired capitalist system. Hence the appeal for a rationalized, expanded, and further liberalized private sector, one imbued with a collective sense of community consciousness and social justice.

An area of particular concern has been tourism which the party, among others, feels should be more fully exploited in order to derive the kind of income needed to remedy existing social inequities. In the area of agriculture the LKP has recommended an expanded governmental role in discovering and developing new water

[1] *Minhaj*, pp. 33-34, *passim*.

resources for irrigation and maximizing the use of existing lands for productive purposes. In this respect the Kata'ib strongly supported the Green Plan, a land reclamation and development program instituted under the presidency of Fu'ad Shihab (1958-64) for the purpose of curbing migration to the cities and improving the methods and techniques of agricultural production by offering modern farm equipment and easy loans to farmers.[1]

In the area of social affairs the party has called for the drafting and ratification of a new labor law guaranteeing the right of collective bargaining, organizing and protecting Lebanon's foreign labor force, expanding the benefits under social security, and establishing a nation-wide system of mandatory and free universal elementary and secondary education including technical and vocational training.[2] The latter proposal, while advocated by many groups and individuals of all sects, has been hindered by the fragmented nature of the Lebanese educational system wherein the majority, and probably the best academically, of the schools are privately run and exhibit particular religious or ethnic characteristics. This phenomenon has exacerbated social cleavages while producing citizens of different and often opposing loyalties. Attempts at remedying this situation have often failed due to the many vested interests in retaining the educational status quo. The party's 1968 congress resolutions were explicit in regard to educational reforms. It was recommended that, in light of exorbitant tuition fees of private schools, mass intellectual unemployement, paucity of teacher specialization, imbalance of diploma certification between degrees received abroad and those received at home, and the stagnation of academic curricula, the following reforms be implemented: legislative ratification of the LKP's draft law on free and universal education, expanding professional and vocational training to a level commensurate with Lebanon's developmental needs, establishing a permanent national committee to supervise

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[1] See Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p. 322.

[2] See *Action*, XXV (December, 1966), p. 9; "L'Education et la jeunesse," *Septième Congrès*, pp. 56-57; "Le problème scolaire," *Action*, XXIII (October-December, 1965), pp. 61-62; *al-Mu'tamar al-'Amm al-Rabi'* (the fourth general congress) (Shaturah: September 29, 1961) in *al-Mulhaq Raqm 5: Tawsiyat al-Mu'tamarat al-Sitta al-Sabiqa* (supplement number five: resolutions of the six previous congresses) (Beirut, 1965), p. 2; Maurice Gemayel, "L'Enseignement libre est le plus grand patrimoine culturel du Liban," *Action* (February, 1961), pp. 1164-1167.

academic programs, courses, and degree requirements, strengthening the academic qualifications of faculty at Lebanese University, expanding student participation and decisionmaking powers in the academic, social, and administrative affairs of Lebanese universities, both private and public, and forbidding non-Lebanese students and teachers from participating in any kind of overt political activity, demonstration, or organization.[1]

Whatever the success or failure of the Kata'ib's effort to ameliorate Lebanon's socio-economic ills it has continued to promote the development of the human individual in the midst of diversity while respecting the special characteristics of each community. Towards this end it has worked closely with every Lebanese president since independence in undertaking measures aimed at both regional and social development, such as the expansion and modernization of industry and education, the implementation of a comprehensive employment policy, accelerated administrative and governmental reforms, large scale planning programs, and the introduction of new and innovative programs such as the Green Plan.

Extra-Systemic Dimension

The LKP operates on two levels in its extra-systemic attempt at gaining sustained support for the system. On the one hand, it strives to differentiate—some would say isolate—Lebanon from the other Arab states by emphasizing the distinctive rather than common characteristics between Lebanon and her neighbors. Optimally inter-Arab relations should consist of a dynamic social, political, and economic interaction among independent and equal units rather than the subordination of smaller and unequal units within a larger pan-Arab framework. Hence, as the LKP views it, internal Lebanese development could be greatly enhanced if neighboring powers not only recognized and accepted the permanence of Lebanon's political independence, but also worked to improve and strengthen inter-Arab socio-economic relationships. Reality, however, has more often than not made conflict rather than cooperation the guiding principle of inter-Arab relations.

On another and perhaps more important level the party has

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[1] *Tawsiyat Mu'tamar al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyah al-Hada 'Ashar* (resolutions of the eleventh Lebanese Kata'ib congress) (Shaturah: September 20-22, 1968), pp. 2-4.

sought to involve directly Lebanon's emigrant communities in the growth and development of the state. For the most part economic support is sought for specific industrial, business, or manufacturing projects and other development-related schemes aimed at improving state and society. Not infrequently, however, emigrant contributions are used for self-seeking ends either to perpetuate existing social or economic inequalities or to assist status quo elites in retaining power and control. Hence the border line between dynamic system maintenance in both its intra- and extra-systemic dimensions and static system maintenance is very thin and easily traversable.

The Role of Lebanese Emigrants

The Kata'ib hopes actively to involve Lebanese emigrants in the national life of the country in order to preserve, among other things, the "Lebanese" character of the state.

Since the Maronite-Druze massacres of 1860 Lebanese citizens, mostly Christians, have emigrated to various parts of the world especially to the Americas and Africa.[1] Four general emigration periods may be identified: (1) the early period from 1860 to 1900 when emigration began in earnest. No statistics are available as to the approximate numbers that actually departed; (2) the peak period from 1900 to 1914 during which over 225,000 departures were recorded with an average of 15,000 to 20,000 a year; (3) the inter-war period with a yearly average of 4,000 emigrants; and, finally, (4) the post-war period with an average of 2,000 to 3,000 departures annually.[2]

While various moral and political factors have been involved, the primary reason for emigration has been economic.[3] In many instances Lebanese abroad have prospered and presently constitute an important source of revenue helping the country alleviate its balance of payments deficit.[4] It is estimated that today, close to

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[1] See Joseph Saouda, "Libanais de l'Etranger: Colonies libanaises, émigration et immigration," *Action* (September, 1960), pp. 1030-1036. See also *Les Cahiers de l'Est*, December 21, 1968, p. 36.

[2] Mansour Challita, "Le Liban d'outre-mer: une influence mondiale à notre portée," *La Revue du Liban*, December 21, 1968, p. 36.

[3] See Philippe Daher Kfoury, *The Future of Our Country: Reflections Addressed to the Lebanese People* (Beirut, 1954), pp. 3-30. See also Elie Safa, *L'Emigration libanaise* (Beirut: Université de Saint Joseph, 1960).

[4] See Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Liberalism in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal*, 18 (Summer, 1964), p. 283.

two and a half million Lebanese and their descendants populate the five continents.

Most of the emigrés have settled in "Christian" countries helping to explain one dimension of the Christian predominance among the emigrants. Also important have been the educational and economic opportunities sought by extremely socially conscious and upward-mobile Lebanese Christians. In return Lebanese emigrants are considered an important element in the economic viability of the state as well as potential political forces in their host countries especially during periods when Lebanon's independence or political physiognomy seems threatened by other Arab states or Israel.

As early as 1945 the Kata'ib organized an emigré congress in Zahlah for the purpose of mobilizing emigrant support for Lebanon.[1] Another two congresses were held in 1946 (in Beirut) and 1955 (Beirut and Zahlah) while between 1948 and 1960 the LKP sent out six delegations to Africa and the Americas to establish contacts with Lebanese emigrants.[2] The most recent party delegation (July-September, 1969) visited Lebanese communities in Latin America and the United States for the purpose of soliciting funds and political support in behalf of the party's campaign against the use of Lebanon by Arab guerrilla organizations as a base for their attacks against Israel.

It was only after the 1958 civil war when Jumayyil was a minister in the "government of four" that the idea of creating a World Lebanese Union (WLU) was born. The LKP leader suggested the idea to president Fu'ad Shihab. When it was agreed upon, the government charged Jumayyil with the task of elaborating and carrying out the details for its implementation.[3]

An important factor influencing Jumayyil's determination to establish a world-wide Lebanese association was Israel's remarkable success in gaining universal Jewish support. The success of the Israeli "model" caused Jumayyil, in a revealing parallel, to write in 1959:

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[1] According to the party, upon the conclusion of this first conference the Lebanese government adopted its recommendation and changed the name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigration." See *al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah* (Beirut, 1958), p. 24.

[2] See *Action* (September 11, 1960), pp. 1054-1055 and *al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah*, p. 24.

[3] See "Message de Pierre Gemayel aux emigrés," *Action* (September, 1960), pp. 1022-1023.

> For a long time I have compared the strength of world-wide Jewry, which created Israel from nothing, to that of Lebanese abroad; a strength that rests not only in their number, but mainly in the ties which unite the one and a half million Lebanese abroad to the one and half million Lebanese in Lebanon.
>
> These ties are much closer than those which exist between Jews in the diaspora and Israel. The latter originated from different races and different countries living under different conditions; whereas the Lebanese all belong to the same race, the same land, the same family. It is from Lebanon that they all left for remote countries, whereas the Jews had to assemble from here and there to create the state of Israel.
>
> I am convinced that the position of the Lebanese in the world, and the esteem they are held in, will contribute to a better understanding of our problems; they are able to explain Arab problems to the world much more effectively than official delegations can.[1]

In 1960 the World Lebanese Union was officially established with a complete statutory document of seven chapters and nineteen articles.[2] The objectives of the WLU were defined as follows: (1) to reaffirm the link between Lebanese abroad and in Lebanon; (2) contribute to a better knowledge of Lebanon and further this knowledge throughout the world; (3) unify the Lebanese emigrants, strengthen the ties which unite them to Lebanon, and bring them closer to their homeland; (4) organize the emigrants' participation in economic projects as well as cultural and social enterprises both in Lebanon and in the countries to which they immigrated; and, finally, (5) to unify their efforts and coordinate them in order "to defend the Lebanese cause in international circles and give it the necessary publicity."[3]

Afraid that the numerical imbalance between Christians and Muslims may someday prove insurmountable, the party has even sought to extend citizenship to Lebanese emigrants. Even to this day the Arabic term *mughtarib* ("living, temporarily, away from home;" "absent") is used in preference to *muhajir* ("emigré," "emigrant") in describing Lebanese abroad. Towards this end the LKP, at the Third Emigrants Conference held in Zahlah on

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[1] Pierre Gemayel, "L'Agence libanaise," *Action* (September, 1959), pp. 688-689.

[2] For original text see "Les statuts de l'agence libanaise dans le monde," *Action* (September, 1960), pp. 1047-1051.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 1047-1048.

September 4, 1955, recommended that Lebanese nationality be recognized for those emigrants who left Lebanon after August, 1924, and who desire to remain Lebanese citizens; that a special law be enacted giving those who did not choose Lebanese citizenship before September 29, 1956, the right to receive it upon request; that emigrants be given representation in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies and amendments be introduced to that effect into present electoral laws; and, finally, that the Directorate of Emigrants be elevated to a Directorate General with full authority to carry out its reponsibilities including making it the implementing agency for the above recommendations.[1] All subsequent annual party congresses have included resolutions concerning the current status of Lebanese emigrants.[2]

Wherever Lebanese emigrants are found in any significant number the LKP has organized local sections for the purpose of arousing an active participatory spirit in Lebanese social, political, and economic development best translated in the form of generous remittances and political pressures on resident elites. The party's department of emigration and immigration seeks to coordinate the work of all foreign sections although, as is the case internally, sustained overseas support manifests itself only in times of severe strains and stresses upon the Lebanese system. The post-1967 period has witnessed an increased involvement of Lebanese emigrants in the internal affairs of the state as the country has been involved in a series of recurring crises. The LKP in particular has received generous financial support in recent years which has helped, among other things, to defray the high campaign costs of the 1968 parliamentary elections.[3]

Today's increased emigrant concern for Lebanon, however, is motivated less by a genuine desire to initiate or even assist social change than by the fear that unless given strong international and national support Lebanon will be radically transformed and its dominant, mostly Western-oriented elites overturned. This in fact is the fundamental dilemma confronting all those involved in maintaining and positively challenging the system: how can the widespread and intensely felt social frustrations and political

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[1] *Al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah*, p. 27.

[2] See *L'Orient*, November 30, 1958.

[3] Interview with Dr. Naif Bassil, party representative in the United States, New York, New York, September 25, 1969.

grievances brought out so acutely by the cataclysmic events of June 1967, be constructively resolved without at the same time overturning the basic fabric of Lebanese social and political life? Can the system in fact respond effectively to the multifaceted demands of a young and angry generation of Arab peasants, laborers, students, and refugees? If an already fragmented system is unable to respond effectively can any of its relevant constituent parts do so?

Under the present circumstances it seems rather unlikely that there can be a "functional" response to unbearable demands imposed upon the system. In fact as pressures for rapid social and political change have increased the LKP, as one important example, has made the rather easy slippage from dynamic system maintenance to static system maintenance. This is clearly illustrated in the first fida'iyin crisis of April 1969 when the LKP reassumed some of its former defensive and intransigent characteristics, neglecting in the process its decade-long attempt at achieving evolutionary forms of systemic change.

CHAPTER TEN

SYSTEM MAINTENANCE: STATIC

PALESTINIAN REVOLUTIONISM IN LEBANESE POLITICS

The Palestine Liberation Organization (*al-Fath*), the largest of the Palestinian resistance movements, was created in 1962. However, it was not until after the Arab defeat in June 1967 that it gained wide appeal among the Arab masses. Disillusioned with the Arab states' inability to promote and defend the Palestinian cause successfully, the more radical members of the Palestinian elite began creating their own revolutionary formula for national liberation.

This revolutionary formula required the development of a mass consciousness among Palestinians and an awareness of national identity to be concretely realized through armed struggle. According to al-Fath,

> the revolutionary vanguard must in order to succeed, transform itself into a mass movement. To do this the vanguard must awaken the Palestinian masses "not by verbal propaganda" but by "concrete example." Armed struggle is the only way to awaken mass consciousness.[1]

In the four years since the third Arab-Israeli war the Palestinian liberation movement has gained a large-scale and devoted following among Arab masses and elites alike. Successful guerrilla exploits against the Israelis have popularized the Palestinian commando into a new Arab folk hero. As a result Palestinians "no longer saw themselves, and were no longer seen by others, as mere 'refugees;' this involved a psychological transformation of wide practical consequences: a truly revolutionary spirit had swept the younger Arab generation and the guerrillas seized the initiative."[2]

In Lebanon, where over 200,000 Palestinian refugees reside, this new national consciousness as embodied in the guerrilla movement has critically challenged the system's political stability. Among the

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[1] Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 199.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 209.

Muslim masses and radical elites of all confessions the commandos represent a common revolutionary bond overshadowing existing ideological cleavages. For Lebanese nationalists, however, this revolutionary current can only bring possible disaster to the Lebanese state as now constituted. The threat seems especially ominous as refugee camps are converted into recruiting and training centers for future guerrillas.

The depth of the challenge to the Lebanese system is revealed in the series of recurring commando crises which have in recent years plunged the country into political turmoil. How the conflict is perceived by Lebanese and Arab elites, the nature of the Kata'ib response, and the resulting consequences for the system will be analyzed in the case of the first major crisis resulting from guerrilla attempts to expand their base of operations within Lebanese territory.

Commando Crisis and the Kata'ib Response

On April 22, 1969, a proposed public demonstration in support of Palestinian commandos killed in battle was cancelled.[1] Prime Minister Rashid Karami, under competing pressures from the left (Junbalat in particular) and the right (Hilf), reluctantly decreed the cancellation order. For its part the Triple Alliance, fearful that mass demonstrations would be exploited by leftists and other "extremist elements" in support of revolutionary ideologies, threatened a counter demonstration not, as it declared, to protest the commandos, but rather, to counter "subversive currents" in the country. A rival demonstration "would never be against the commandos," Jumayyil declared. He emphasized that the LKP was not counting on the government to defend Lebanon's interests "but on itself and honest citizens who are commandos in the defense of the motherland."[2]

Nevertheless, in defiance of the government ban, demonstrations did take place on April 23 resulting in bloody clashes between security forces and pro-commando marchers and demonstrators in Beirut, Sidon, and Bar Elias in the Biqaʿ.[3] An estimated fourteen

[1] *L'Orient*, April 23, 1969.

[2] *Al-ʿAmal*, April 23, 1969.

[3] The actual outbreak of violence seemed partly accidental. A planned burial ceremony for a fallen Fath commando was officially cancelled in accordance with

persons were killed, including two policemen, and eighty-two others wounded of whom eighteen were members of the Internal Security Force.[1] The same day a state of emergency was declared and the military command imposed a strict curfew on Beirut, Saida, Tyr, Ba'lbak, Tripoli, and Nabatiyah.[2]

The LKP's immediate reaction to the disturbances and resulting violence was predictable: "the issue is not between the Hilf and the Nahj," Jumayyil wrote in *al-'Amal*, "nor is it a problem of confessionalism; the real issue is Lebanon's integrity. In order to enable Lebanon to continue supporting the Palestinian cause, there must first of all always be a Lebanon."[3]

Non-Christian leaders, less concerned about the "conspiratorial" implications of the conflict, severely criticized Karami's actions. 'Abdullah al-Yafi and Sa'ib Salam, the two leading Sunnite political bosses of Beirut, for example, accused the government of overreacting and employing unnecessarily repressive measures against the demonstrators. In a marathon six-hour parliamentary session, deputies of varying political persuasion vehemently debated the immediate issue: what was to be the status of commando activities in Lebanon? According to Karami two general tendencies prevailed: "we could allow commando activities regardless of the consequences. On the other hand there are those who think that the commandos represent a danger to Lebanon. As a result, the government cannot take any one side without splitting the country."[4]

At the close of the session, the Premier announced his resignation effective immediately, as a consequence of which Lebanon was thrown into political turmoil. The resulting crisis was somewhat similar to the one that occurred three months earlier when al-Yafi's government resigned in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on

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the government decree but never publicly announced. Consequently while thousands waited for the ceremony to begin tensions between marchers and security forces increased. When the actual burial ceremony failed to materialize, slogans and chants in support of the commandos were begun by the restless crowd. Soon impatient policemen began indiscriminately to subdue demonstrators. For details see *L'Orient*, April 24, 1969.

[1] *Ibid.*, April 26, 1969.

[2] For details see *L'Orient*, April 24, 1969; *Daily Star*, April 24, 1969; *al-Nahar*, April 24, 1969; *International Herald Tribune*, April 24, 1969; *The New York Times*, April 24, 1969.

[3] *Al-'Amal*, April 24, 1969.

[4] *L'Orient*, April 25, 1969.

Beirut's international airport on December 28, 1968. Now, however, the central issue was not the composition or political coloration of a new government but, rather, involved the scope of commando actions and, more broadly, the direction of the Palestinian revolutionary struggle in Lebanon.

Al-Fath publicly charged that army measures to put down the demonstrations were clearly aimed against the guerrilla movement. It warned that such action should not be allowed to be repeated. Moreover, the guerrillas accused the Lebanese army of becoming "a force to protect the security of Zionism and called on the Lebanese people to protect the Palestinian revolution."[1] Such accusations found support among the rioters which included students, leftists, and Palestinian refugees. Moreover, al-Fath's categorical insistence on freedom of movement and supplies found a receptive audience among the young and the alienated.

The Kata'ib, representing majority Christian opinion, perceived the same situation in rather conventional terms. For example, it accused communists and Ba'thists, "not al-Fath or the fida'iyun," of provoking the disturbances. It especially denounced Syrian "infiltrators" for inciting riots and civil disturbances for the purpose of promoting their extremist Ba'thist ideology.[2] Unquestionably, as the conflict spread, Syrian guerrilla forces from al-Sa'iqah, the guerrilla wing of the ruling Ba'th party, exploited the situation to their advantage. Yet, the riots were not induced by the Syrians but rather erupted as a consequence of a genuine malaise among refugees and leftist groups about the non-participation of Lebanon in the Palestinian revolutionary resistance movement. The demonstrations also revealed the depth of popular dissatisfaction with Lebanon's non-role in the Israeli conflict and, more generally, the alienation of major elements in the population from the power structure and its established system. Most significant was the participation of university students. Their presence indicated not only ideological support of the Arab conflict with Israel but general rejection of Lebanese society's inequality and social callousness. Specifically, the student participation showed how deeply and how widely the fida'iyun cause has caught hold as the charismatic force in the Arab world.

A new revolutionary ethos that had spread over the younger Arab

[1] *International Herald Tribune*, April 26-27, 1969.

[2] *Al-'Amal*, April 29, 1969.

generation could no longer tolerate the status quo-ism of bourgeois Lebanon. Moreover, while a partial effort, not always successful, to ameliorate the social and economic conditions of the underprivileged Lebanese masses has been conducted for over twenty years, with the Kata'ib in the forefront of that effort, no sustained attempt had been made to rectify the abominable, inhuman conditions of the Palestinian refugees. For over twenty years this potentially explosive revolutionary mass has been involuntarily suppressed at all levels of human, political, economic, social, and cultural expression. Today the commandos have seized the initiative in reviving a genuine Palestinian national consciousness through revolutionary action. Non-Palestinian masses and elites, young and old alike have joined this new revolutionary effort. The Kata'ib, its Hilf allies, and most Christians have been slow to appreciate this altered condition in the political environment.[1]

By circumventing the fundamental issues the Kata'ib hoped to achieve a workable compromise; a *modus vivendi* which could permit the application of a more "Lebanese" solution to the problem. According to party officials the real issue in question "is not whether some Lebanese support Arab commando operations or not but whether troublemakers, with whom the commandos have nothing to do, should be allowed to sow dissention in the country."[2] The Kata'ib position could probably have been disregarded as the propaganda of the "ins" against the "outs" had there not been conclusive evidence of Syrian armed aggression against Lebanese military personnel.

Since 1968 three major guerrilla organizations have been operating from Lebanese territory, each independent of and sometimes in opposition to the others: al-Sa'iqah (thunderbolt), the Ba'th-controlled Syrian guerrilla organization under the leadership of Syrian ex-army officers; al-Fath (reverse acronym for *harakat tahrir*

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[1] Whatever verbal support the Kata'ib has given to the Palestinian cause there has never been any question that, for various political, economic, religious, and ideological reasons, the party has been unsympathetic to the refugees and their plight. A 1958 pamphlet on the Palestine question stated that "the Kataeb was practical in its approach to the Palestinian question. To choose between two evils the Arabs should have accepted the United Nations partition decision of 1947, since they were not in a position to force their own solution. No attention was paid to such remarks and the result was the Palestinian tragedy with the refugees constituting a great burden on Lebanon." *Al-Kataeb al-Lubnaniah* (Beirut, 1958), pp. 4-5.

[2] *Al-'Amal*, April 30, 1969.

filastin, the Palestine liberation organization, meaning victory), the largest and most popular of the commando groups under the direction of Yasir ʿArafat; and the radical, Marxist-inspired Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) headed by Dr. George Habash.[1]

Al-Fath has no declared political ambitions on Lebanon. ʿArafat claims to be non-political and puts the liberation of Palestine ahead of social revolution. But he leads a people who has lost its homeland. His is a movement of men and women who believe they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. Such circumstances invite revolution and challenge the political status quo. Al-Saʿiqah, on the other hand, seeks, among its other objectives, the overthrow of Lebanon's "reactionary" system and uses the Palestinian cause as an excuse for its guerrilla activities. All the commando groups desire transit rights through Lebanon's rugged southeastern frontier with Israel, access to refugees for recruiting purposes, and immunity from government control.

While the LKP directed its attack specifically at "communist and Baʿthist troublemakers"[2] (that is, the PFLP and al-Saʿiqah) it was, in fact, challenging all commando activities in Lebanon. As al-Saʿiqah troops began infiltrating into Lebanon in greater numbers, Kata'ib delegations were sent out to the Arab League and the United Nations to express Lebanon's anxiety over Syrian military operations. Shifting the issue from its internal focus where in fact the core of the problem lay, Jumayyil warned that the current crisis

> is not a Lebanese internal crisis but a difference between two independent and sovereign states in which one is openly attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the other. The whole problem is clear: it is no longer the actions of the fida' iyun; it is our system, our regime, our institutions which are desired under the cover of Palestinian commandos and the sacred cause of Palestine.[3]

Subsequent clashes between Lebanese military forces and al-Saʿiqah generated new support for anti-commando elements as fallen government soldiers became martyrs overnight. Nevertheless, the distinction between al-Fath and al-Saʿiqah was in no way being blurred; universal condemnation of Syrian guerrillas did not imply a rejection of al-Fath and its objectives.

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[1] *L'Orient*, May 1, 1969.
[2] See *al-ʿAmal*, May 2, 1969.
[3] *L'Orient*, May 3, 1969.

Gradually three distinct positions on the commando issue evolved: (1) complete support of commando activities in Lebanon irrespective of future consequences; (2) elimination of all commando bases and activities with continued diplomatic and political support for the Palestinian struggle; (3) coordination (*tansiq*) between guerrillas and the Lebanese military on the degree, scope, time, and place of commando actions against Israeli positions. As the newly designated Prime Minister assigned the task of creating a workable government, Karami was unwilling to form a cabinet until at least a limited consensus on the commando issue had been reached. As expected, attitudes polarized according to sect with most Muslims supporting the first position, most Christians supporting the second, and a mixed minority defending the tansiq approach.[1]

For its part the Kata'ib asserted its traditional challenger role in a somewhat uncompromising fashion. Jumayyil stated that the Hilf would not enter into any government that would allow Palestinian commandos to have bases in Lebanon and regular forces in the country. Similarly, the Alliance would put a condition that any government formed must take the necessary measures to deter Israeli occupation of any part of Lebanon.[2] Thus the tansiq formula, later to be adopted as government policy, was initially rejected by the Hilf.[3]

The commandos themselves were equally obstinate as reflected in their demands made to the Lebanese government. Al-Fath submitted eight conditions as the basis for a compromise: (1) freedom of action for the fida'iyun without any conditions, as was the case for the Algerian FLN in Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco during Algeria's war of independence; (2) release of all Palestinians arrested during the April 23 demonstrations (estimated at 400); (3) withdrawal of all military restrictions in and around Palestinian refugee camps as well as complete freedom of movement for commandos in these camps; (4) rejection of the tansiq principle since coordination of commando activities with the Lebanese army would contradict the need for secrecy which is fundamental to all resistance move-

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[1] It had been reported that on the day of the April 23 riots a "Palestinian mob attacked a church in Tyre and several counter-demonstrations by Christian groups were staged in various parts of the country." This was the only concrete example of a distinctly sectarian encounter resulting from the commando problem. *International Herald Tribune*, April 26-27, 1969.

[2] See *al-'Amal*, May 7, 1969.

[3] See *ibid.*, May 17, 1969.

ments; (5) the centralization of all resistance activities in the Palestine Liberation Organization; (6) government acknowledgment of fida'iyun authority to administer and control their own activities; (7) rejection of any solution achieved without direct PLO authorization and approval; (8) a refusal to be assigned specific portions of Lebanese territory as bases of operation for the commandos.[1]

The government's demands included: (1) no fida'iyun camps on Lebanese territory; (2) commandos may not carry arms in public places; (3) absolutely no commando interference into internal political affairs; (4) the use of Lebanese territory *only* for transit rights; and (5) close cooperation and coordination between Lebanese military authorities and the guerrilla organizations.[2]

The initial confrontation produced little in the way of compromise. In fact while competing Lebanese leaders argued among themselves as to what steps should be taken the masses were becoming increasingly radicalized. The April riots reflected growing impatience with government immobilism. The continuing commando-army clashes in the countryside further heightened political tensions. As one well-informed journalist observed, "Lebanon [was now facing] the gravest crisis of its twenty-six years as an independent nation, a moment of peril far deeper than that of 1958..."[3]

In a series of private meetings with 'Arafat during the second week of May President Charles Hilu and head of the army Emile Bustani stuck to their position that Lebanon, as a sovereign state, could never allow a military force of outsiders to operate across her borders without the express consent of the government. For its part the commando delegation rejected "tutelage of the Palestinian revolution," "restrictions on the revolution," and "limitation of the area of operation of the commandos." It said that the "counter-revolution" in Lebanon was now in trouble because the "Lebanese people would never agree to the suppression of the Palestinian revolution and would frustrate imperialist plans."[4]

It was this kind of revolutionary rhetoric which alarmed Hilf leaders. While the Alliance was determined to sustain the president's

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[1] *L'Orient*, May 12, 1969.

[2] *Ibid.* Both positions are further detailed and evaluated in *L'Orient*, May 14, 1969.

[3] Alfred Friendly writing in the *International Herald Tribune*, May 12, 1969.

[4] See *al-Anwar* (Beirut, pro-Egyptian), May 7-12, 1969. For the Kata'ib's reactions to the Hilu-'Arafat discussions see *al-'Amal*, May 15, 1969.

position, which closely paralleled its own, it wanted the Lebanese head of state to know the full implications and dangers of a continued guerrilla presence in Lebanon. Therefore, in a May 15 meeting with Hilu, the LKP head underlined his party's growing concern over the possibility of Israeli retaliatory raids against Lebanon and some of its major cities such as Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, and Zahlah. He also pointed out Israel's possible interest in southern Lebanon's fertile soil, especially the water resources of the Litani and Hasbani rivers. Even if the Israelis did not occupy the area, Jumayyil contended, they might frighten away or intimidate Lebanese villagers to the point where a Palestinian refugee problem would be compounded by a Lebanese refugee problem. He also attracted Hilu's attention to the fact that 50 per cent of the population, that is, the supposedly Christian half of the Lebanese citizenry, was against commando activities in Lebanon, and that they might react violently to continued Israeli raids against Lebanese territory. In any case, Jumayyil concluded, commando operations tended to weaken an already unstable economy.[1]

Among certain dissident leftists (Junbalat, for example) the fida'iyun issue was being exploited for specific political ends. The current crisis afforded radical outsiders the opportunity to weaken existing institutional structures in the hope of eliminating basic social and economic inequalities. Moreover, with an eye to the August 1970 presidential elections, competing political groups and notables were attempting to establish a popular base among the leftist oriented and pro-commando urban masses. The result of fusing the internal power struggle with the broader and more volatile issue of guerrilla legitimacy in Lebanon worked to further intensify political and ideological cleavages along relatively identifiable ethno-sectarian lines. In addition, the fragile Muslim-Christian entente seemed endangered by the linkage of the internal and external crises. According to some, while a healthy disagreement over commando tactics was acceptable Lebanese national unity should not come into question. The preservation of national unity was particularly important at this stage of Lebanese development when the country's vulnerability was especially evident.

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[1] See *L'Orient*, May 16, 1969. For the implications of the commando problem on internal Lebanese politics see Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," *Middle East Journal*, 23 (Summer, 1969), p. 301.

Hilf representatives argued for the creation of a national coalition cabinet empowered to resolve the commando dilemma. Leftist opponents were hesitant to commit themselves to a government policy that would circumscribe guerrilla activities and thereby weaken their popular base among the masses. Both Hilu and Karami had concurred that no viable government could be formed until a precise agreement on the fida'iyun question had been reached among all the relevant parties involved.

As positions hardened, the threat of widening an already expanding internal schism caused Kata'ib leaders to reassess the situation in the hope of reaching a workable compromise. Within the Alliance itself there were divergent opinions on how the crisis could best be resolved.[1] Jumayyil, for one, had hoped to work with the premier-designate in arriving at a mutually satisfactory compromise. He was not unaware of the inherent dangers of prolonging the government crisis while guerrilla military units continued to undermine Lebanese authority in the countryside. "The problem which exists," Jumayyil told reporters after an hour-long meeting with Karami, "is much more serious than the question of the formation of a government, because it involves the existence of this country, its independence and future."[2]

Post-1967 threats to the system required a fundamental reordering of tactical priorities on the part of the LKP. Chronic challenges to the system, by alienating a significant segment of the Muslim elite, weakened rather than fortified the national unity concept. Unlike previous crisis periods the Palestinian struggle aroused intense reactions among the masses who now had the active support of armed guerrilla groups capable of seriously challenging the country's legitimate authority. Systemic stability, according to the LKP, required common acceptance of a common destiny. Hence the need for broadened areas of cooperation.

Eddé, on the other hand, representing the more intransigent wing of the Hilf, reiterated his party's opposition to any form of compromise or accommodation with fida'iyun groups. Sham'un remained uncommitted to either position although he made no secret of his dislike of the commandos. A potentially destructive schism within the Hilf was averted by the mediation efforts of Patriarch al-Ma'ushi.

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[1] See *al-'Amal*, May 18, 1969.
[2] *Ibid.*, May 27, 1969.

In a series of luncheon meetings at the patriarch's winter residence in Bkirki the Maronite leader arbitrated in favor of the Kata'ib's accommodative approach.[1] It should be remembered that while relations between the Kata'ib and the Maronite clergy have always been extremely cordial the party has not been, as some of its detractors claim, in "holy collusion" with the patriarchate. The Kata'ib has consistently consulted the Maronite patriarch on issues of national and communal importance; it has also sought his advice and support on specific issues of mutual interest. The Patriarch's office, however, has never dictated policy to the Kata'ib. In fact, when al-Ma'ushi came out in open opposition to Sham'un and his loyalist forces in 1958 the LKP was not hesitant to denounce his actions. After the civil war relations though temporarily strained were restored on a new footing. Kata'ib policy now sought to cooperate with Bkirki when it was in the interest of both parties. There was no compunction, however, to disagree with the patriarch on specific political or social issues. Since 1967 the Maronite clergy has been a close ally of the Hilf.

That the Triple Alliance opted for moderation was a result of its awareness that this crisis was inherently more explosive than any previous crisis since 1958. Similarly, by moving towards a middle position close to that of Karami and Hilu the Hilf sought to underline Junbalat's obstinacy; he rather than they could now be blamed for prolonging the crisis by assuming a radically uncompromising posture. Within establishment politics Junbalat represented the polar extreme of Raymond Eddé without the benefit of a moderate intermediary like Jumayyil. In reference to Junbalat's intransigence the LKP leader wrote on May 29 that "certain political figures in the country were trying to change the Lebanese system and create in its place a socialist state on the model of Syria, Algeria, and Iraq. The Alliance will not allow such change to take place."[2]

Junbalat was unwilling to cooperate with Karami unless there was a clear statement of support for commando activities. *Al-'Amal* replied that "Lebanon could not expose her sovereignty nor her security to danger even to benefit a cause as sacred as the Palestinian one." Only two options faced Lebanon: either the army forced the commandos out or they left willingly. With or without Arab support

[1] *L'Orient*, May 27, 1969.
[2] *Al-'Amal*, May 29, 1969.

Lebanon must take the initiative, and for this purpose a representative government had to be formed.[1]

Government and military leaders concurred with the Hilf appraisal and gave their support to Hilu's speech of May 31. "It is our duty not to provide the enemy with pretexts," the Lebanese president told his people in a major nation-wide address, "which it uses, under the guise of retaliatory action, to execute its expansionist plans at the expense of Lebanon." The continued deterioration of the crisis was not due to Lebanon's failure to participate in a "noble cause," Hilu argued, but, rather, to the continued efforts of certain parties to impose exclusively upon Lebanon a fait accompli. He concluded with a reaffirmation of Lebanon's "sacred right to sovereignty and security."[2]

Lebanese *'ulama'* or Muslim religious leaders voiced their displeasure with the president's speech which they regarded as reflecting the views of one fraction of the Lebanese population.[3] Most Christian nationalists, however, were relieved by Hilu's explicit commitment to defend Lebanon's national interests above and beyond both Palestinian and Arab nationalist considerations.

As expected Arab reactions were unfavorable. Cairo's semi-official government daily, *al-Ahram*, for example, criticized the Hilf for its "isolationist" attitude and denounced its "foreign elements" which were being "used to serve Hilf interests." According to editor-in-chief Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the real cause of the Lebanese crisis was no longer the problem of Palestinian commando activities from Lebanese territory but the political opportunism of a minority hoping to isolate Lebanon from the Arab world. This minority, according to Haykal, was going against the will of Lebanese workers, students, intellectuals, farmers, and laborers.[4]

In any case the Hilu regime was determined to stand its ground. Towards the second month of the crisis the Lebanese head of state, in a comprehensive policy statement, reaffirmed his position that commandos would not be permitted unrestricted access to refugees or bases in Lebanon.[5]

[1] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1969.
[2] *Daily Star*, June 1, 1969.
[3] See *al-Nahar*, June 2, 1969.
[4] *Al-Ahram*, June 17, 1969.
[5] The full text is reproduced in *L'Orient* and the *Daily Star*, among others, June 24, 1969.

By June 20 it was estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 guerrilla forces, mostly from al-Sa'iqah and al-Fath and camped in the foothills of Mount Hermon, had been evacuated by Lebanese government troops.[1] This unquestionably was a victory for the government and its Hilf supporters. Moreover, it succeeded in reasserting the government's supremacy over all unauthorized guerrilla movements. Had the Lebanese government had the sufficient military strength to oversee all commando activities it probably could have successfully sustained its position. However, guerrilla units continued to infiltrate Lebanese territory as a means of attacking Israeli border villages. An August 11 Israeli reprisal raid against commando camps in the Mount Hermon region[2] revived political tensions. Again Lebanese troops clashed with Palestinian refugees which further aggravated the existing crisis.

Although Jumayyil spoke of the possibility of passive resistance, civil disobedience, the refusal of civil servants to work, and the refusal of citizens to pay taxes[3] as means of protesting guerrilla actions and government immobilism there was much doubt that such measures could significantly alter commando attitudes. If anything, it would occasion a more serious rupture among opposing political groups.

When government troops sought physically to suppress pro-commando demonstrations in the refugee camps another armed conflict ensued.[4] Again Karami, as caretaker premier, resigned his post and plunged the country into further political turmoil. Only by the intervention of Egypt's president Nasser was a truce finally arranged and the tansiq principle agreed upon. On November 25 Karami finally succeeded in forming a new government which included, among others, both Maurice and Pierre Jumayyil as well as a representative of the LNP. On December 7 the cabinet was confirmed, thus ending the longest political crisis in the nation's history: 214 days without a government.

The fundamental dilemma nevertheless remains. For many Lebanese the guerrilla movement has become something of a sacred cause which must be supported at any cost. For the Kata'ib and its like-minded supporters the guerrillas represent a revolutionary force

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[1] *Al-Nahar*, June 20, 1969.
[2] *Le Monde*, August 11, 1969.
[3] *The New York Times*, August 29, 1969.
[4] For full details see *ibid.*, October 21-November 25, 1969.

of frightful proportions; a force capable of greatly weakening the system either by inviting drastic Israeli attacks or by expanding its popular base throughout most of Lebanon and thereby undermining the system's legitimacy. With little to no support from the international community and numerically overwhelmed by pan-Arab forces Lebanese Christians feel especially threatened by these new circumstances. The Kata'ib's effort to utilize legitimate institutional means to resolve political differences seems almost irrelevant under conditions where one party—the commandos and their allies—has no interest in the system's viability. Extra-institutional means of response whether para-military or civil also have little chance of success since relatively well-armed and well-trained guerrilla forces residing within the country's borders and having significant logistical support from neighboring Syria are ever ready to combat any movement seeking their elimination.[1]

In any case, whatever path it follows it appears that the LKP is only involved in a temporary holding action. Even its previous efforts at creating a viable Lebanese political community and advancing meaningful programs of social reform and political development—dynamic system maintenance—have had to be subordinated, for the present at least, to the more immediate task of preserving the system—static system maintenance. As chronic political crises continue to engulf Lebanon it seems unlikely that the Kata'ib either alone or in combination with other moderate elements can for long prevent the system's seemingly inevitable transformation which can occur under three possible conditions: (1) civil war resulting from an outright conflict between Christians and Muslims, Lebanese nationalists and Arab nationalists, government forces and the guerrillas over the role of the Palestinian revolutionary move-

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[1] The first direct armed confrontation between Palestinian guerrillas and Kata'ib firaq occurred during the last week of March (25-29), 1970, when LKP para-military units in the predominantly Christian village of Kahhalah about ten miles east of Beirut on the main highway to Damascus, clashed with a commando funeral procession as it was making its way through the town. Sporadic fighting between the two groups, which had spread to Beirut and its suburbs, continued for nearly a week until Interior minister Junbalat succeeded in reaching an accord with Jumayyil and the commandos. At the end of the conflict twenty-one persons were reported killed the majority of whom were Palestinians and their supporters. Thus, on a small and limited scale, the Kata'ib exhibited its determination to directly confront and do battle with commando groups. Moreover, it was the first test of its military preparedness against the better armed and battle-tested guerrillas. For details see *The New York Times*, March 26-29, 1970.

ment in Lebanese politics; (2) Israeli attack and occupation of southern Lebanon as a means of halting guerrilla activities against its frontier communities. The resulting political chaos would itself precipitate a civil war or, at minimum, a military takeover with the possible overthrow of the whole democratic parliamentary system; or (3) armed invasion by Syrian guerrilla forces in collusion with al-Fath and other pan-Arab elements within Lebanon.

The Prospects Surveyed

It would be foolhardy indeed to predict the demise of Lebanon's political system given its historical capacity to avoid, sometimes only by narrow margins, political disintegration even in the face of seemingly uncontrollable strains, stresses, and dysfunctions. Such experiences may have created over time an internal capacity to regulate systemic stress of whatever magnitude.

Nevertheless, Lebanese society, especially since 1967, has been undergoing immense internal strains. These strains transcend the immediate problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its commando derivative but concerns more importantly the eventual form of social organization that Lebanese society will adopt in order to meet the multi-faceted demands of stability, modernization, and democracy.

Hence the real tragedy of the current political situation lies not merely in the polarization of Lebanese society between pro-Palestinian "revolutionaries" and pro-Lebanese "republicans" but in the diversion of essential political energies from the tasks of social organization and political development to those solely of protection, preservation, and perpetuation. Inevitably such a process weakens the legitimacy of existing political institutions and renders Lebanon's multiconfessionality vulnerable to alternate, non-democratic modes of social organization.

Increased tensions in the Middle East and the recurring pattern of internal political crises have weakened the possibility of having a pluralist pattern prevail, while concurrently giving strength to the other alternative forms of social and political organization. Thus while the Kata'ib has been relatively successful in preserving the system's essential physiognomy against internal and, to a lesser extent, external threats it has done so at a high price; its pluralist approach towards Lebanese society is slowly being undermined as various elements within society assume extremist and polarized

positions. As the limited consensus that already exists begins to break down the possible development of a nonpluralist form of socio-political organization greatly increases.

The problem for the LKP and other Lebanese pluralists thus becomes one of response: how can an important but nonetheless minority party effectively respond to the increasingly dominant position of assimilationists within the system? Has the system and its actors been so transformed that what was formerly dynamic system maintenance has now become static system maintenance? What relevance does positive system challenging have when institutional rules no longer have the same universal impact on the allocation of authority and power? Under such conditions of systemic change what alternatives are available to the Kata'ib? It can, for example, continue to support the status quo by all means possible. This could entail, among other things, the request for direct international assistance of whatever magnitude. Undoubtedly this would alienate seriously relevant leftist elites, whether Muslim or Christian, to the point of effecting the very kind of radical change that the LKP wishes to avoid. Also it would probably fail as a static system maintenance tactic since Lebanon seems to have no specific politico-military commitment from the international community. Even French support, once dependable and secure, seems uncertain since the passing of president Charles De Gaulle.

More promising perhaps, especially if the party remains committed to the development of a genuine pluralist democracy, would be to begin a concerted effort at broadening political, social, economic, and educational opportunities on a mass basis. Thus if the LKP hopes to see Lebanon transformed from a segmented plural society into an institutionally heterogeneous nation-state, thereby enabling effective modernization and long-term political legitimacy to develop, it must work, with the largest cross-confessional representation possible, toward the following three objectives:

(1) establish and then enforce civil and political equality throughout the country, thereby eliminating all ethno-confessional, regional, or elite privileges in the public sphere;
(2) provide uniform schooling and equal social, occupational, economic, and political opportunities for all sub-national groups and cultural sections in the society; and, finally,

(3) enforce the basic freedoms of worship, speech, movement, association, and work.[1]

[1] These are the objectives recommended by M. G. Smith for all segmented plural societies. See M. G. Smith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism," in *Pluralism in Africa*, ed. by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 60.

CONCLUSION

The Lebanese Kata'ib Party represents a rather unique phenomenon in Middle Eastern politics. Inspired by and formed along the lines of para-military fascist youth movements of the 1920's and 1930's in Europe and the Middle East, derided, harassed, and not infrequently persecuted both by the supposedly sympathetic French mandatory power and the unquestionably hostile pan-Arab and pan-Syrian elements in Lebanon, internally shackled by its own obsessive commitment to a "Christian" Lebanon, and severely circumscribed by the inefficiency of its political, organizational, and programmatic configurations, the LKP managed, over the next three and a half decades, to successfully transform itself into an organization which is today considered the single most powerful independent political force in Lebanon.

This transformational process, as we have seen, was a consequence of both voluntary and involuntary forces exerted, often simultaneously, within both party and system. Greatly assisting this transformation was the relatively tranquil political atmosphere prevailing in Lebanon during the 1943-1958 period which enabled the Kata'ib to adapt and adjust its internal mechanisms, both structural and human, within an evolutionary framework. Concomitantly there existed important international influences during this period which, sharing the Kata'ib's desire to see Lebanon remain a pro-Western parliamentary democracy within its multiconfessional structure, actively supported Lebanon's democratic elements. When those influences eventually waned or were discredited, the LKP had, through trial and error, managed to develop a respectable and effective political party organization ready to assume the precarious tasks of preserving, within a different although not totally antithetical ideological and philosophical construct, Lebanon's democratic pluralism and pro-Western orientation.

With its credibility as a political force assured the party began to broaden its commitment to relatively large-scale social and economic change and adopted programs, policies, and proposals towards that end. In short, the LKP had managed to become the most sophisticated and influential player in a system whose rules and regulations

it had helped create and had vigorously defended, if only from the "outside." As we have seen the 1958 civil war and subsequent counterrevolution transformed the Kata'ib from a concerned observer to an influential participant in the Lebanese political system.

What enabled the Kata'ib to succeed where others failed was its ability to operate according to a realistic appraisal of Lebanon's history, culture, politics, and society. Where pan-Arab and pan-Syrian nationalists developed a program for present and future action on the basis of mostly mythical or much contorted distant and not-so-distant Arab history of the region, the LKP acted on the basis of contemporary historical processes. Even its attempt to rationalize Lebanon's Phoenician ancestry as a basis for an ongoing nationalist ideology failed to achieve its desired purpose. Only when belief system and ideology concurred with the realities of multiconfessional pluralism did Lebanonism gain any credibility and popularity among the Lebanese.

Another important dimension of the party's ability to survive has been the quality and character of its leadership. While it has not produced intellectuals of exceptional stature (the late Maurice Jumayyil probably being the sole exception) the Kata'ib has had the good fortune of being directed by sincere, dedicated, and, for the most part, honest men. While this dedication has at times overflowed into fanaticism, it has not done so frequently enough to detract from the basically high opinion that most Lebanese have of the Kata'ib leaders both at the national and local levels. Whatever may be said of the LKP, both favorable and unfavorable, it is generally agreed that its leaders are men of principle whose primary objective is to insure the wellbeing of Lebanon and all its citizens. In a region where duplicity, corruption, and dishonesty in public and private life are the rule rather than the exception, where coups and countercoups occur with almost boring regularity, and where states are led either by playboy monarchs, feudal amirs, petty dictators, or military autocrats, men of principle with dedication and purpose are indeed rare species.

It is this quality which has remained constant over the years while the rest of the party underwent immense changes. It is thus not surprising that sympathetic observers of the Lebanese political scene have wished that the LKP remain for the most part outside the arena of total or even transient power where it is felt its efficacity

as the country's political conscience, if not its guardian, would be seriously compromised. If we take seriously Lord Acton's dictum that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely then there may be a certain amount of verisimilitude in these observations.

It would indeed be a tragedy if this progressive and forward-looking party with its quality leadership, dedicated members, and countless followers, supporters, and sympathizers were to regress, as a consequence of the political disarray and social unrest currently characterizing the region, in its stated objectives of achieving an enduring modernization, democracy, and stability.

It is difficult to surmise during this critical period in Lebanese political history whether or not forces outside the control of either the Kata'ib or its like-minded allies will overcome its evolutionary attempts to achieve meaningful social and political change or whether it will once again make the necessary adaptation if not full transformation to the existing conditions and thus manage not only to survive the current crisis but achieve its desired sociopolitical objectives. If the past thirty-five years are any guide the latter seems more likely to occur than the former.

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